The Three Concepts Of Donald Davidson's Anomalous Monism

In a series of relatively simple though complexly-worded (out of necessity) thought experiments regarding body-swapping and changes to memory and the mind, Bernard Williams attempts to demonstrate that identity should be identified with the body rather than with the mind when identity is extended into the future (and by extension during the present). That is, though it is typical for identity to be associated with the mind at any given moment, Williams argues that the logic that supports this intuitive association does not hold up over longer periods of time, and that anticipation of the future leads to an association of identity with the body rather than with the mind. Whether or not Williams is successful in this attempt is a matter of much debate, with this author finding some fundamental flaws in the very premise of the comparisons and thus the conclusions, however the argument is fairly elegant and persuasive and certainly worth of closer inspection. A careful reading of the argument might lead one to a conclusion opposite to that which was intended, but is no less rewarding for this unusual quirk.

One of the most talked about concepts of philosophy is that of the mind-body problem. In short, the mind-body problem is the relationship between the mind and the body. Specifically, it’s the connection between our mental realm of thoughts, including beliefs, ideas, sensations, emotions, and our physical realm, the actual matter of which we are made up of the atoms, neurons. The problem comes when we put the emphasis on mind and body. Are the mind and body one physical thing, or two separate entities. Two arguments have stood amongst the rest, Interactionism and physicalism. Interactionism claims that mind and matter are two separate categories with a casual integration between the two. By contrast, physicalism draws from the idea that all aspects of the human body are under one physical being, there are no nonphysical connections that come into play. While both state a clear and arguable statement regarding mind-body problem, Interactionism gives a more plausible answer to the mind-body problem because although it may seem like we are tied as one, our minds have a subconscious that influence our thoughts, actions, ideas, and beliefs, which is completely independent from the realm of our physical matter.

In David Armstrong’s thought-provoking work titled, The Nature of Mind, he explains that the most convincing way to make sense of the mind-body problem is to approach it in a materialistic way. Specifically, Armstrong shows that the science of physico-chemical processes of the brain is the best way to explain the nature of our mind. He goes on to explain traditional and dispositional behaviorism, and states his own materialistic take on behaviorism. His arguments throughout his paper are very logical, and though there have been arguments against his explanations, he effectively justifies the materialistic view of the mind.

In the critique of pure reason, Kant states, “All alternations occur in accordance with the law of the connection of cause and effect.”1 This statement is interpreted in two different ways: weak readings and strong readings. The weak readings basically suggest that Kant's statement only refer to “All events have a cause”; however, the strong readings suggest that “the Second Analogy is committed not just to causes, but to causal laws as well.”2 To understand the difference between the readings, it is helpful to notice Kant's distinction between empirical laws of nature and universal transcendental principles. Empirical laws have an empirical element that universal transcendental principles cannot imply. On the other hand, empirical experiences require necessity to become a law, accordingly, “the transcendental laws “ground” the empirical laws by supplying them with their necessity.”3In this paper, according to this distinction, I first, argue that the second analogy supports the weak reading, second, show how in Prolegomena he uses the concept of causation in a way that is compatible to the strong reading, and third, investigate whether this incongruity is solvable.

To strength his initial claim, he goes onto show that the baseball does not cause the actions of any of the atoms arranged to form the ball. This is a rejection of downward causation and an advocation for bottom-up metaphysics, according to which, “the final and complete causal stories will involve only the entities over which physics quantifies (pg.60) ”. A baseball is not an entity over which physics quantities, its atoms are; a such, it is clear that the baseball does not exercise downward causation upon their atoms. Nor is a baseball an intermediary in a causal chain, nor is a baseball a partial cause, alongside its atoms, of the windows shattering. From this, he argues that it is clear that his first premise is true, that is, the baseball

Consequently, there’s no need to introduce a mental event in order to solve the mind and body problem, and the dualistic interactionism is debatable. Second, materialists argue that from everyday experiences, the systematic coincidence is rare. Thus, if there’s a systematic wide-spreading multi-causing coincidence, dualists need to explain that. Yet, dualists can’t give an explanation about that. Therefore, the dualistic interactionism is problematic.

