Addressing the question of whether war is a rational decision or a mistake is important to understand the causes of war and explain the reduction in the number of wars fought among countries in today’s nuclear era. The argument, under which war is a mistake, is a normative claim about what action states should have chosen, based on the outcomes that have been produced. That is, for a decision to be good, it needs to have produced the actor’s preferred outcome. However, the mistake perspective is problematic under the uncertainty and competitiveness of the anarchic international political system.
The rational theory provides a better alternative. In this paper, the rational theory of war will unfold by beginning with an understanding of
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States pay attention to the long term as well as the immediate consequences of their actions. Therefore, the value of going to war is the outcome for which a state would settle through bargaining. Thus, for any deal to prevent war, each state must decide that they prefer the deal to fighting a war. Mistake advocators will be quick to point out that the utility-maximizing perspective might be problematic since the theory does not include uncertainty in its evaluation of costs and benefits. However, accepting this criticism will not undermine the rational perspective. The utility-maximizing theory is only the simplified first step in assessing the rationality of a state decision to fight a war.
That being said, this vision of rationality accounts in part for the reduction in the number of wars fought between countries now compared to the past. Nuclear technology and mutually assured destruction have elevated the cost of war to such an extent that it is now almost impossible for the benefits to outweigh the costs of nuclear warfare. Thus, the main interest in security has shifted the rational utility-maximizing states’ policy from winning to avoiding wars.
Rationality and relative power: Balance, stability and security
Today’s ‘balanced multi polarity’, stabilized by nuclear technology, makes international relations more secure
Realists’ belief that, “war is unavoidable and natural part of world affairs.” According to Bova, there are over 200 sovereign states, and they all interest to gain power to defend themselves. As a result, state’s feeling of insecurity causes it to take any means to feel secure whether it is through the formation of ally with another powerful state or accumulation of military and economic power. Such action threatens other states provoke them take similar actions. This cycle applies to all states, and the feeling of threat and desire to survive is innate in humans In understanding International Relations, McNamara’s lesson is useful in the regards that actions that state takes to protect itself causes the complexity and conflicts of foreign policies that human beings are incapable of
I agree with the quote that “Wars between states can be explained by the distribution of power and capabilities in the international system.” Power distribution among all the great powers plays an important role for the stability and economy of the state. I believe that war determines who will govern the international system, and whose interests will be primarily served by the new international order.
War has been designed to show a ghastly frame that sets out for propaganda, defeats, and victories. Involving multiple aspects, war exhibits a product of both human choice and human actions. “And a person's definition of war often expresses the person's broader political philosophy, such as limiting war to a conflict between nations or state. Alternative definitions of war can include conflict not just between nations but between schools of thought or ideologies.” (Moseley, Alexander.
In the international arena, there is no hierarchical rule to keep states in line or behaved; meaning that the international system is constantly in anarchy, aka the state of nature. This lack of rule enforcement puts states in a constant state of war, in a constant state where they need to stay on guard and in a tactical advantage otherwise the safety and well being of their state will be in jeopardy. In this scenario, the state’s number one priority is to protect itself and act in its self interest when need be, despite if it would typically be deemed immoral. (Donnelly 20)
The most prevalent reasons for states going to war are security, interest, standing, and revenge; of these, I posit that security is the most frequent. For the purposes of this paper, I will focus on warfare occurring since the onset of the 20th century, however many of the core arguments retain efficacy through the countless centuries of human warfare. States don’t trust one another; even the best relationships between states are mired in spycraft with, or in opposition to one another. To summarize Waltz, drive for security is something that all states want, and need, as long as there are multiple states and at least one of them is looking for power.
Throughout much of the history of civilizations, states have declared war for land, valuables, and resources. In the course of the mid-20th century and the 21st century, ascendant super powers have invaded foreign lands for resources such as oil, and weapons companies have profited from the ongoing cycle of war these super powers promote. The populations of these states have been fed lies vis-à-vis the media; propagandizing these “rogue nations” and promoting an ‘Us vs. Them’ mentality, to garner support for these armed conflicts. War is our primordial instinct, as humans are territorial and aggressive. That is our nature, and by looking at events in our history, one may see that war appears to be timeless and inevitable.
By realists’ theory, alliances and military mobilization can be seen as practices that can avoid war, but critics argue that it can cause the security dilemma – I build up my armed forces because you built up yours. (Packer 2015) Mutual fear and threats push neighbors to arms with the resulting arms race making all sides insecure and more likely to go to war. There will always be conflict between alliances and armament by satisfied powers versus by dissatisfied powers, major power alliances versus major-minor, and minor-minor alliances. (Packer,
The purpose of this essay is to inform on the similarities and differences between systemic and domestic causes of war. According to World Politics by Jeffry Frieden, David Lake, and Kenneth Schultz, systemic causes deal with states that are unitary actors and their interactions with one another. It can deal with a state’s position within international organizations and also their relationships with other states. In contract, domestic causes of war pertain specifically to what goes on internally and factors within a state that may lead to war. Wars that occur between two or more states due to systemic and domestic causes are referred to as interstate wars.
