Assignment Question Part A Issue The legal issue in this question is whether Jason Miao can go back on his promise of paying the extra $5,000 to Damien, for covering the additional cost of materials and additional work needed to construct the swimming pool. Principle The underline legal principle applicable to this situation is that ‘once an offer is complete, or in this case accepted, the offer cannot be revoked’. Doing so would constitute to a breach of contract. The offer shows a clear intention (to pay additional $5,000 on top of the original agreed amount of $30,000) of the offeror (Damien) that he intends to enter into a legal relationship with the offeree (Jason Miao). There was no further bargaining expected or mentioned, …show more content…
Argument However, one might also argue that a contract will not be frustrated merely because it becomes more difficult or more expensive to perform. The principle of law was established in the case of; Tsakiroglou & Co Lt v Noblee Thorl GmbH (1962) AC 93, (1961) 2 All ER 179 The case concerned a sale of groundnuts, from Port Sudan to Hamburg. The parties envisaged shipping through the Suez Canal, but the canal was closed after the contract was concluded. The court ruled that the contract was not frustrated. The fact that it was more difficult or more costly to perform is not sufficient to amount to frustration. The principle of this case is that a contract will not be frustrated merely because it becomes more difficult or expensive to perform. This is further illustrated in the book of; Force Majeure and Frustration of Contract, Second Edition by Ewan McKendrick (1995) Conclusion and Recommendation Following this line of argument, it is not possible that Jason Miao go back on his promise of paying the extra $5,000 to Damien. Jason Miao is still legally bounded by the contract to pay the additional amount as the contract is not discharged by frustration. Assignment Question Part B Issue The legal issue in this question is whether Damien’s decision having accepted the sum of $20,000 in full settlement f his account, out of the original contractual agreement of $35,000, is legally binding. In other words, can Damien take legal actions against
-The Reasoning: the face that the appellant did not like the fee indicated does not preclude the finding of a binding contract. Appellant intended to negotiate, but never did so. Appellant
Dale Alleman v. Brett J. Kitson, 341 Fed. Appx. 234. Appellant creditors, a corporation and its owner petitioned than an order of the
Leagle. (2008). Garelli Wong & Associates, Inc, v. Nichols. (551 F.Supp.2d 704). Retrieved from http://www.leagle.com/xmlResult.aspx?page=7&xmldoc=20081255551FSupp2d704_11203.xml&docbase=CSLWAR3-2007-CURR&SizeDisp=7
. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981).
Odishelidze v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 668 F. Supp. 94 (D.P.R. 1987) Tri-Continental Leasing Corp. v. Cicerchia, 664 F. Supp. 635 (D. Mass. 1987)
Background of the case: The issue of the case was that Ogden sued Gibbons when he started operating a ferry service. The defendant said that his ferry was licensed and that he had the right to operate his ferry in that location as well.
The U.S. court of appeals ruled that the general release Marder signed was an enforceable contract. In other words, the court of appeals agreed with the district court’s verdict dismissing Marder’s complaint against Paramount. Marder’s complaint against Paramount was invalid because the contract she had sign with them covered all four of the characteristic found within a legal contract. Both parties made an agreement to release and discharge during the signing of the contract. Paramount paying Marder $2,300 is classified as a promise that was supported by a bargain-for consideration. Marder had contractual capacity and the objective of the contract was lawful. Marder should have negotiated for a percentage of the profit instead of signing off
Gratz Et Al. V. Bollinger Et Al., 539 US 244 (2003). The case was originally heard in the Federal District Court, and finally decided in the Rehnquist Court.
Pleasant Valley Promenade v. Lechmere, Inc., 120 N.C.App. 650, 664, 464 S.E.2d 47, 58 (1995)
This case crossed the supreme court during the Warren burger court. Arthur Gochman and charles Wright argued for the appellees and the appellant respectively. It was decided on March 21, 1973
shown in the case of Branson v Bower (No.1) where the claimant tried to sue on the
Immingham is a provider of storage for petroleum products. The defendant, Clear Plc (“Clear”), was a commodities trader. Both sides exchanged a number of emails dealing storage availability and cost. A quotation was emailed to Clear, headed in bold capitals “Subject to board approval and tankage availability”, stating “a formal contract will follow in due course”. Immingham emailed Clear confirming Board approval with a subject heading “Contract Confirmation”. It included the wording “our full contract for this business will now be raised… and sent for your signature and return.” The “formal contract” was emailed to Clear, but was not signed or returned.
The legal issue is whether agreement of Sam and Matt is valid to form a legally enforceable contract.
A contracts with B to pay B Rs. 1,000 if he fails to pay B Rs. 500 on a given day. A fails to pay B Rs. 500 on that day. B is entitled to recover from A such compensation, not exceeding Rs. 1,000, as the court considers reasonable.”
In Chau v DPP (1995) 3 NSWLR 639 ALR 430; 82 A Crim R 339 (CA), Gleeson CJ