UDTPA: A Case Study

This case is extremely relevant to what is known as the four D’s of negligence; duty, dereliction, direct cause and damages. Duty is when a doctor and a patient have formed a relationship and said doctor has taken on the responsibility of taking care of the patient. Dereliction or failure to perform a duty, there must be some kind of proof that the doctor somehow neglected the doctor neglected the patient. Direct cause, there must be some kind of proof that what happened to the patient was a direct cause of how the doctor conducted himself or his failure to act which resulted in injury. Damages a patient must prove that harm was incurred by the direct result of the physicians actions.

2. The outcome of this issue is governed by Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965) Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress. The elements of this cause of action are (1) the wrongdoer's conduct was intentional or reckless, that is, he intended his behavior when he knew or should have known that emotional distress would likely result; (2) the conduct was outrageous, that is, as to go beyond all bounds of decency, and to be regarded as odious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community; (3) the conduct caused the emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress was severe.

The student 's motion for summary judgment was granted by the court and dismissed Drakers claims against the students for defamation and libel per se. The students and their families then had to file another motion for summary judgment regarding Draker’s remaining claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy, and negligence. Once this happened, Draker filed her third amended petition alleging the students only for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence and gross negligence as to the parents. Eric Goldman states, “the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was dismissed because under TX law the cause of action is a gap-filler, and there was no gap given that the defamation doctrine putatively governs these facts.” Along with her third amended petition, Draker filed a motion for continuance. This motion would give her more time to look into the facts of her remaining claims. This motion was denied by the trial court. Along with the denial of Drakers motion, the court granted the Schreibers ' and the Todds ' motion for summary judgment. Draker argues that the trial court made three mistakes. These mistakes, as listed in the case are (1) granting summary judgment in favor of the students on her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress; (2) granting summary judgment in favor of the parents on her claims of negligence and gross negligence; and (3) denying her motion for continuance and

Additional Damages– The Courts felt that the employer owes an obligation of good faith and fair dealing in the way in which it dismisses an employee. They did not condone terminating employees in a callous and insensitive way and showing no regard for well-being when terminating an employee. The plaintiff Mr. Beatty stated that his termination was carried out in a dishonest, unfair and insensitive way even though the termination was “without cause”. He was called to Mr. Lebeter’s office and informed of his dismissal and given his letter of termination. He stated this

A civil suit is commonly derived from a private party or individual, who alleges damages from duty of care. Once a civil case begins, it is the duty of the plaintiff to prove, with evidence, duty of care, breach of duty, causation, and damages. Conversely, the defendant must prove their affirmative defense against documented allegations. The Oliver versus Brock case proves the importance of supporting evidence as opposed to hearsay statements, to prove the truth of the matter. In the Oliver versus Brock case, Cathy (Plaintiff) filed a lawsuit against Bryan Whitfield Memorial Hospital of Demopolis and the treating physicians Dr. F.S. Whitfield, Dr. Paul Ketcham and Dr. E.C. Brock (Defendant) for negligence of care. Analyzing the facts in

Mr. Foster was a very bright young man and would probably present very well as a person. However, he also acknowledges having ran a red light. For this reason, I think we should begin the process of discussing a reasonable settlement range. I am enclosing a summary of the plaintiff’s medical records and billing which was produced by Susan Haynes here in our office. Please take a look at this and contact me at your convenience to discuss an appropriate path forward. I think we should consider at least an initial conversation with the plaintiff’s counsel before we start the process of depositions. However, I look forward to hearing your prospective as well. Thank you so much for time and

See Electcrostim Med. Servs., Inc. v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 962 F. Supp. 2d 887, 898-99 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (granting motion to dismiss); Encompass Office Solutions, Inc. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., No. 3:11-cv-02487-L, 2012 WL 3030376, *8-*9 (N.D. Tex. July 25, 2012) (denying motion to dismiss); Team Healthcare/Diagnostic Corp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Tex., No. 3:10-cv-1441-BH, 2012 WL 1617087, *6 (N.D. Tex. May 7, 2012) (denying motion to dismiss); Mid-Town Surgical Ctr., LLP v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tex., No. H-11-2086 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2012) (granting motion to dismiss); DAC Surgical Partners, P.A. v. United Healthcare Servs., Inc., No. H-11-1355, 2011 WL 3841946, *6 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2011) (denying motion to dismiss);

