Stolypin - Polities KEY DATES: THE DUMAS April-June 1906: First Duma February-June 1907: Second Duma November 1907-June 1912: Third Duma November 1912-August 1914: Fourth Duma 11/12/23 LOOK AGAIN On page 97 the activity asked you to reflect on what had been learned from the 1905 revolution. What do you think. now? How well had the Tsar done in the ensuing period up to 19147 Do you think the constitutional experiment I could have worked more satisfactorily? How far was the constitutional experiment working by 1914? Stolypin was assassinated in September 1911 and, after his death, the constitutional experiment ground to a halt. The new ministers that Nicholas appointed were conservative and unimaginative nonentities who were not likely to cause him any trouble. The power of the prime minister declined and the battles between ministers and conflicting departmental policies returned to its old pattern. There was little chance of a creative relationship with the Duma. Indeed the government abandoned any attempt to present a coherent package of reforms to the Duma. Nicholas and his court cronies were becoming increasingly isolated and depended almost entirely on right-wing support, particularly that of the All-Russian Union of Landowners (or United Nobility). Nicholas must take a large share of the responsibility for this. He had never really been willing to work with or listen to the Duma. Those close to him were always looking for ways to reduce its power and Nicholas looked for excuses to close down sessions. In Stolypin he had a chance to bring in significant reforms but Nicholas had never backed him in any consistent way and had at the end contrived with his right-wing friends to thwart him. He did not want to change the key institutions of the Russian autocracy or the main legal arrangements. At heart, Nicholas did not believe that democratic government was a good idea; he wanted to preserve the autocracy because he believed it was a better way of running Russia. Not all the blame should be attached to the Tsar, however. The Kadets' demands in the early Dumas were very radical and they were not prepared to compromise or be patient. As a result, the Duma degenerated into quarrels and a bitter struggle between the Tsar and his supporters on the right, and the liberals and other parties on the left. This did not allow for any relationship of trust and co-operation to develop. By 1913, the liberals, a much reduced force, had little hope of getting what they wanted. Some historians believe that the existence of the Duma showed that political progress was being made. It had done some useful work and there was evidence to show that a working relationship between Duma and government minsters could be established. Further, it provided reason to believe that the regime might slip into some form of constitutional government in the future. Other historians consider that the Duma experiment had failed to bring about any fundamental change to the conduct of government, and the relationship between Tsar and people, and that articulate groups who had participated in the Duma were becoming thcreasingly disillusioned. The autocracy had fought off any attempt to reform it and the political aspirations of the Russian people had been frustrated. Dominic Lieven, who is generally supportive of the Tsar says: 'Russia's situation in 1914 did not augur well for a peaceful transition to liberalism and democracy. This was partly because the Emperor, who still retained the last word in such matters, could only be pressured into constitutional concessions by the dire and immediate threat of revolution. Stolypin Could Stolypin have saved the Tsar? Peter Stolypin came to notice as a provincial governor in Saratov where he had forcefully dealt with peasant unrest. He was appointed Minister of the Interior and, soon after, Prime Minister. Stolypin was a strong supporter of the autocracy and opponent of revolution and disorder. He had set up field courts- martial in 1906 to crush peasant uprisings. Under his watch, thousands of peasants were executed by hanging (Stolypin's neckties) and thousands sent into exile in 'Stolypin carriages (railway cars). This earned him the enmity of the left who condemned him as a brutal butcher However, he was not a diehard supporter of autocracy. Like Witte before him, he believed that reform was essential to solve Russia's problems. He believed that industrial progress alone was not sufficient to take Russia forward and gave his main attention to agriculture. His land reforms (see page 50) had bold aims: to feed the rapidly growing population and create a strong conservative peasantry who would support the regime. If he had succeeded, this would indeed have radically altered Russia's future. But it was always going to take years to work in the face of a deeply conservative peasantry. He did not have that time. Stolypin was virtually the only prime minister of the constitutional decade to see the Duma as a partner in building a strong Russia. He did not consider that he was limiting the monarch's authority but rather giving it a broader social base. In particular he developed an understanding with the Octobrists which allowed him to push through his reforms. His success suggested the possibility of a working relationship between government and elected assembly. However, his own actions undermined this relationship. He had, in what was known as Stolypin's coup', radically changed the electoral system when the Second Duma proved unworkable. To all intents and purposes he had deprived the workers and peasants of their votes and created a more conservative electorate likely to produce a more amenable Duma, Also, he cynically used Article 87 of the Fundamental Laws which allowed him to pass measures by decree when the Duma was not sitting. In March 1911 he persuaded the Tsar to suspend both houses of