Non Reductive Physicalism
“‘And that’, he argued, ‘means that somewhere in them is intelligence.
It can’t be seated in a brain because dissection shows nothing like a brain
–but that doesn’t prove there isn’t something that does a brain’s job”
(Wyndham, 1951/2008, p. 47)
Suppose it is a nice sunny day, and you decide to linger in the sun; after a few minutes you may feel thirsty and you look for some refreshment. It can be said that this situation triggers two ‘situations’; on the one hand there is a physical process: the body’s reaction to heat, and on the other hand, there is a ‘mental effect’: the experience of heat like being thirsty. The relationship between the two situations has been the source of many debates within
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My own sympathies, supported by arguments like the completeness of physics (Papineau, 2001) –among others- and empirical research is with the physicalist approach. However, one of the problems with physicalism is its reductivism. For example, there is the claim that consciousness is no more than a brain process (Smart, 1959); however, the problem of these reductive approaches is to find the physical process or the physical laws that can explain the mental in those terms. There are strong arguments against such reduction: (Putnam, 1967, Davidson, 1970, Fodor, 1974) with the ideas of multiple realizability, special sciences and anomalous monism are all critical of reductive views, consequently a form of physicalism in non-reductive terms is not just plausible, but a promissory alternative of understanding the mental in physical terms; for instance, Baker (2008) suggests that “nonreductive materialism holds that the mental is ontologically part of the material world; yet, mental properties are causally efficacious without being reducible to physical properties” (Baker, 2009, p. 109).
It is argued in this thesis that physicalist ontology can be secure without the constraints and problems of reductionism, through this non-reductive physicalism (NRP for short). Moreover, if identity theory can be reconciled with a view such as functionalism then non-reductive physicalism can be argue it is a robust
In his writings, “A Contemporary Defense of Dualism,” J.P. Moreland argues the point that the mind and brain are separate from each other. It seems as a quick thought that both are the same. However, the mind deals with ideas, thoughts and hopes. The brain is made up of the neural process. Throughout the entire argument, Moreland tries to prove the theory of physicalism, which is the idea that only things that exist are composed of matter. His explanation is that the soul doesn’t exist and the brain controls everything.
I would like to begin this paper by addressing what question I hope to answer through the entirety of this paper: is the mind physical? As simple as this question may seem to be, there still, to this day, is not a definite answer. There are, mostly, two approaches to answering this problem, through dualism or physicalism. The dualist, for the purposes of this paper, simply believes that the mind and the body are not equal and therefore, they are not one in the same. The physicalist, however, would come back to say that there are no such things as non-physical objects and therefore, they would conclude that the body and the mind are both physical. After weighing on both sides of this argument, I am going to defend the physicalist ideas and
The social constructionist theory. Not too long ago did we study this and grace our minds with the reading by Fausto Sterling entitled Dueling Dualism. As a recap can anyone tell me what the four features of a social constructionist approach are? Ah yes so as they said, The four features of a social constructionist perspective are as follows; sex is not given by nature, but is produced, culture, cultural meanings and history play a part in constructing the differences in sex, operations of power, such as big business and medicine, are central to the social construction of sex, and lastly if sex is constructed, then it can be reconstructed. These four constructs apply not only to sex, but to gender and sexuality as well and are the reason that the socially constructed identities or
Physicalism is a philosophical theory that attempts to solve the mind-body problem with its explanation of the results of the interactions between our brains and our bodies. Physicalism explains that everything in the universe is made up of
In my mind, dualism is a more attractive view to take when considering the mind-brain issue. The idea that the mind is a separate entity and that it is independent of the physical body is the central point of dualism. One reason it appeals to me is because of my religion, my Catholic upbringing. Introspection is another good reason why dualism is a little more logical to me than materialism.. It logically explains why the mind and brain are separate. Also, the divisibility argument raises good points to allow dualism to appear to be the more attractive idea in my eyes.
(P1) In this paper I will be explaining the Knowledge Argument against Physicalism. I will be stating each of the premises and giving an explanation on why they are plausible. Then, I will choose the strongest reply to the Knowledge Argument--the Ability Reply. I will be explaining and justifying the objection to the Ability Reply.
