The War Of Fools By Barbara Tuchman

In “War and Massacre” by Thomas Nagel, Nagel argues that there are limits on what can be done to an enemy even its for the sake of overall good. He believes that such an idea is grounded on the principles of Absolutism, where morality is determined by the action itself (deontology). This is contrary to the view of Utilitarianism, which relies on the premise that Morality is determined by its consequences (Consequentialism). Although could one in fact generate such a moral structure around war? Do the ends justify the means in War? Through identifying with a real-life example, I will look to expand on Nagel’s account where an action taken by a country in war would be prohibited even if it were for the overall good.

Many historians argue that the reason for Germany going to war was due to the aggressive behaviour of Germany in the build up to the war. Throughout this essay I will be addressing this issue looking at whether Germany was responsible for the outbreak of a general European war in August 1914. There are many factors which contribute to the outbreak of the war from a short-term trigger such as the assassination of Franz Ferdinand to the long-term annexation aims Germany implemented in the years building up to the war, the most important reason was Germany’s aggressive foreign policy, they had provided

Barbara Tuchman’s book, The Guns of August begins in 1910, at King Edward VII of England’s funeral. At the funeral there are nine European kings there to pay their respects. One of the kings is his nephew, German Kaiser Wilhelm. Wilhelm resented how England softened Germany’s rise as a European power, affiliating instead with France, Russia, and Japan. Wilhelm desired power and acknowledgment and used Edward’s funeral to begin calculating. Over the years, Germany prepares for war, making plans to attack Belgium and widening the Kiel Canal.

In “The Longest War,” Rebecca Solnit discusses the vast amount of violence against women and how violence affects women. To begin with, she provides some stark facts: it is statistically proven the male population is more violent than women (522). Additionally, rape takes place more often than the average person knows. This is problematic because violence derives from the need for power and control. Women cannot simply “get out” of violence because of a man’s desire for power over the situation.

Fischer argues that German imperialism bears the onus for the Great War, as he concluded that they had gone to war to achieve European and worldwide domination. He states that Germany had ‘confidence in the invincibility of her military strength,’ implying that Germany had been building up their forces. This indicates Germany must have already been preparing for war, strengthening her army until she saw that both France and Russia were ‘militarily weak’ in comparison - to the extent that German elites believed they would remain somewhat unhindered in their continuation of ‘aggressive intentions.’ This is significant for several reasons. First, it was controversial as these ideas challenged the pre-existing general consensus of historians’ outlook since the 1930s: that all involved European nations shared a collective war-guilt from the First World War. Fischer rejects this view. He references a document written by Bethmann’s private secretary on 9 September 1914, outlining the Chancellor’s plan for peace negotiations which he anticipated would soon take place, as according to the September Programme. Fischer extrapolated that these detailed plans (that already had the support of the wider political nation in Germany) must have existed in August and July, and that this was indication towards Germany’s

Ambrose Bierce is noted as a literary genius for his short stories on the civil war. His military experience during the Civil War allowed him to write some of his most memorable short stories. He is most noted for his story, “An Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge.” It is a story of a man’s last thoughts before being hanged. The story tells about a man, Peyton Farquhar, who was deceived and is condemned to death for doing what he thought would be helping the Confederate Army. In the moment before Farquhar’s death, Bierce paints the reader a colorful description of what goes through Farquhar’s mind. Through what he saw and experienced in the Civil War along with his

Joll, Mayer, and Fischer each look at the same events and players leading up to 1914, but draw differing conclusions as they assign significance, motivations, and meanings to the causes and effects. Each scholar uses the body of evidence to make a strong argument for his point of view.

Our daily life is effortlessly painted by our ignorance and own deceit and self-deception. Our most prized possession, language, not only strengthens our ability to lie, but also greatly extends it scope. According to the book “The Folly of Fools – The Logic of Deceit and Self-Deception in Human Life,” written by Robert Trivers, we as humans lie to ourselves to better lie to others. In this book, deceit and self-deception are analyzed from different perspectives of life and different perspectives scientifically. The main topics discussed are the evolutionary logic of self-deception, neurophysiology and levels of imposed self-deception, the psychology of self-deception, and self-deception and the structure of social sciences. In the text to follow, I will discuss each category in detail in hopes to better understand why as humans we are deceitful not only to others, but also to ourselves as well.

During his rule, Kaiser Wilhelm the second made numerous decisions that affected the German populace in both positive and negative ways. However, after further examination it is clear that the Kaiser’s horrid resolutions are inconsequential, because of the beneficial and revolutionary ideas he made reality. By pushing aside moral obligations and the idea that internationalism can aid a country, Wilhelm the Second was able to make the foundations for a strong, powerful Germany, much like the one today. He made Germany into one of the most powerful nationalist countries in the world, and should be revered for such an astounding accomplishment.

