This biography offers insight into the personal and public lives of two men who so initially agreed then feverishly denied each other’s foreign policy proposals. Concluding with Nitze, as the hawk and Kennan, starring as the dove.
Washington D.C. in the summertime is constantly perspiring, a rather miserable place to be. And, although the summer of 1949 was equally as dredged, Paul Nitze, an expert economist who lacked status in the United States government, was about to receive the opportunity of a lifetime. George Kennan, longtime diplomat and Russian studies expert, was looking to retire to his quiet farm in Pennsylvania, but he needed to leave a successor for the Policy Planning Staff. He decided on Paul Nitze. However, just months later after Russia succeeded in building and testing an atomic bomb and Nitze’s appeal for an assessment of U.S. Foreign Policy, Kennan on September 30 wrote, “I face the work of these remaining months with neither enthusiasm nor hope for achievement.” Obviously, the Cold War would be a large undertaking for any Russian expert in the State Department, however, it is more than likely that he was referring to working closely with colleague whose foreign policy tactics evidently began to differ greatly from his own as time would show. On February 23, 1946, George Kennan was the most careful, thought-provoking, “nobody” in the United States government. He was considered to be the most widely knowledgeable on Russian affairs, after having lived
Casey argues on the impact the Korean War had on Harry S. Truman’s publicity operations. Moreover, Casey references that even for revisionist historians Truman made a mark in the realm of foreign-policy leadership. Case in point, analysts oversee the fact that Truman was a war president and unlike the world wars Korea was different as it was a “hot war that broke out in the midst of an ongoing cold war.” The historical significance is that emphasizes how even a limited war has an important impact. Casey relies on a variety primary and secondary sources to justify his argument. Sources from the Defense and State Department Papers dating from the 1950s and similar to Matray referencing John L. Gaddis. However, Elizabeth Edwards Spalding argues on the fundamental differences between that developed between Truman and Kennan and their perspective about on the Cold War and U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, Truman’s principles not only gave rise to and defined containment, but helped America by recognizing the Cold War and as an outcome of this important part, that Harry S. Truman was the first cold war warrior. Spalding claims that Truman’s containment approach provided the grounds for a new liberal internationalism. Moreover, for Truman, international meant that American leadership was central as his ideas and policies
Throughout the course of history, the United States has remained consistent with its national interest by taking many different actions in foreign policy. There have been both immediate and long term results of these actions. Foreign policy is the United States policy that defines how we deal with other countries economically and politically. It is made by congress, the president, and the people. Some of the motivations for United States foreign policy are national security, economics, and idealism. The United States entry into World War I in 1917 and the escalation of the Vietnam War in 1964 and the both had great impact on the United States.
George Kennan's containment plan is a radical shift in the U.S foreign policy when the Policy of the United States towards the Soviet Union prior, and during the World War II is considered. The containment policy marks the shift of American foreign policy towards the Soviets from alliance to deterrence. Kennan's states in the Long Telegram, "USSR still lives in antagonistic "capitalist encirclement" with which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence." (Citation needed) only two years after the end of World War II, a war both the U.S and the Soviet Union fought side by side for a common ambition. If the aspect of radical shift in the U.S foreign policy is seen from a post-Cold War perspective, another radical change can
Source C focuses on the American relationship with the Soviet Union and their indefinite competition to be better than the other, giving information about the commencement of the arms race between the two countries and their discreet battle over which country had the better security and defense system. This source contains information that is critical to one’s understanding of the American policies that were legislated at the given time period.
First, in the Stalin speech in 1946, he stated “the only key to future world peace was for “monopoly capitalism” to be replaced by Communism around the world.” It became clear to the Supreme Court Justice William Douglas that Stalin was declaring another World War based in his ideology. (Fraser 697). Based on Stalin speech, the American embassy in Moscow, George Kennan sent the “Long Telegram”, which he explained his strategy of “containment” against Soviet Union, “a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with the U.S. there can be no permanent modus vivendi [agreement between parties that disagree]”; as a result, America’s only choice
Shortly after World War II, the world’s two most powerful nations, the United States and the Soviet Union, emerged as arch-adversaries and in doing so, they created a rivalry that casted a shadow over international affairs for decades known as the Cold War. The Soviet Union saw the United States as a ruthless, imperialist power whose goal was to destroy communism and encourage the growth of a capitalist world. In contrast, America saw the Soviets as a ruthless, imperialist, and totalitarian power whose goal was to destroy democracy and encourage a Communist revolution through expansion. Therefore, the United States’ actions toward the Soviet Union was justifiable after World War II. American diplomat George Kennan said how the Soviets were
George Kennan was a major factor in the U.S. foreign policy of containment, which was created during the Cold War in order to prevent the spread of Communist ideology of the Soviet Union in other countries. After World War II, George Kennan, “...a career diplomat and expert on Russia…”(Roark, Pg.867), had anticipated that the Soviet Union wanted to gain power and expand Communism throughout other countries, so in order to provide a counterforce and protect American capitalism, Kennan developed the idea of containment that defended threaten countries from Communist power with American atomic weapons, economic aid, espionage, propaganda, and army alliances. Eventually, the containment policy was significant in America and around the world because it was “...a critical turning point in the development of the Cold War, providing a compelling rationale for wielding U.S. power throughout the world.”(Roark, Pg.870) (Roark, Pg.867)
This article written by George Kennedy is essentially a review of the United States Government's views on the Soviet situation. It introduces the idea of a policy of containment which ultimately was going to be the way America would battle the Cold War with the Soviet Union.
