As mentioned above, the Physicalist doctrine has come under serious threat by an argument for Property Dualism (and therefore against Physicalism). We have already seen this Property Dualism Argument (henceforth PDA) in its original formulation by J.J.C. Smart, but it will be helpful to look at a few of its reincarnations to fully grasp its scope. I will introduce two notable and familiar examples, namely Chalmers’ Zombie argument and Jackson’s Mary’s room argument, and then show, using Block’s terminology of reference, how they boil down to having the same generic form as Smart’s (CHECK WHETHER YOU’RE PLAGIARISING FROM BLOCK HERE). Formulating the generic PDA in Block’s terms exposes its central premises as well as its critical points. Reincarnations of the Property Dualism Argument
In 1982, Frank Jackson proposed an argument to the effect that phenomenal properties are irreducible to physical properties by appealing to knowledge. His reasoning runs as follows:
Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She specialises in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like 'red ', 'blue ', and so on. […] What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room or is given a colour television monitor? Will she
Moreland refutes physicalism through is argument of personal identity. His argument starts out with an example. (pg. 311)
He presents Mary, a scientist who focusses on colour processing in the brain, whilst having never left a black and white room, or experienced colour. Jackson’s argument rests on the premise that upon seeing colour she will learn something new, and given that she knew everything there was to know about the physical world, there must be epiphenomenal qualia which physicalism fails to explain.
The zombie argument presents an idea meant to prove that consciousness doesn’t necessarily logically supervene on the physical. In this example there exists a zombie, defined as “someone or something physically identical to me ( or any other conscious being) but lacking conscious experiences altogether.” (Chalmers,94) Zombie world is then defined as “a world physically identical to ours,but in which there are no conscious experiences at all. In such a world, everyone is a zombie.” (Chalmers, 94) In this idea, only “phenomenal zombies” are to be considered meaning zombies that are “physically and functionally identical ( as us) , but which lack experience” (Chalmers 95) There are five main arguments that stand behind this idea, the first two being ideas regarding conceivability, the second two arguments of epistemology and the fifth and argument of analysis.
Coup Poudre - there is knowledge about the existence of Zombies and how they are created. A drug used to induce death/or give the appearance of death contains tetrodoxin and is produced by puffer fish. In small quantities the coup poudre, as is known, is ingested unknowingly by the person and will quickly give appearance of death as it gives total
Physicalism is a philosophical theory that attempts to solve the mind-body problem with its explanation of the results of the interactions between our brains and our bodies. Physicalism explains that everything in the universe is made up of
In “vampires never die” Guillermo Del Toro and Chuck Hogan use technology advancement to explain the creation of vampires, also using mixed vocabulary and expressions to explain a more serious tone. On the other hand, James Parker uses the development of the modern zombie to explain the stereotype of these creatures in his article “Our Zombies, Ourselves,” while using more playful expressions to show his tone. These three authors seem to have the same concepts while writing about these monsters, but still disagreeing on some points. While there are some key differences in these two articles, they are similar in many ways also. All three authors agree and disagree on several points, such as they both appeal to more intellectual audiences, and they both write about conformity with the want to fit in, while disagreeing on what they use to explain their monster’s general idea.
Property dualism proclaims the existence of a single, physical substance (unlike Cartesian dualism), but argues that this single
The zombie problem that parts of the U.S and parts of Canada are facing is something that everybody should be worried about. John Hafernik first notice the zombie bees outside of his lab when he thought that the bees were acting strange. This is showing that instead of pika sting plants or collecting nectar they are walking in circles. Without them pollinating plants and flowers and collecting nectar we don't get honey neither do we he get do we get oxygen which plants and flowers create.a few weeks after he captured the zombees he saw that the bees had decomposed into fly pupae. This is saying that when the flies infect the bees they will soon die because the files hach out of the bee. So if this spreads all over to the U.S or the world
The following is a thought experiment by Jackson to undermine Physicalism. “Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She specialises in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like ‘red’, ‘blue’, and so on. She discovers, for example, just which wavelength combinations from the sky stimulate the retina...What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room or is given a colour television monitor? Will she learn anything or not? It seems just obvious that she will learn something about the world and our visual experience of it. But then it is inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. But she had all the physical information. Ergo there is more to have than that, and Physicalism is false” (Jackson 130). At this point of time, Mary supposedly
In denying that the mind and mental properties, like qualia, are nonphysical things, mind-brain theory objects to both substance and property dualism. Therefore it is a physicalist approach to the philosophy of
There are two main theories that make up the knowledge argument. The first is Physicalism, (or better known as materialism) which is the thesis that “All facts are dependent upon physical processes.”(Smart) The other main stance taken is property dualism. The thesis of property dualism states that there are “Non-physical properties of physical substances” (Calef) or that there are physical and mental properties. In this article, I will defend the stance of property dualism by acknowledging objections and replying to these objections to show why the argument for property dualism works.
After reading the Jackson article I have concluded that I agree with the points being made against physicalism. The example that I believe disproves physicalism is trying to
Not only do Zombies raise disputes concerning consciousness, but they also raise questions about other elements of people. The philosophical zombie problem is one of the most compelling and nightmarish of all the philosophical problems. It cuts to the heart of how we relate to the world and how we relate to people, and it is obviously a very practical issue. While no one really believes that we are surrounded by clockwork people going through a set of motions as if they were a real person, we do very often relate to someone going through the motions of trying to help us when they have an insidious motive, or wonder how sincere someone else is when they say that “I love you.” It is an open neurological question as to whether or not something
The mind is perhaps the most fascinating part of the human body due to its complexity and ability to rationalize. In essence, the mind-body problem studies the relation of the mind to the body, and states that each human being seems to embody two unique and somewhat contradictory natures. Each human contains both a nature of matter and physicality, just like any other object that contains atoms in the universe. However, mankind also is constituted of something beyond materialism, which includes its ability to rationalize and be self-aware. This would imply that mankind is not simply another member of the world of matter because some of its most distinctive features cannot be accounted for in this manner. There are obvious differences between physical and mental properties. Physical properties are publically accessible, and have weight, texture, and are made of matter. Mental properties are not publically accessible, and have phenomenological texture and intentionality (Stewart, Blocker, Petrik, 2013). This is challenging to philosophers, because man cannot be categorized as a material or immaterial object, but rather a combination of both mind and body (Stewart, Blocker, Petrik, 2013). Man embodies mind-body dualism, meaning he is a blend of both mind and matter (Stewart, Blocker, Petrick, 2013). The mind-body problem creates conflict among philosophers, especially when analyzing physicalism in its defense. This paper outlines sound
It can be very difficult to find a universal proposal that offers a solution to the mind body problem. While solutions to this problem differ greatly, all attempt to answer questions such as: What makes a mental state mental? What is the fundamental nature of the mental? Or more specifically speaking, what makes a thought a thought? Or what makes a pain a pain? In an attempt to answer these questions, many philosophers over the centuries have rejected, proposed, or altered preexisting theories in order to keep up with the thinking and science of their times. Entering the 21st century their still exit a plethora of theories, some stronger than others, which include Cartesian dualism, physicalism,