Analysis Of Daniel Dennett 's ' Where Am I '

In a series of relatively simple though complexly-worded (out of necessity) thought experiments regarding body-swapping and changes to memory and the mind, Bernard Williams attempts to demonstrate that identity should be identified with the body rather than with the mind when identity is extended into the future (and by extension during the present). That is, though it is typical for identity to be associated with the mind at any given moment, Williams argues that the logic that supports this intuitive association does not hold up over longer periods of time, and that anticipation of the future leads to an association of identity with the body rather than with the mind. Whether or not Williams is successful in this attempt is a matter of much debate, with this author finding some fundamental flaws in the very premise of the comparisons and thus the conclusions, however the argument is fairly elegant and persuasive and certainly worth of closer inspection. A careful reading of the argument might lead one to a conclusion opposite to that which was intended, but is no less rewarding for this unusual quirk.

The mind is a complex myriad of thoughts and psychological systems that even philosophers today cannot entirely grapple. It is composed of the senses, feelings, perceptions, and a whole series of other components. However, the mind is often believed to be similar or even the same as the brain. This gives rise to the mind-brain identity theory, and whether there exists a clear distinction between the physical world and the non-material mind. In this paper, I will delineate the similarities and differences between mind and brain, describe the relevant ideas such as functionalism and materialism, and provide explanations on how these theories crystallized. Further, I will discuss the differing views of this concept from multiple philosophers’ perspectives and highlight the significance of each. Ultimately, I will defend the view that the mind-brain identity theory is false by analyzing its errors and examining the invalid assumptions it makes about consciousness.

Daniel Dennett tackles these mind and body questions in his essay, Where Am I. In Daniel Dennett’s, Where Am I, Dennett agrees to undergo an operation with would remove his brain from his body and insert an antennae that would enable his brain to control his body remotely. When Dennett wakes up, he finds that he doesn’t know where he is, but not in that sense that he was geographically lost. Dennett has woken up to find himself in his body without his brain, leaving him with the question, where am I? Is Dennett still in his body, in his brain, or in some cross-section between the two?

The book “With No Direction Home: Homeless Youth on the Road and in the Streets” written by Marni Finkelstein refers to the homeless youth. This book describes the lifestyle of the teenagers with no home and explains with detail about what consist in their everyday lives in the streets of New York City. The purpose of this book is to explain to people who these kids are and to see life in their point of view. It explains the difference between street kids and the kids that live on the street. We need to understand that the kids that live on the streets have their own culture and their own way of surviving. Learning their point of view would be a great eye opening experience for everyone and to also understand their struggle. This book explains a study that was done to 50 street kids and life on the streets.

Am I the same person today as I was yesterday? Will I be the same person a few years from now as I am now? Kagan explains a few theories that can help with figuring out what makes me, me. There is the soul theory, the body theory, and the personality theory. The body theory consists of the brain and body theory and the torso and body theory. After looking into each theory carefully through Kagan’s lectures, I found that there were flaws in all three theories. The theory that I favor, however, is the body theory and more specifically the brain aspect of that theory. In my essay I will discuss why I favor the body theory and its strength and weaknesses. I will also discuss Kagan’s take on survival.

For centuries philosophers have engaged themselves into conversations and arguments trying to figure out the nature of a human person; this has lead to various theories and speculation about the nature of the human mind and body. The question they are tying to answer is whether a human being is made of only the physical, body and brain, or both the physical or the mental, mind. In this paper I will focus on the mind-body Identity Theory to illustrate that it provides a suitable explanation for the mind and body interaction.

“Solitude, yes. Think of being alone and frozen in the crypt, the capsule. Will new technologies allow the brain to function at the level of identity? This is the mask, the created character in the medley of

Thus, one may further conclude that the only difference between a "normal" individual and Dennett's hypothetical case is the great temporal gap that exists between the brain and the body in Dennett's case. A difference that one may believe does not have clear philosophical implications. Therefore, it can be suggested that Dennett, in setting up his scenario in this way, does not contribute much more insight into the ‘self'-phenomenon than many

