Collaborative Governance: Public Goals In Turbulent Times

As Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma successively lashed the gulf coast starting in late August 2005, nature’s fury exposed serious weaknesses in the United States’ emergency response capabilities. Not all emergencies pose this magnitude of challenge. In the United States, the initial—and usually major—responsibility for disaster response rests with local authorities. This “bottom-up” system of emergency management has a long history and continues to make sense in most circumstances. Core Challenges for Large-Scale Disaster

The whole world observed as the administration responders appeared incapable to provide essential protection from the effects of nature. The deprived response results from a failure to accomplish a number of risk factors (Moynihan, 2009). The dangers of a major hurricane striking New Orleans had been measured, and there was sufficient warning of the threat of Katrina that announcements of emergency were made days in advance of landfall (Moynihan, 2009). Nonetheless, the responders were unsuccessful to change this information into a level of preparation suitable with the possibility of the approaching disaster. Federal responders failed to recognize the need to more actively engage (Moynihan, 2009). These improvements include improved ability to provide support to states and tribes ahead of a disaster; developed a national disaster recovery strategy to guide recovery efforts after major disasters and emergencies; and the Establishment of Incident Management Assistance Teams in which these full time, rapid response teams are able to deploy within two hours and arrive at an incident within 12 hours to support the local incident commander (FEMA,

Two specific areas of concern are noted in the majority of studies conducted. The first area of concern was that there was not a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities or organizational leaders (Haddow et al., 2014, p. 322). Since this event this has been an area that has shown considerable improvement. This has been accomplished through the use of NIMS and collaborative efforts of first responder leaders to craft an all hazards model of response. By doing both of these things, partner agencies are better able to fold into the rescue

Emergency managers’ response in the wake of Hurricane Katrina was uncoordinated and went poorly. Survivors were left for several days without basic relief such as food, water, and sanitary items. This paper investigates what led to this major response failure. The conclusion is that preparedness was not a top priority for officials at the local, state, and federal levels. First, this paper describes the major response failures in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and the reason that they failed using the National Preparedness Framework and the National Response Framework. Then, it identifies several instances in which preparedness efforts were postponed despite the well-known risk that New Orleans was well overdue for a major hurricane that could

There has been a great development in the way the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) responds to natural disasters. Hurricane Katrina, Hurricane Sandy, and wildfires in California are three major disasters that required a large FEMA response and recovery effort. These three natural disasters stressed the resources and abilities FEMA has in their arsenal. As any good organization does, FEMA learned from their experiences and mistakes in order to handle the next challenge they have to face accordingly. Hurricane Katrina affected over 15 million people, caused $81 billion in property damages, and 90,000 square miles (11 Facts About Hurricane Katrina). There was much controversy over the response of the Federal Emergency Management Agency

In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina left a path of destruction down the coastline of the Gulf of Mexico. It was the worst natural disaster that the United States had encountered up to that point. Even with warning signs before the storm hit, local and state governments failed to adhere to the warnings. Katrina’s worst devastation came in New Orleans where thousands lost everything due to massive flooding. New Orleans was in desperate need of assistance. Unfortunately, due to difficult circumstances at every level of government, the relief would have to wait. “Breakdowns in communication and confused emergency and law enforcement responses from local, state, and federal officials in the hours and days after Hurricane Katrina led to chaos and panic in the affected areas, endangering citizens’ property and lives.” (Tkacz, 2006, p. 1) Command Relationships were a complete failure in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina due to the absence of Command and Control, training for that type of situation, and the lack of resources.

The disaster which hit the Maricopa County in the State of Arizona in September 2014 was a major disaster that necessitated the community preparedness for leading successful response and a prompt recovery. Besides emergency managers, many officials and the private are involved in the processes. Some of these stakeholders are public health, public safety, and municipal officials. Collaboration is needed for getting all those involved in the processes to interact accordingly. This paper addresses the major collaboration strengths between emergency responders, public health, public safety, and municipal officials to deliver accurate response and recovery during the event, the main weaknesses of the collaboration among all those that were involved in the efforts, and recommendations for improving the collaboration between the stakeholders.

