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David Boonin Argument Analysis

Decent Essays

As it was presented earlier, David Boonin’s interest based argument has three major elements: 1) A modified future-like-ours account of Don Marquis, 2) Relationship between desires and right to life, and 3) Organized cortical brain activity as a necessary condition for the onset of consciousness. It is the first two elements which are of major concern here.
David Boonin modifies Marquis future-like-ours argument and converts it to a desire based account, before developing his analytical distinction of desires that has been shown earlier. Once “values” and “desires” are used interchangeably (which itself raises concerns), the idea that the foetus values its future or comes to value its future can be restated as that which a foetus desires, …show more content…

First, it is not the property of the valuable future that is morally significant. It is the desire for a valuable future which is morally important. Second, there is an implicit emphasis on the present. The foetus in this new version desires in the present that its future be preserved. In the original version the foetus will come to value its future. In fact, the focus on the present is perhaps one of the reasons Boonin has to focus on desires. What drives Boonin to focus on the present is that the morally significant property that would confer the status of personhood on the foetus must be actually present in the foetus for it to qualify as a person. If it is a potential property, an essential property or even a capacity for a potential property, then Boonin will not be able to argue against those who support the foetus inviolability from the moment of conception. Boonin must show that the foetus is not inviolable before they start to have present conscious desires. Since he is basing his argument on Marquis’ future-like-ours argument, any modification of the original argument to the present conscious desires version must be done in such a way that the same criteria applies to infants, suicidal teenagers, temporary comatose adults as well as the foetus. In order for the argument to work on all these cases, Boonin creates the analytical distinctions between the occurrent vs dispositional desires and actual vs ideal desires, as presented earlier, to say that it is the property of only “present ideal dispositional conscious desires” that is a morally significant property for personhood. Once the foetus meets the conditions necessary of conscious desires, that is from the onset of advanced organised cortical brain activity, a foetus can have present ideal dispositional conscious

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