The mind-body problem is an age-old topic in philosophy that questions the relationship between the mental aspect of life, such as the field of beliefs, pains, and emotions, and the physical side of life which deals with matter, atoms, and neurons. There are four concepts that each argue their respective sides. For example, Physicalism is the belief that humans only have a physical brain along with other physical structures, whereas Idealism argues that everything is mind-based. Furthermore, Materialism argues that the whole universe is purely physical. However, the strongest case that answers the commonly asked questions such as “Does the mind exist?” and “Is the mind your brain?” is Dualism.

Examining all three premises together Davidson argues “...Anomalous monism: monism because it holds that psychological events are physical events, anomalous, because it insists that events do not fall under strict laws when described in psychological terms” (davidson2).

Anomalous monism is a theory that attempts to explain the mind – body dualist view. Donald Davidson coined the term and is the most notable contributor behind its inception. The theory has two major points that it addresses. Firstly that mental events and interactions produce physical events. Secondly, that mental events do not abide by physical laws or guidelines. We will look at Davidson’s theory in detail as well as explore his defensive arguments throughout the course of this paper.

For example, in the event of a cue ball colliding with another ball, causing it to change location, every thinking and perceiving human would reasonably see the necessary connection between cause and effect without having known the details of Newton’s 3rd law. The perceived nature of this event is cognized on the basis that our fundamental conditions allow for the concept of causation to be firmly entrenched a priori. The idea of causation is not provided by empirical data, but rather empirical data in

Now in order for this to be cognized as determined, the relation between the two states must be thought in such a way that it is thereby necessarily determined which of them must be placed before and which after rather than vice versa. The concept, however, that carries a necessity of synthetic unity with it can only be a pure concept of understanding, which does not lie in the perception, and that is here the concept of the relation of cause and effect, the former of which determines the latter in time, as its consequence, and not as something that could merely precede in the imagination (or not even be perceived at all). Therefore, it is only because we subject the sequence of the appearances and thus all alteration to the law of causality that experience itself, i.e., empirical cognition of them, is possible; consequently they themselves, as objects of experience, are possible only in accordance with this law.”(B233-234)

My goal in this paper is to renew our faith in supervenience. To do so, however, will not require the development of a new formulation of the concept; instead, it involves clearing up some misconceptions about an existing version of this relation. I refer to Davidson’s original treatment of supervenience. Most have assumed that Davidson’s brand of supervenience is equivalent to Kim’s "weak supervenience," which is too weak to express dependence. I will argue that Davidson’s conception of supervenience is, despite certain formal similarities, quite different from Kim’s and clearly captures a sense of psychophysical dependence that is of use to forms of physicalism.

The Mind-Body problem arises to Philosophy when we wonder what is the relationship between the mental states, like beliefs and thoughts, and the physical states, like water, human bodies and tables. For the purpose of this paper I will consider physical states as human bodies because we are thinking beings, while the other material things have no mental processes. The question whether mind and body are the same thing, somehow related, or two distinct things not related, has been asked throughout the history of Philosophy, so some philosophers tried to elaborate arrangements and arguments about it, in order to solve the problem and give a satisfactory answer to the question. This paper will argue that the Mind-Body Dualism, a view in

He acknowledges that there are a great deal of possible ways that we could assign our native language to the language and behavior of another to come about an understanding. He relates this to the measurement of weight in the sense that no matter what system you use for measurement; kilograms, pounds ounces, etc., the invariable factor, in this case the actual weight of the object, is the fact of the matter, not the arbitrary units of measure. His point is that there will likely always be indeterminacy in our translations, but we will often get the general idea. He also believes that there are no strict laws that connect mental states with physical ones, stating that such laws can exist “only when concepts connected by the laws are based on criteria of the same sort” (Davidson, pg. 215).

This paper focuses on the ideas of David Hume and his work concerning cause and effect. Firstly, I am going to explain impressions and ideas and why we cannot have the idea of power. Secondly, I am going to explain why Hume declares that there is a perception necessary connection between events. Thirdly, I will explain Hume’s definitions of causation and the conclusion he cones up with that states that cause is the conjunction that reinforces our ideas. Fourthly, I will point out that Hume’s idea of necessary connection has altered the causation debate. Lastly, I will raise two objections that question that viability of his causality argument.