the Duma to allow him to force his measure to introduce zemstva in the western provinces, This alienated the Duma including the majority of the Octobrists who had hitherto supported him. Stolypin was assassinated at the theatre in September 1911 but his star was already waning by this time. He had proposed a series of reforms to extend civil rights, reform local government (giving the peasants more influence in zemstva) and local justice (abolishing Land Captains) and make changes in education and a reform of emergency powers. The right and those close to the Tsar considered that his dangerous reform policies undermined the principles of autocracy and they worked to block him and get him out of office. When he died, it seems that the Tsar was quite pleased to see the back of him, the Tsar's wife, Alexandra, had always hated Stolypin. The enmity which confronted Stolypin from all sides demonstrated the difficulty of taking a middle road in Russia. He seemed to understand this himself when he commented to Bernard Pares, a British historian, in 1906, I am fighting on two fronts. I am fighting against revolution, but for reform, You may say that such a position is beyond human strength and you may be right. In the final analysis, apart from his land reforms, he was not able to implement much of his programme of reforms and even then only with the use of emergency powers. Stolypin remains a controversial figure. He has many admirers who believe that, given the support of the Tsar and the time to implement his reforms, he was the only person who could have saved Russia from revolution and brought about a more peaceful transition into the modern age. According to Richard Pipes, the American historian, 'Stolypin stood head and shoulders above his immediate predecessors and successors in that he combined a vision of the desirable with a sense of the possible; he was a rare blend statesman and politician"

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Context: Russia & Stolypin What are the strengths and limitations of Stolypin's political reforms (Use the attatched sheet for info) Use specific examples to justify your points
Part 1 Autocracy, Reform and Revolution: Russia, 1855-1917
102
Stolypin - Politics
KEY DATES: THE DUMAS
April-June 1906: First Duma
February-June 1907: Second Duma
November 1907-June 1912: Third
Duma
November 1912-August 1914:
Fourth Duma
11/12/23
LOOK AGAIN
On page 97 the activity asked
you to reflect on what had
been learned from the 1905
revolution. What do you think
now? How well had the Tsar
done in the ensuing period
up to 1914? Do you think the
constitutional experiment
could have worked more
satisfactorily?
How far was the constitutional experiment working
by 1914?
Stolypin was assassinated in September 1911 and, after his death, the
constitutional experiment ground to a halt. The new ministers that Nicholas
appointed were conservative and unimaginative nonentities who were not
likely to cause him any trouble. The power of the prime minister declined and
the battles between ministers and conflicting departmental policies returned
to its old pattern. There was little chatice of a creative relationship with the
Duma. Indeed the government abandoned any attempt to present a coherent
package of reforms to the Duma. Nicholas and his court cronies were becoming
increasingly isolated and depended almost entirely on right-wing support,
particularly that of the All-Russian Union of Landowners (or United Nobility).
Nicholas must take a large share of the responsibility for this. He had never
really been willing to work with or listen to the Duma. Those close to him
were always looking for ways to reduce its power and Nicholas looked for
excuses to close down sessions. In Stolypin he had a chance to bring in
significant reforms but Nicholas had never backed him in any consistent way
and had at the end contrived with his right-wing friends to thwart him. He
did not want to change the key institutions of the Russian autocracy or the
main legal arrangements. At heart, Nicholas did not believe that democratic
government was a good idea; he wanted to preserve the autocracy because he
believed it was a better way of running Russia. Not all the blame should be
attached to the Tsar, however. The Kadets' demands in the early Dumas were
very radical and they were not prepared to compromise or be patient. As a
result, the Duma degenerated into quarrels and a bitter struggle between the
Tsar and his supporters on the right, and the liberals and other parties on
the left. This did not allow for any relationship of trust and co-operation to
develop. By 1913, the liberals, a much reduced force, had little hope of getting
what they wanted.
Some historians believe that the existence of the Duma showed that political
progress was being made. It had done some useful work and there was evidence
to show that a working relationship between Duma and government minsters
could be established. Further, it provided reason to believe that the regime
might slip into some form of constitutional government in the future. Other
historians consider that the Duma experiment had failed to bring about any
fundamental change to the conduct of government, and the relationship
between Tsar and people, and that articulate groups who had participated
in the Duma were becoming increasingly disillusioned. The autocracy had
fought off any attempt to reform it and the political aspirations of the Russian
people had been frustrated. Dominic Lieven, who is generally supportive
of the Tsar says: "Russia's situation in 1914 did not augur well for a peaceful
transition to liberalism and democracy. This was partly because the Emperor,
who still retained the last word in such matters, could only be pressured into
constitutional concessions by the dire and immediate threat of revolution".
Stolypin
Could Stolypin have saved the Tsar?