Application of deconfliction concepts. A basic expectation of citizens in developed countries is that their governmental agencies employed in the event of massive emergency situations or natural disasters are able to respond rapidly and effectively. The policy stance for building capacity to manage massive destruction threats and their aftermath rests on three pillars: Establish a common language (definitions), delineate and deconflict interagency functioning (plans, roles, and responsibilities), and establish a clearly defined and streamlined response channel. Not surprisingly, interagency response capabilities are not always sufficiently efficient or effective. The national experience with regard to Hurricane Katrina illustrates the difficulty of proving swift, comprehensive responses.

FEMA response to disastrous incident have improve drastically from the beginning of time. After each incident, organizations such as FEMA learned from previous incidents in what steps to take when it comes to dealing with Natural Disasters incidents. After Hurricane Sandy incident, “Communities are building back stronger and becoming more resilient for the future through collaborative partnerships between state, local and federal agencies” (N.D., 2015). Due to past Natural Disaster the government and other organizations had learned that it is best to come together and work as a team to provide assistance to those who were victims of the Natural Disaster incident. Since there were many organizations and they all had a different obligation. A

The overwhelming extent of disruption and destruction at all levels of emergency management, and all levels of government particularly during the preparedness and response phases, made Hurricane Katrina a catastrophe. Prior to the 2005 hurricane, the National Response System underwent restructuring which produced both intended and unintended outcomes, which later on, became apparent during the response to Hurricane Katrina. In addition, the National Incident Management System structure implied, but did not define, an information flow that would ensure a common situational awareness at all levels of the distributed decision network. As a result, this lead to a communication breakdown between the federal, state, and local government and prevented

The Engaged Partnership refers to the leaders at all levels, the whole community/international partners, work together to develop response collective goals and aligned capabilities. Tiered Response is where the incidents are handled at the lowest jurisdiction/levels (such as local authorities), supported by any additional – higher entities when necessary or needed. The third principle covers the Scalable, Flexible, and Adaptable Operational Capabilities that are implemented as incidents change and evolve so that the responders are able to rapidly meet the challenges/changes to any situation. “National response protocols are structured to provide tiered levels of support when additional resources or capabilities are needed”. (NRF 2013, 6). The Unity of Effort through a Unified Command is the state of coordinating efforts among multiple organizations, which reduces duplication of effort and helps achieve the common objective. The Incident Command System (ICS) is a vital element in ensuring interoperability across ‘multi-jurisdictional or multi-agency’ incident management/leaders. The fifth and final key principle is Readiness to Act which is just that; individuals, local, state, and federal authorities being prepared to act upon and react to any type of disaster situation. An effective response is a balancing act of the understanding of the risks and hazards that the responders may encounter and the ability to act decisively. These principles mirror

Disasters are incidents that most hope to avoid but in reality they happen often. Preparation for these events is necessary if the damage and loss of life is to be mitigated. Several events have occurred in the last decade that has increased awareness of the necessity of emergency management. Events such Hurricane Katrina and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Both of these events had massive death tolls and millions of dollars worth of property damage. They both resulted in a public outcry for more effective intervention and assistance with disaster incidents. The National Response Framework (NRF) was created after both of these events and in response to criticism of the prior National Response Plan. The change of title from National

FEMA and the Red Cross associations were the primary expected source of aid and assistance during and after Hurricane Katrina. However, the organizations failed to respond as quickly as needed and should have. If the media did not spread, there would be little to no evidence that help was being delayed and was not being properly provided as desperately needed. The public became more involved and helped more than organizations promoted. Outside sources and organizations, such as firefighters and policemen, were also hesitant in assisting the affected areas. (source)

When a disaster has taken place, first responders who provide fire and medical services will not be equipped to meet the demands for many services. Several issues such as the number of victims, communication failures and road blockages will stop people from accessing emergency services they have come to expect at a moment 's notice through 911 emergency services. Individuals will have to rely on others for help in order to meet their immediate lifesaving and life sustaining needs. If access is blocked or the agency’s capacity is exceeded, it may be hours or days before trained help arrives. There is a four-phase model that organizes the events of emergency managers. This model is known as the “life cycle” which includes dour

Hurricane Katrina exposed huge issues in the United States disaster preparedness and response programs. In 2005, the structure for homeland security was unable to manage catastrophic events like Hurricane Katrina. Unified management of national response