The Knowledge Argument by Jackson is one of the main threats to Physicalism. Physicalism says that everything that is or could ever exist is ultimately physical in nature. The Knowledge Argument claims that there are truths about consciousness that cannot be deduced from the complete physical truth. Lewis’ response on the other hand, disagrees with the Knowledge Argument. In this paper I will address the Knowledge Argument and Lewis’ response to it.
In denying that the mind and mental properties, like qualia, are nonphysical things, mind-brain theory objects to both substance and property dualism. Therefore it is a physicalist approach to the philosophy of
The Knowledge Argument is Frank Jackson’s direct challenge to physicalism. Physicalism is the belief that the world, as well as our knowledge of the world, is entirely physical. When Jackson first proposed this argument, it was widely recognized as one of the key components in discrediting physicalism, and is still thought of as such by many philosophers today. Jackson attempts to dismantle physicalism by providing a few counter examples, and goes on to say why, in these cases, physicalism simply cannot be true. Jackson begins his argument by recognizing the fact that ‘physical information’ has provided us with much of the information we have about ourselves and the world.
There are two main theories that make up the knowledge argument. The first is Physicalism, (or better known as materialism) which is the thesis that “All facts are dependent upon physical processes.”(Smart) The other main stance taken is property dualism. The thesis of property dualism states that there are “Non-physical properties of physical substances” (Calef) or that there are physical and mental properties. In this article, I will defend the stance of property dualism by acknowledging objections and replying to these objections to show why the argument for property dualism works.
The mind is perhaps the most fascinating part of the human body due to its complexity and ability to rationalize. In essence, the mind-body problem studies the relation of the mind to the body, and states that each human being seems to embody two unique and somewhat contradictory natures. Each human contains both a nature of matter and physicality, just like any other object that contains atoms in the universe. However, mankind also is constituted of something beyond materialism, which includes its ability to rationalize and be self-aware. This would imply that mankind is not simply another member of the world of matter because some of its most distinctive features cannot be accounted for in this manner. There are obvious differences between physical and mental properties. Physical properties are publically accessible, and have weight, texture, and are made of matter. Mental properties are not publically accessible, and have phenomenological texture and intentionality (Stewart, Blocker, Petrik, 2013). This is challenging to philosophers, because man cannot be categorized as a material or immaterial object, but rather a combination of both mind and body (Stewart, Blocker, Petrik, 2013). Man embodies mind-body dualism, meaning he is a blend of both mind and matter (Stewart, Blocker, Petrick, 2013). The mind-body problem creates conflict among philosophers, especially when analyzing physicalism in its defense. This paper outlines sound
A physicalist is one who believes that all information is physical. This is a view that sees all factual knowledge as that which can be formulated as a statement about physical objects and activities. Thus, the language of science can be reduced to third
The mind-body problem is an age-old topic in philosophy that questions the relationship between the mental aspect of life, such as the field of beliefs, pains, and emotions, and the physical side of life which deals with matter, atoms, and neurons. There are four concepts that each argue their respective sides. For example, Physicalism is the belief that humans only have a physical brain along with other physical structures, whereas Idealism argues that everything is mind-based. Furthermore, Materialism argues that the whole universe is purely physical. However, the strongest case that answers the commonly asked questions such as “Does the mind exist?” and “Is the mind your brain?” is Dualism.
neurophysiological is to say the science of neurons dealing with living matter such as the
Dualism is a broad term that can encompass many areas within philosophy itself. In aspect to metaphysics, it classifies the types of entities in the world into two subcategories, physical and non physical substance. While this may appear to be a very wide and ambiguous opinion, it becomes very specific in regards to our own existence. Paul Churchland puts it very explicitly in his book Matter and Consciousness, and defines dualism as the idea that, “the essential nature of conscious intelligence resides in something nonphysical” (Churchland 1). Though dualism is a highly regarded and popular view on the state of existence, its core arguments present an array of problems that detract from the credibility of its