Configuration Management: United States Department Of Defense

The United States army values soldiers that are responsibility for their actions and equipment. Being responsibility means being

Optimization of machinery so that production setups are not required for small customizations which can be managed manually.

The Naval Aviation Command Logistics Information Management Information System (NALCOMIS) Optimized Organizational Maintenance Activity (OOMA) is the Navy and Marine Corps’ primary aviation maintenance documentation system. Introduced to the fleet in 2007 by the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWARSYSCOM), it provided significant capability improvements such as the creation of the Auto Log-Sets, thus allowing the Naval Aviation Enterprise to track the repair history, Technical Directives, etc... for individual repairable components throughout its life. The developers failed to ensure integrity of the Automated Log Set by not limiting the amount of times a component with the same part and serial number could be created.

In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.

The Air Force is a component of the United States Department of Defense with numerous responsibilities and combat capabilities. The broad scope of its military responsibilities has necessitated a moderately flexible organizational structure, and a wide range of educational and technical specialties. Obtaining the talent required to fill highly technical job openings has forced the military to recruit civilian workers, resulting in a highly diverse work force. Although diversity and flexibility provide the Air Force with significant advantages, these attributes also cause several problems when leaders attempt to implement change. Researchers from RAND Corporation suggest change management would be a less difficult issue if the Air Force

On 22 January 2013, General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff released a white paper describing his vision for the Joint Information Environment (JIE) and how it would support operations in the years to come.1 This mandated transition is driving a reassessment of the most appropriate command and control (C2) structure to conduct operations within the domain. Attempts to achieve a standardized fully interoperable environment will only achieve limited success due to the innate variability and changing nature of technology, exacerbated by service unique capabilities and requirements as well as inconsistent funding. Existing C2 models either fail to address the uniqueness of operations in the cyber domain or otherwise fail to

Force management, or what is really otherwise known as planned comprehensive change, is in reality a complex and interwoven process. Though it was designed within the confines of a systemic approach referred to as the DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel and Facilities), in reality it is meant to enable both dutiful and well-thought out change as well as faster, more urgent adjustments in accordance with the evolving nature of war and information gathering tactics. The Army, as one branch involved in this initiative, focuses most of its attention in this regard on the organizational sector because of the way it facilitates an adequate and democratic step-by-step system of review (Student Reader, F102:2). But the fact is that even this initiative remains multi-faceted and appears to be rather bureaucratic in nature (it has five phases, which seems antithetical to an urgent change process), which might not be surprising since implementing the type of changes that are demanded can have major implications of all sorts. Still, it does appear that this concentration is being well received and that it will eventually serve its goal even if it does not appear that way when detailed on a point by point basis.

Throughout the history of the world, there has always been a struggle to be the most powerful country in the world. Many key aspects that go into deciding what countries are the most powerful; some of these aspects are having a powerful military, strong economy, large population and a powerful but strong government. Most key aspects of what makes a country strong are also the same the aspects that make up the operational environment variables. The United States Army breaks down the operational variables into Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information, Physical Environment and Time (PMESII-PT) when evaluating the operational variables .

Under new Department of Defense regulations (DFARS 252.204-7012) all US Defense contractors are required to implement or to have a plan to implement new security protocols that are aimed at protecting sensitive (and above) information in the cyber realm.

The historical process of creating and implementation of the Military Decision Making Process has changed significantly since World War I. The US Army did not have a published staff doctrine or guidance to assist commanders in the decision making process. The Regulations for Field Maneuvers (1910), did not provide staff guidance. In 1914, the field service regulation (FSR) identified the need for decision making processes. The Staff Officer Field Manual (1932), complied principles, data, and information that was intended to guide the operations of staff of all units and territorial commands. The Staff Officer Field Manual (1932), was a detailed manual that explained staff functions and more complete commander estimates of implementation time.

Gioe Melaney is the general director of Southern Toro – a subsidiary company included in the distribution system of Toron Coporation in Galveston, Taxas.

The MDMP is the Army's solution to decision-making and assists the commander and staff in developing a plan and estimates. The MDMP is analytical and detailed through all levels. The commander decides the procedures to use in each instance, his plan hinges on clear visualization, and he uses the entire staff to make his plan. The steps in the MDMP are the following:

This Configuration Management Plan (CMP) specifically addresses the management approach that will be used to implement Configuration Management for the Constellation program. To support and manage the Configuration Management (CM) processes, the Program Management Office (PMO) will appoint a Configuration Manager. The Configuration Manager will be responsible for managing all Constellation Configuration Items (CIs) and baselines. The Configuration Manager will be involved in all phases of the Epics Capability Release (CR)? lifecycle, from initial concept, experimentation, development, systems integration, and the transition to operations. The Configuration Manager will be supported by the Constellation

The multifunctional nature of Operations Management requires a high level of process- and system-based synchronization across many different departments and divisions to be successful. The structural organization of the US Army is heavily dependent on Operations Management for missions to be accomplished, and long-term strategic visions to be attained (VanVactor, 2007). The intent of this analysis is to evaluate how the five areas of accounting, industrial engineering, management, management science and statistics, in conjunction with critical path analysis and linear programming, are used extensively throughout the US Army's supply chain operations.

The operational environment is the framework the military uses to define a how we will create a concept to defeat an enemy. To help paint the picture of the operational environment the Army uses the acronym PMESSII-PT. PMESSII-PT stands for Politics, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment, and Time . I do not believe there are one or two areas that can be focused on and have a successful outcome in combat. GEN David Petraeus stated, “there are no purely military solutions in Afghanistan.”1