In, “A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality,” the author, John Perry, proposes three totally different ways of thinking about personal identity. The first theory is presented by a character named Gretchen Weirob, she believes that a person is their body. By this she means that a person’s identity is intertwined with the DNA and molecules of their body. Their personality as well as their personal identity can’t be separated from their body, and they cannot exist without it. The second theory was presented by a character named Sam Miller, he believes that a person is their immaterial soul. So in general, Sam thinks that the soul is this invisible, immaterial substance that is able to exist from the body. The third and final theory was presented by a character named Dave Cohen. Cohen believes that a person has continuity of memory, and/or psychology. So in general Cohen’s theory is that personal identity is a set of correlating experiences and/or memories enclosed in the brain. All three of the personal identity theories state some very valid points, but they also have some inconsistencies, some more than others. But there is one theory that seems to be the most credible, and creates a very compelling argument while also having a little science to back up some of its points.

In every person, an ego which interacts with the world appears to exist; hence, languages use the basic pronouns, “I” and “you.” However, what can one truly classify as the self? Cognitive scientist Bruce Hood defines an illusion as, “[the] experience of something that is not what it seems.” By this definition, he classifies the self as illusory; humans naturally experience their self, but it does not actually exist. Similarly, in Pablo Neruda’s The Egoist, Neruda contrasts the ego with the natural world, deeming abandoning one’s self a necessary step to obtain lasting satisfaction with existence. Neruda conveys his idea as a physician would a diagnosis; first identifying the problem’s nature, then outlining its effects and solution.

In the world of philosophy, there has been an ever growing skepticism of the relationship between the human body and its mental state. The physical state of a person is tangible, meaning that they can be seen by anyone and touched. While the mental state of a person is embedded in their consciencousness, meaning that it can’t be observed by others unless willing expressed by said person. I will be using Leibniz’s law of identity to show that the metal states of an individual are distinct from a physical state. Using the notion of sameness, I can prove a valid argument that the physical and mental states are distinct. While this theory in part can be debated, some identity theorists can provide a rebuttal this claim. I will provide a response to an identity theorist rebuttal.

In Where am I?, Daniel Dennett goes through a series of operations and life changing experiences that involves separating his brain and body, having his body buried alive, and then shares a body between his brain and an ‘identical’ brain. The topic of the paper is the discussion of where and when Dennett exists throughout the narrative. It is an interesting topic because it forces the reader to consider the the necessary and sufficient conditions for a person to exis. In this paper, I will argue that Daniel Dennett exists as Yorick (brain by itself) or the combination of Yorick/Hamlet or Yorick/Fortinbras. Dennett still existing as Yorick or as the combination of Yorick/Hamlet or Yorick/Fortinbras is lockean theory. This means that having a body is neither a sufficient or necessary condition for being a person.This is how Dennett is able to survive until the end of the story.

If on Tuesday, I suffer an accident and lose all of my memory, it is probable that my family and friends will still love and care for me, creating an impression that I am indeed the same person I once was. These conditions imply the theses of animalism and bodily continuity when it comes to personal identity. However, is this human habit enough to discard the idea that it is psychological continuity that sustains identity? Whilst many may argue that it would be against our intuition to say that I am no longer the same person, I do not believe that this is caused by our intuition, but instead a societal construct that’s sole purpose is to make the trauma of the accident and loss easier to deal with. By using this premise and upholding the psychological

The first answer Dennett provides, that he is where his brain is. The problem with this is that he didn’t mind that his brain was taken out as long as his body was not imprisoned. This shows that he didn’t consider his brain as part of his identity.

Relating to Daniel Dennett’s essay “Where am I” if Yorrick (Dennett’s brain) were to die would Dennett continue to exist through Hubert (the computer program that functionally mirrors his brain)? Dennett would not be able to survive because even though Hubert functions like Yorrick, Hubert isn’t able to recall memories and thoughts that make up a large part of Dennett. An example of this would be if you were to put your brain in a famous singer’s body and take their brain, would you be where they were or would you be in school right now? If they were to get interviewed about their past, what would they say. Memories and our feelings are vital to who we are. The celebrity might claim to be you and be able to tell personal stories about you. So Even though Dennett continues to have basic function such as breathing and a heart beat, his trust testament to himself, which included his personality, intelligence, and desires are not shown through Hubert.