8 Consider the following protocol: A→ KDC: KDC → A: A → B: B → A: A → B: a. Explain the protocol. b. Can you think of a possible attack on this protocol? Explain how it can be done. c. Mention a possible technique to get around the attack-not a detailed mechanism, just the basics of the idea. IDA IDB NI E(K₁ [KSIDBN₁E(Kb [KSIDA])) E(Kb. [KSIDA]) E(KS, N₂) E(K5, f(N₂))

8 Consider the following protocol: A→ KDC: KDC → A: A → B: B → A: A → B: a. Explain the protocol. b. Can you think of a possible attack on this protocol? Explain how it can be done. c. Mention a possible technique to get around the attack-not a detailed mechanism, just the basics of the idea. IDA IDB NI E(K₁ [KSIDBN₁E(Kb [KSIDA])) E(Kb. [KSIDA]) E(KS, N₂) E(K5, f(N₂))

Database System Concepts

7th Edition

ISBN:9780078022159

Author:Abraham Silberschatz Professor, Henry F. Korth, S. Sudarshan

Publisher:Abraham Silberschatz Professor, Henry F. Korth, S. Sudarshan

Chapter1: Introduction

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1PE

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