Throughout history, war has been the most common resort for nations to solve problems or show off their strength. However it wasn’t until recently where mankind had just live and experience a war that not only did it have the potential destroy nations, but also had the potential to destroy the whole world and humanity itself. This was known as the Cold War where after WWII, citizens of the world witnessed the potential of the atomic bomb and feared the possibility of nuclear fallout or total annihilation of the Earth. The only two superpowers remaining at the time were the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic. These two nation competed against each other in a nuclear arms race. They fought to spread the ideals of either a free democratic, capitalistic society or a controlled socialist, communist society. After a 45 year struggle from 1945-1991, the Cold War came to an end due to the fall of the Soviet Union. It was inevitable due to the fact during the last few years of the war, the USSR face internal domestic problems such as their financial/economic situation, failed political reforms, and revolution throughout the Union itself. The causes to the collapse of the Union not only affected them but affected the world to present day.
Typically, in popular depictions of arms races, the political calculations that start and regulate the pace of the game remain obscure. As Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., has noted, “The strange result is that the activity of the other side, and not one’s own resources, plans, and motives, becomes the determinant of one’s behavior.” And what constitutes the “finish line” of the game is the province of assertion, rather than analysis. Many onlookers, and some participants, have claimed that the likelihood of war increases as the accumulation of arms proceeds apace.
I disagree with Kenneth Waltz’s position that nuclear proliferation makes the world a safer place, and how best to measure the spread of nuclear weapons, particularly in regimes that are developing, unstable, or “third-world.”1 While some scholars see nuclear weapons as a threat to stability and peace due to their mass destruction capability and the potential for horrific fallout triggered by ethnic and geopolitical instability, others see those weapons as holding the power to maintain an appropriate balance of power between opposing regimes at times of tension and during periods of low level conflict. This debate is reflected in international relations.
To understand the causes of war and the transformation between traditional warfare into modern warfare, key concepts that allowed this to occur need to be explained. Carl von Clausewitz famous for writing On The Nature Of War in 1832 in which he argued that war is a part of social life involving conflicts of interests between states which can only be settled by bloodshed (Clausewitz, 2005). The state is responsible for maintaining what Clausewitz referred to as ‘social conditions’ in that it is the responsibility of the state to defeat the enemy by disarming them through force or place the enemy into a position of submission through deterrence (Clausewitz, 2005). Jean-Jacques Rousseau famous for writing Social Contract in 1762 argued that in order for the state to protect the weak from oppression, certain personally liberties have to be sacrificed in order to preserve the other liberties citizens have (Rousseau, 1978). Both definitions are helpful in understanding the need for a state to obtain nuclear arms as a way of protection.
The previously accepted nature of war stemmed from the Clausewitzian trinity: war is emotional, an experience wrought with passion, violence, and enmity; uncertainty, chance, and friction pervade the medium of war; however, because war is not an end in itself, and because, as a means, it is subordinate to its political aims, war must be subject to reason (Clausewitz, 89). With the first employment of nuclear weapons, however, strategists and military theorists began to question Clausewitz’s foundational ideas (Winkler, 58). Similarly, Allan Winkler, in agreeing with Bernard Brodie’s thesis, opines that the advent of nuclear weapons fundamentally changed the nature of war. Winkler’s assertion stems from his argument that such a nuclear duel would yield a post-war environment incapable of recovery for any parties involved (62). He further describes Brodie’s realization that “[t]he atomic bomb is not just another and more destructive weapon to be added to an already long list. It is something which threatens to make the rest of the list relatively unimportant.” (62) Ultimately, Winkler abridges Brodie’s assessment in stating that “the United States was caught in the paradox of having to prepare for a war it did not plan to fight.” (63)
This essay intends to define and give an overview of the ‘Principles of War', the philosophers that coined these principles and with examples from the various countries that used and have their own perspectives on the ‘Principles of War'.
Wars have been waged for decades creating the world we live in today. Charles Tilly observed, “the state made war and war made the state” (qtd in Sernau, 2009, 147). However, these battles have been destructive and bloody resulting in the deaths of countless individuals. These grave consequences lead us to ask the ever problematic question, what could possibly motivate a state to engage in warfare? Fundamentally, some believe war is linked to a conflict of political and economic interests rooted in power struggles ranging from territorial and humanitarian to ideological and ethnic while others argue that war has become ingrained in our societies and economies resulting in this tenacious cycle of confrontation.