George F. Kennan served as an American diplomat with a background in history and political scientist. He was an influential member of the United States State Department during the Truman Administration and under Secretary of State George C. Marshall (George 2014). Kennan wrote an article titles The Sources of Soviet Conduct in which he highlights policies of the Soviet Union as well as the opinionated response of the United States. He strongly vindicates soviet policy as secretive and suspicious, and that a relationship with this nation should be watched with an ever-careful eye (Kennan 2017, 549). The Soviet Union and the principles of communism believe that capitalism is evil, and in their terms “can lead to the exploitation of the working class by capital-owning classes”, (Kennan 2017, 547). Within the article, Kennan explicitly attacks the aggressive expansionist soviet regime. He warns that the soviets adhere to the notion that they have a duty to eventually overthrow or topple other political forces or regimes beyond their indicated borders. The soviets also felt that to keep these policies in check, the system of centralized government must be held in the clenches of a dictator, or totalitarian figure (Kennan 2017, 548). Kennan drew out plans for the United States that would eventually be known as the “containment” policy. He proposed that foreign policy initiatives should pressure the Soviet Union. The policy must focus on a long-term, vigilant containment of Russian
United States Foreign Policy has always been in a constant form of metamorphosis. Gradually, since the birth of the United States of America, the country has been slowly evolving it’s policies and relations with other countries. The United States began its history as a insignificant isolated nation. It slowly overtime would change to what the powerhouse that it is today: A Global Superpower.
Kennan, author of the Long Telegram, published an influential article under the pseudonym “Mr. X” in the journal Foreign Affairs in which he outlined a policy of containment against the Soviet Union. The strategy was designed to put enough pressure on the Soviet Union to produce a change in both its internal structure and its international conduct. The application of counter-forces at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points were designed to break-up or gradually mellow Soviet power. Thereafter, the United States embarked on a global strategy to confront the Soviet Union. Notwithstanding changes in tactics, containment remained the basis for U.S. policy for four decades.
Cleva also examines what he terms the “Kissinger cycle” of foreign policy, which advocated limited war and continued enhancement of military strength . Cleva cites the paradoxes present in Kissinger’s foreign policy, for example, the reason a virulent anti-communist could negotiate détente is that Kissinger also sought to avoid nuclear holocaust .
It was a cold day in March 1946 when Winston Churchill took the stage at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri to deliver what would become one of his well-known speeches. The 74 year-old had recently been voted out of office in England, nonetheless he was still giant on the world stage. A small stage was erected so that the vast crowds of people present could hear him speak. In his address, Churchill would warn of the growing power of the Soviet Union, saying “From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent.” Churchill’s observations and dire predictions would prove true in the coming decades. For the next fifty years, the Soviet Union and the United States would be pitted
The Kissinger Transcripts, edited by a senior analyst, provides insight into the top secret talks of Henry Kissinger with Beijing and Moscow through declassified transcripts. The origin of this source is the National Security Archive, along with expert commentary written by William Burr, who received his Ph.D. in history. The purpose of the book is to help others understand the diplomacy of Henry Kissinger, who is considered to be one of the most influential figures of the Cold War era. Because these transcripts were formerly classified, they offer insights and new pieces of information that has not been seen by the public. It is valuable in that it offers both sides of the conversation, so the reader could see the conversations that have changed history unfold. The limitation of the document lies in the analysis portions of the book, due to the bias that William Burr may have held in editing the transcripts, perhaps editing out portions that could have put Henry Kissinger in a bad light.
In "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", George Kennan assesses the predicament of Soviet power, and their political ideologies within the international arena in 1947. He deliberates on the ideologies of the complex Soviet regime, the uncertainty of the Soviet leaders, and the way in which the U.S.A. may be able to restrict their regime.