Peter Stolypin came to notice as a provincial governor in Saratov where he
had forcefully dealt with peasant unrest. He was appointed Minister of the
Interior and, soon after, Prime Minister. Stolypin was a strong supporter of the
autocracy and opponent of revolution and disorder. He had set up field courts-
martial in 1906 to crush peasant uprisings. Under his watch, thousands of
peasants were executed by hanging (Stolypin's neckties) and thousands sent
into exile in 'Stolypin carriages (railway cars). This earned him the enmity of
the left who condemned him as a brutal butcher.
However, he was not a diehard supporter of autocracy. Like Witte before him, he
believed that reform was essential to solve Russia's problems. He believed that
industrial progress alone was not sufficient to take Russia forward and gave his
main attention to agriculture. His land reforms (see page 59) had bold aims: to
feed the rapidly growing population and create a strong conservative peasantry
who would support the regime. If he had succeeded, this would indeed have
radically altered Russia's future. But it was always going to take years to work in
the face of a deeply conservative peasantry. He did not have that time.
Stolypin was virtually the only prime minister of the constitutional decade to
see the Duma as a partner in building a strong Russia. He did not consider that
he was limiting the monarch's authority but rather giving it a broader social
base. In particular he developed an understanding with the Octobrists which
allowed him to push through his reforms. His success suggested the possibility
of a working relationship between government and elected assembly.
However, his own actions undermined this relationship. He had, in what was
known as Stolypin's coup', radically changed the electoral system when the
Second Duma proved unworkable. To all intents and purposes he had deprived
the workers and peasants of their votes and created a more conservative
electorate likely to produce a more amenable Duma, Also, he cynically used
Article 87 of the Fundamental Laws which allowed him to pass measures by
decree when the Duma was not sitting. In March 1911 he persuaded the Tsar
to suspend both houses of the Duma to allow him to force his measure to
introduce zemstva in the western provinces. This alienated the Duma including
the majority of the Octobrists who had hitherto supported him.
Stolypin was assassinated at the theatre in September 1911 but his star was
already waning by this time. He had proposed a series of reforms to extend
civil rights, reform local government (giving the peasants more influence in
zemstva) and local justice (abolishing Land Captains) and make changes in
education and a reform of emergency powers. The right and those close to the
Tsar considered that his dangerous reform policies undermined the principles
of autocracy and they worked to block him and get him out of office. When he
died, it seems that the Tsar was quite pleased to see the back of him, the Tsar's
wife, Alexandra, had always hated Stolypin.
The enmity which confronted Stolypin from all sides demonstrated the
difficulty of taking a middle road in Russia. He seemed to understand this
himself when he commented to Bernard Pares, a British historian, in 1906,
I am fighting on two fronts. I am fighting against revolution, but for reform,
You may say that such a position is beyond human strength and you may be
right. In the final analysis, apart from his land reforms, he was not able to
implement much of his programme of reforms and even then only with the use
of emergency powers.
Stolypin remains a controversial figure. He has many admirers who believe
that, given the support of the Tsar and the time to implement his reforms, he
was the only person who could have saved Russia from revolution and brought
about a more peaceful transition into the modern age. According to Richard
Pipes, the American historian, 'Stolypin stood head and shoulders above his
immediate predecessors and successors in that he combined a vision of the
desirable with a sense of the possible; he was a rare blend of statesman and
politician.
103
Transcribed Image Text:Part 1 Autocracy, Reform and Revolution: Russia, 1855-1917 102 Stolypin - Politics KEY DATES: THE DUMAS April-June 1906: First Duma February-June 1907: Second Duma November 1907-June 1912: Third Duma November 1912-August 1914: Fourth Duma 11/12/23 LOOK AGAIN On page 97 the activity asked you to reflect on what had been learned from the 1905 revolution. What do you think now? How well had the Tsar done in the ensuing period up to 1914? Do you think the constitutional experiment could have worked more satisfactorily? How far was the constitutional experiment working by 1914? Stolypin was assassinated in September 1911 and, after his death, the constitutional experiment ground to a halt. The new ministers that Nicholas appointed were conservative and unimaginative nonentities who were not likely to cause him any trouble. The power of the prime minister declined and the battles between ministers and conflicting departmental policies returned to its old pattern. There was little chatice of a creative relationship with the Duma. Indeed the government abandoned any attempt to present a coherent package of reforms to the Duma. Nicholas and his court cronies were becoming increasingly isolated and depended almost entirely on right-wing support, particularly that of the All-Russian Union of Landowners (or United Nobility). Nicholas must take a large share of the responsibility for this. He had never really been willing to work with or listen to the Duma. Those close to him were always looking for ways to reduce its power and Nicholas looked for excuses to close down sessions. In Stolypin he had a chance to bring in significant reforms but Nicholas had never backed him in any consistent way and had at the end contrived with his right-wing friends to thwart him. He did not want to change the key institutions of the Russian autocracy or the main legal arrangements. At