Brohawn, supra, 276 Md. at 399. Subsequently, the other party to the altercation filed an action against Brohawn seeking damages for intentional torts and negligence. Id. at 399-400. Transamerica, Brohawn’s insurer, refused to defend Brohawn on the grounds that her coverage contained a policy exclusion whereby Transamerica was not responsible for intentional conduct. Id. at 400. Thereafter, Transamerica initiated a declaratory judgment action, in the same court, seeking to have the court declare that Brohawn’s conduct was intentional, and, therefore, fell within the policy exclusion. Id. at 401. The circuit court dismissed the declaratory judgment action because “the question of coverage would be ‘determined by the jury’s verdict in the tort suits]. . . .” Id. at

With regard to Ms. Green’s claims against O’Brien, it is apparent that Ms. Green was O’Brien’s client, and that O’Brien owed Ms. Green a duty. Should this case proceed to trial we do not anticipate that we would argue to a jury that O’Brien did not neglect this duty. Rather, there are serious questions as to whether “the negligence resulted in and was the proximate cause of loss to the client.” Kendall v. Rogers, 181 Md. 606, 611-12 (1943). Indeed, the estate will have to demonstrate that Ms. Green would have prevailed in proving that one or both health care provider defendants committed medical negligence that caused her to fall into the diabetic coma.

Plaintiff, OSCEOLA SC, LLC, a Florida Limited Liability Company d/b/a St. Cloud Regional Medical Center, (“Hospital”) by and through its undersigned counsel, sues Defendant, Rafael Fleites, M.D. (“Physician”), and alleges:

Ms. Almanza claimed she researched and provided the claimant’s entire personnel file for this investigation and stated she was not aware of any industrial-related injuries associated with the claimants said injuries, by noting that no treating physicians ever provided any causation or the implied injuries. She provided proof with the claimant’s personnel file taken into as evidence by stating there was no medical evidence, doctors note or request of modified work duties to suggest any medical

Plaintiff further asserts that the Defendant breached its duty of care to her by: (1) “failing to fix a hazardous condition within a reasonable time;” (2) “failing to adequately warn plaintiff of a hazardous condition;” and (3) “otherwise failing to exercise reasonable and due care under the circumstances.” The Plaintiff is seeking compensatory damages in the amount of two hundred thousand dollars, plus interest and costs.

The court ruled that State could not sue for equitable indemnity or contribution based on the fact that there was no evidence that Moffatt owed a duty of care or that Moffatt was negligent. The court also determined that there was no contractual relationship between State and Major and that a person or other property was not damaged. Based on the two core findings, all cross complaints made by State are disregarded and State is found to be solely responsible for the damages. Moffatt is also awarded costs on the appeal.

As requested, I have reviewed the facts of the above-captioned file, along with the applicable law and summarized same in this memorandum. Mrs. Mary Smith suffered an injury to her right ankle in an automobile accident on 10/3/95. After surgery and months of rehabilitation, Mrs. Smith still suffers daily. I have researched the facts regarding a personal injury action against Paul Joseph, as well as a medical malpractice action against the medical providers.

Torts of negligence are breaches of duty that results to injury to another person to whom the duty breached is owed. Like all other torts, the requirements for this are duty, breach of duty by the defendant, causation and injury(Stuhmcke and Corporation.E 2001). However, this form of tort differs from intentional tort as regards the manner the duty is breached. In torts of negligence, duties are breached by negligence and not by intent. Negligence is conduct that falls below the standard of care established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm(Stuhmcke and Corporation.E 2001). The standard measure of negligence is the universal reasonable person standard. The assumption in this case is that a reasonable