Bostongal Valley Mission Command

Six principles comprise the philosophy of mission command: (a) build cohesive teams through mutual trust; (b) create share understanding; (c) provide clear commander’s intent; (d) exercise disciplined initiative; (e) use mission orders; and (f) accept prudent risk. When combined together, these six principles assist the commander in balancing the aforementioned art of command and science of control. To understand how General Robert E. Lee’s performance at Gettysburg lacked the marks of a great mission commander necessitates a deeper understanding of the individual principles of mission command.

General Patton did an outstanding job demonstrating the four of the six steps of Mission Command during the Battle of the Bulge. The forces that General Patton led were subjected to a stern leadership and instilled tighter discipline than any other American field forces in World War II. General Patton lived by a few principles daily and one of those include a quote he made of his own “say what you mean, and mean what you say.” An example of his quote he enforced in his soldiers that he made sure that regulations concerning uniforms were rigidly enforced, and on many occasions he imposed fines or other punishments when he found his men on front lines violating the rules he

Operational leaders down to the platoon and squad level have recently faced increasingly complex missions in uncertain operational environments. Accordingly, Army doctrine has shifted to officially recognize mission command, which enables leaders at the lowest level feasible to “exercise disciplined initiative” in the accomplishment of a larger mission. The operational process consists of six tenants: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. During the battle of Fallujah, LtGen Natonski understood the intent two levels up, visualizing courses of action for both allies and the enemy, and leading his organization into combat while directing his officers and soldiers to meet his intent. He visualized that Marines alone could not accomplish the mission. He understood that without the support of Iraqi police and a task force from the Army with

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0 defines mission command as “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations” (U.S Army, Training and Doctrine Command, Combined Arms Center, Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, 2015, p. 1). The six principles of mission command direct leaders to build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, provide a clear commander’s intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk. These principles enable subordinates that

Successful leadership on a battlefield can be measured in different ways. It is possible for a good, successful leader to lose a battle. Conversely, it is possible for an ineffective leader to win a battle, given the right circumstances. What distinguishes a successful leader from an unsuccessful one is his/her ability to oversee an operation using effective mission command. In ADP 6-0, mission command as a philosophy is defined as “as the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations” (ADP, 1).

According to Army ADP 6-0, mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander, using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent, to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations (CAPE, 2012). Effective mission command can generally be analyzed according to the six principles outlined in ADRP 6-0. The six principles of mission command are to: build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, provide a clear commander’s intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk (CAPE, 2012). This paper provides a brief overview of the

What might have been the setback we previously faced in making decisive, clear or sound effective decisions? Was it a defect in how Commanders and Leaders led units or troops, or perhaps the philosophy in which we chose to command and control every aspect of the battlefield? What does it mean to recognize or comprehend the art of Command and the science of Control? The six principles of mission command are key in developing a cohesive team that will support all aspects of the mission. Asking “why” is now encouraged when it pertains to certain situations or missions. Understanding the purpose of why a course of action or desired outcome is necessary, leads to mission success and a cohesive unit with thinking leaders. Thinking clearly usually isn’t an issue for most leaders, but position an individual in a situation of extreme stress or complexity, then there might be a reason to be concerned. Through

This whole battalion was at a disadvantage before they left the states, given the mission

Operation Anaconda was a subordinate joint combat operation, during Operation Enduring Freedom, (Lyle 2012) to be carried out in the Shahi Kot Valley located in southeastern Afghanistan. Operations planning took place in February of 2002 and was executed from 2-16 March. The operational purpose was to capture or kill, what was reported to be, “The largest concentration of al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan”. Operation Anaconda Case Study (2003) In order to undertake a mission of this magnitude and scope, unity of command would prove critical. The task organization of Operation Anaconda involved both joint and multinational assets. Operation Anaconda lacked unity

Operation Anaconda was the first major joint combat operation against the war on terror that the US was committed to winning. This operation would test our military’s readiness for joint operations against a hardened and willing adversary. The primary mission was to kill/capture Taliban/Al Qaeda forces occupying towns and villages in the vicinity of Shahi Khot in order to gain control of the valley.1 The US needed the towns, villages, mountains, and more importantly, the intricate and hard to access caves cleared of enemy fighters. Units participating in the operation included elements of the 101st Airborne Division, 10th Mountain Division, Special Operations Forces (SOF), and Coalition forces from seven nations

Mission Command: The unity of command principle favored Colonial forces and their allies. General Washington refined his command climate through years of troubled multinational operations. He painfully understood the importance of synergy towards an end state. General Washington’s clear communication of intent and subordinate leader empowerment contrasted his adversaries. General Clinton’s combative command climate with Lord Cornwallis exacerbated their demise. Clear intent allowed the Colonial coalition to seize a fleeting opportunity at Yorktown.

In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.

From the battalion level to the company level the leadership from the top started to makes its way the individual squad members. As 1st platoon continue to have their struggles with the leadership they begin to also have them with the battlefield. The constant stress from the leadership began to build up and continued to build up with the environment they were set in. A lot of the company commanders became passive leader not knowing what to or did not want to do anything that would get on LTC Kunk’s bad side. CPT good did show signs of stress in some of his decision making one in particular cost him the lives of his men. The platoon leader of first platoon LT Britt was an enthusiastic leader who everyone in his platoon respected but later feared for his life before dying to IED. The platoon sergeant seemed to take everything well even with the lack of sleep and supply. The squad leaders

The Patrol is a story told by Ryan Flavelle about his experience on a seven day patrol in Afghanistan, Ryan Flavelle is a reservist in the Canadian army who volunteered to serve in Afghanistan for seven months and Ryan was a signaller for the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry. Initial conflict, Ryan is told that he will be going on a seven day patrol through villages that are controlled by the Taliban, their goal is to patrol the areas conduct searches of the villages and too eliminate any enemies along the way, Ryan and his squad gear up and begin their patrol, they clear two villages and make it to base Zangabad after going through dangerous mine fields

“We’re going back to the GU day after tomorrow”, my Platoon Leader (PL) said to me when I walked into his room for the morning update. He was referring to Afghan National Army Combat Outpost (ANCOP) Kalagu. We frequently visited the ANCOP during our deployment. We focused a lot of our time helping out the Afghan National Army (ANA). We primarily conducted dismounted patrols with the ANA in the surrounding town of Kalagu, to help them in planning and conducting their own operations. Our platoon went out to stay at the ANCOP usually once per month, and typically stayed for no longer than one week. This particular week was much different than the others.