heart, Nicholas did not believe that democratic government was a good idea; he wanted to preserve the autocracy because he believed it was a better way of running Russia. Not all the blame should be attached to the Tsar, however. The Kadets' demands in the early Dumas were very radical and they were not prepared to compromise or be patient. As a result, the Duma degenerated into quarrels and a bitter struggle between the Tsar and his supporters on the right, and the liberals and other parties on the left. This did not allow for any relationship of trust and co-operation to develop. By 1913, the liberals, a much reduced force, had little hope of getting what they wanted. Some historians believe that the existence of the Duma showed that political progress was being made. It had done some useful work and there was evidence to show that a working relationship between Duma and government minsters could be established. Further, it provided reason to believe that the regime might slip into some form of constitutional government in the future. Other historians consider that the Duma experiment had failed to bring about any fundamental change to the conduct of government, and the relationship between Tsar and people, and that articulate groups who had participated in the Duma were becoming increasingly disillusioned. The autocracy had fought off any attempt to reform it and the political aspirations of the Russian people had been frustrated. Dominic Lieven, who is generally supportive of the Tsar says: "Russia's situation in 1914 did not augur well for a peaceful transition to liberalism and democracy. This was partly because the Emperor, who still retained the last word in such matters, could only be pressured into constitutional concessions by the dire and immediate threat of revolution". Stolypin Could Stolypin have saved the Tsar? Peter Stolypin came to notice as a provincial governor in Saratov where he had forcefully dealt with peasant unrest. He was appointed Minister of the Interior and, soon after, Prime Minister. Stolypin was a strong supporter of the autocracy and opponent of revolution and disorder. He had set up field courts- martial in 1906 to crush peasant uprisings. Under his watch, thousands of peasants were executed by hanging (Stolypin's neckties) and thousands sent into exile in 'Stolypin carriages (railway cars). This earned him the enmity of the left who condemned him as a brutal butcher. However, he was not a diehard supporter of autocracy. Like Witte before him, he believed that reform was essential to solve Russia's problems. He believed that industrial progress alone was not sufficient to take Russia forward and gave his main attention to agriculture. His land reforms (see page 59) had bold aims: to feed the rapidly growing population and create a strong conservative peasantry who would support the regime. If he had succeeded, this would indeed have radically altered Russia's future. But it was always going to take years to work in the face of a deeply conservative peasantry. He did not have that time. Stolypin was virtually the only prime minister of the constitutional decade to see the Duma as a partner in building a strong Russia. He did not consider that he was limiting the monarch's authority but rather giving it a broader social base. In particular he developed an understanding with the Octobrists which allowed him to push through his reforms. His success suggested the possibility of a working relationship between government and elected assembly. However, his own actions undermined this relationship. He had, in what was known as Stolypin's coup', radically changed the electoral system when the Second Duma proved unworkable. To all intents and purposes he had deprived the workers and peasants of their votes and created a more conservative electorate likely to produce a more amenable Duma, Also, he cynically used Article 87 of the Fundamental Laws which allowed him to pass measures by decree when the Duma was not sitting. In March 1911 he persuaded the Tsar to suspend both houses of the Duma to allow him to force his measure to introduce zemstva in the western provinces. This alienated the Duma including the majority of the Octobrists who had hitherto supported him. Stolypin was assassinated at the theatre in September 1911 but his star was already waning by this time. He had proposed a series of reforms to extend civil rights, reform local government (giving the peasants more influence in zemstva) and local justice (abolishing Land Captains) and make changes in education and a reform of emergency powers. The right and those close to the Tsar considered that his dangerous reform policies undermined the principles of autocracy and they worked to block him and get him out of office. When he died, it seems that the Tsar was quite pleased to see the back of him, the Tsar's wife, Alexandra, had always hated Stolypin. The enmity which confronted Stolypin from all sides demonstrated the difficulty of taking a middle road in Russia. He seemed to understand this himself when he commented to Bernard Pares, a British historian, in 1906, I am fighting on two fronts. I am fighting against revolution, but for reform, You may say that such a position is beyond human strength and you may be right. In the final analysis, apart from his land reforms, he was not able to implement much of his programme of reforms and even then only with the use of emergency powers. Stolypin remains a controversial figure. He has many admirers who believe that, given the support of the Tsar and the time to implement his reforms, he was the only person who could have saved Russia from revolution and brought about a more peaceful transition into the modern age. According to Richard Pipes, the American historian, 'Stolypin stood head and shoulders above his immediate predecessors and successors in that he combined a vision of the desirable with a sense of the possible; he was a rare blend of statesman and politician. 103
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