The end of the First World War saw a shift in political thought towards liberalism through the creation of the League of Nations to avoid a recurrence of international aggression, while realism seemed to have lost its credibility. The dramatic failure of the League in stopping another international war gave rise to serious questions and doubts about the effectiveness of the liberal ideas upon which it had been founded. This offered realism a chance to re-emerge as the dominant perspective in international relations. But, unlike the eighteenth-century definition of classical realism that argued that all states are motivated by the pursuit of power and expansion, the postwar realists modified the initial theory. For nearly 2,500 years, classical realism has displayed a principal unity of thought. One of the most important classical realist writer, Hans Morgenthau, came to have the largest impact on this field. His 1948 book, Politics Among Nations, coined an account of realism that dominated international relations for almost three decades.

“Diplomacy would rely more on naked power than on shared values” (Kissinger, 1994 page 94). In world history we can reflect on two treaties that had the intention to achieve the same goal of stability; however they had diverse approaches. Henry Kissinger and other proponents of The Congress of Vienna argue that the great period of peace in Europe, between all great powers, was successful in creating longevity in peace due to the realist theories encompassed in The Congress of Vienna. Further, many realists also believe that The Treaty of Versailles produced “the precise opposite of what they had set out to do” because, unlike The Congress of Vienna, it was composed of liberalist, constructivist and ideological principles (Kissinger, 1994, page 245). I agree with Kissinger’s argument and further argue that The Treaty of Versailles, which failed to include legal obligations and concrete mechanisms, was a primary cause of World War II. Even though there are numerous explanations for why the Congress of Vienna produced greater stability than the Treaty of Versailles, in this essay I will compare two major reasons. The first is that the Congress of Vienna focused on restoring the balance of power, while the Treaty of Versailles wanted to enforce collective security. The second reason is evident through comparing the outcomes of both treaties; while the Congress of Vienna produced the Concert of Europe, the Treaty of Versailles produced the infamously unsuccessful League of

In the years leading up to the first shots of World War I, citizens and governments on both sides of the trenches were entangled in their own unique dilemmas. With France experiencing a diplomatic revolution and Germany showing major growth from an industrial revolution, both world powers were showing a drift towards nationalism. While tensions increased in the Balkans, it’s safe to say that citizens in France and Germany weren’t yearning for conflict. It’s also safe to say that both nations were showing enthusiasm and a nationalistic mindset amongst their respective populations. Governments were in a continuous struggle with their own peoples. As the common man strived for a nationalistic country, leaders weren’t yet ready to give away most of their power. This idea was especially active in Germany, as the “narcissistic emperor, William II, fancied himself an authority on all aspects of foreign and domestic affairs.” The differences between France and Germany’s political environments and relationships with their people led to the conflict that is infamously known as “The Great War.”

The years following 1918 were highly turbulent for post-World War I Germany, undergoing multiple crises that greatly hindered the authority of the Weimar Republic. In this, several incidents threatened the state’s legitimacy, specifically the hyperinflation of the German mark, the recurrence of workers’ strikes and uprisings, and the ongoing factionalism between political parties. Furthermore, while each major crisis contributed to either the outbreak or the effects of one another, all are ultimately able to find an underlying cause in the Treaty of Versailles and the general defeat of Germany in World War I. Moreover, such incidents not only undermined the political power of the Weimar Republic but also, allowed for greater radicalization

At the time that Hitler was appointed Chancellor, Alfred Hugenburg said “‘I’ve just committed the greatest stupidity of my life; I have allied myself with the greatest demagogue in world history’” (Briggs & Clavin, 254). Even the politician who appointed Hitler was unaware of how radical his ideology was, and how influential he would be as a leader to the German people.

The governing principles of the balance of power theory and polarity failed to predict the outbreak of the first world war. To understand the dangers of grand simplifications such as the two aforementioned principles it’s best to contrast how they viewed international relations precluding the war with how the actual state of affairs and its consequences. Prior to the first world war, the world was in a state of multipolarity with a multitude of empires vying for power [Brown and Ainley, 21]. During this time, each empire was building up strength internally with the knowledge that any attempt to disrupt the balance of power through external military means would be met with staunch opposition [Hill, 181]. Given that states are rational actors concerned with survival, an assumption made by realists and their theories, they would understand that any such opposition would be a direct threat to their security. As described by many realist theorists, polar states want to maintain the balance of power as it is. Brown and Ainley explain that Bismarck was willing to forego expanding the German Empire into neighboring states in order to maintain the balance of power and stability [Brown and Ainley, 102].