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ct more custome ill earn $14,000 customers will

ct more custome ill earn $14,000 customers will

Linear Algebra: A Modern Introduction
Linear Algebra: A Modern Introduction
4th Edition
ISBN:9781285463247
Author:David Poole
Publisher:David Poole
Chapter2: Systems Of Linear Equations
Section2.4: Applications
Problem 28EQ
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Consider a remote town in which two restaurants, All-You-Can-Eat Café and GoodGrub Diner, operate in a duopoly. Both restaurants disregard health and safety regulations, but they continue to have customers because they are the only restaurants within 80 miles of town. Both restaurants know that if they clean up, they will attract more customers, but this also means that they will have to pay workers to do the leaning. If neither restaurant cleans, each will earn $14,000; alternatively, if they both hire workers to clean, each will earn only $11,000. However, if one cleans and the other doesn't, more customers will choose the cleaner restaurant; the cleaner restaurant will make $18,000, and the other restaurant will make only $6,000. Complete the following payoff matrix using the information just given. (Note: All-You-Can-Eat Café and GoodGrub Diner are both profit-maximizing firms.) All-You-Can-Eat Café $ Cleans Up Doesn't Clean Up $ Cleans Up $ 81°F Sunny $ GoodGrub Diner $ $ If All-You-Can-Eat Café and GoodGrub Diner decide to collude, the outcome of this game is as follows: All-You-Can-Eat Café GoodGrub Diner Doesn't Clean Up $ $ a If both restaurants decide to cheat and behave noncooperatively, the outcome reflecting the unique Nash equilibrium of this game is as follows: All- You-Can-Eat Café and GoodGrub Diner and
Transcribed Image Text:Consider a remote town in which two restaurants, All-You-Can-Eat Café and GoodGrub Diner, operate in a duopoly. Both restaurants disregard health and safety regulations, but they continue to have customers because they are the only restaurants within 80 miles of town. Both restaurants know that if they clean up, they will attract more customers, but this also means that they will have to pay workers to do the leaning. If neither restaurant cleans, each will earn $14,000; alternatively, if they both hire workers to clean, each will earn only $11,000. However, if one cleans and the other doesn't, more customers will choose the cleaner restaurant; the cleaner restaurant will make $18,000, and the other restaurant will make only $6,000. Complete the following payoff matrix using the information just given. (Note: All-You-Can-Eat Café and GoodGrub Diner are both profit-maximizing firms.) All-You-Can-Eat Café $ Cleans Up Doesn't Clean Up $ Cleans Up $ 81°F Sunny $ GoodGrub Diner $ $ If All-You-Can-Eat Café and GoodGrub Diner decide to collude, the outcome of this game is as follows: All-You-Can-Eat Café GoodGrub Diner Doesn't Clean Up $ $ a If both restaurants decide to cheat and behave noncooperatively, the outcome reflecting the unique Nash equilibrium of this game is as follows: All- You-Can-Eat Café and GoodGrub Diner and
Consider a remote town in which two restaurants, All-You-Can-Eat Café and GoodGrub Diner, operate in a duopoly. Both restaurants disregard health and safety regulations, but they continue to have customers because they are the only restaurants within 80 miles of town. Both restaurants know that if they clean up, they will attract more customers, but this also means that they will have to pay workers to do the cleaning. If neither restaurant cleans, each will earn $14,000; alternatively, if they both hire workers to clean, each will earn only 000. However, if one cleans and the other doesn't, more customers will choose the cleaner restaurant; the cleaner restaurant will make $18,000, and the other restaurant will make only $6,000. Complete the following payoff matrix using the information just given. (Note: All-You-Can-Eat Café and GoodGrub Diner are both profit-maximizing firms.) All-You-Can-Eat Café GoodGrub Diner $ Cleans Up Doesn't Clean Up $ Cleans Up $ $ F ony GoodGrub Diner $ $ If All-You-Can-Eat Café and GoodGrub Diner decide to collude, the outcome of this game is as follows: All-You-Can-Eat Café Doesn't Clean Up $ $ If both restaurants decide to cheat and behave noncooperatively, the outcome reflecting the unique Nash equilibrium of this game is as follows: All- You-Can-Eat Café , and GoodGrub Diner and O
Transcribed Image Text:Consider a remote town in which two restaurants, All-You-Can-Eat Café and GoodGrub Diner, operate in a duopoly. Both restaurants disregard health and safety regulations, but they continue to have customers because they are the only restaurants within 80 miles of town. Both restaurants know that if they clean up, they will attract more customers, but this also means that they will have to pay workers to do the cleaning. If neither restaurant cleans, each will earn $14,000; alternatively, if they both hire workers to clean, each will earn only 000. However, if one cleans and the other doesn't, more customers will choose the cleaner restaurant; the cleaner restaurant will make $18,000, and the other restaurant will make only $6,000. Complete the following payoff matrix using the information just given. (Note: All-You-Can-Eat Café and GoodGrub Diner are both profit-maximizing firms.) All-You-Can-Eat Café GoodGrub Diner $ Cleans Up Doesn't Clean Up $ Cleans Up $ $ F ony GoodGrub Diner $ $ If All-You-Can-Eat Café and GoodGrub Diner decide to collude, the outcome of this game is as follows: All-You-Can-Eat Café Doesn't Clean Up $ $ If both restaurants decide to cheat and behave noncooperatively, the outcome reflecting the unique Nash equilibrium of this game is as follows: All- You-Can-Eat Café , and GoodGrub Diner and O
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