Maryland Code (1973, 2013 Repl. Vol.), § 3-409(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”) provides: “a court may grant a declaratory judgment . . . if it will serve to terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding . . . .” (emphases added). Indeed because “[a] court ‘may grant a declaratory judgement;’ [the] declaratory judgment generally is a discretionary type of relief.” Coverge Servs. Grp. v. Curran, 383 Md. 462, 477 (2004) (quoting CJP 3-409(a)). “Thus, we generally review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny declaratory judgment under an abuse of discretion standard.” Sprenger v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 400 Md. 1, 21 (2007); Tanner v. McKeldin, 202 Md. 569, 577 (1953) (“[I]t is clear …show more content…
Rarely, we have held, is it permissible to dismiss an action for declaratory judgment in lieu of declaring the rights of the party seeking the judgment.Post v. Bregman, 349 Md. 142, 159-60 (1998). Indeed, This Court has emphasized, time after time, that dismissal “is rarely appropriate in a declaratory judgment action.” Popham v. State Farm, 333 Md. 136, 140 n. 2, 634 A.2d 28, 30 n. 2 (1993), quoting Broadwater v. State, 303 Md. 461, 465, 494 A.2d 934, 936 (1985). See, e.g., Turnpike Farm v. Curran, 316 Md. 47, 49, 557 A.2d 225, 226 (1989); Boyds Civic Ass'n v. Montgomery County, 309 Md. 683, 687 n. 2, 526 A.2d 598, 600 n. 2 (1987); Jennings v. Government Employees Ins., 302 Md. 352, 355, 356, 488 A.2d 166, 167–168 (1985); State v. Burning Tree Club, 301 Md. 9, 17, 481 A.2d 785, 789 (1984); Koontz v. Ass'n of Classified Emp., 297 Md. 521, 529, 467 A.2d 753, 758 (1983); Carroll Co. Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 294 Md. 144, 155–156, 448 A.2d 345, 351 (1982); East v. Gilchrist, 293 Md. 453, 461 n. 3, 445 A.2d 343, 347 n. 3 (1982); Mauzy v. Hornbeck, 285 Md. 84, 90–92, 400 A.2d 1091, 1095 (1979), and cases there
Procedural History: The federal court refused to hear the case because it is in question whether or not
decision finding no constitutional violation regarding Loudermill's nine month wait for an administrative decision from the civil service
1. The first issue is whether the trial court erred in denying Greer's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Mr. Austin's will contest was barred by T.C.A. § 32-4-108 (Supp. 1991).
It is the policy of the law to favor, wherever possible, a hearing on the merits, and appellate courts are much more disposed to affirm an order where the result is to compel a trial upon the merits than they are when the judgment by default is allowed to stand and it appears that a substantial defense could be made; the law looks with disfavor upon a party who, regardless of the merits of the case, attempts to take advantage of the mistake, surprise, inadvertence, or neglect of his adversary. (A & B Metal Products v. MacArthur Properties, Inc. (1970) 11 Cal App 3d 642, 648.
State decisis is sometimes difficult to follow because of the large amount of prior cases that may relate to a current case. It is inconvenient to search through countless cases to find that some of the judicial decisions are conflicting. The holdings and dicta from prior cases also need to be differentiated to find the information that led to the judge's decision. Some courts reject state decisis because they believe that the decisions were wrong or that decisions should be made with constitutional relativity.
The District Court’s denial of Petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss is reviewed de novo, and may be affirmed on any ground that is supported by the record. Am. Int'l Enterprises, Inc. v. F.D.I.C., 3 F.3d 1263, 1266 (9th Cir. 1993). Under a de novo standard of review, the appellate court reviews a decision on a question of law anew, and need not give deference to the legal conclusions or assumptions made by the previous court to hear the case. Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Ashland, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 852, 868 (Tex. App. 2001). An appeals court may refer to the trial court’s record to determine the facts, but may rule on the evidence and matters of law without deference to that court’s finding. Id. District court rulings on a motion to dismiss under Federal
The locale court conceded Jireh's movement for rundown judgment and rejected the case. ETW auspicious idealized one to one speech to this court. We survey the area court's stipend of rundown judgment. Rundown judgment is legitimate where there exists no issue of material reality and the moving party is qualified for judgment as an issue of law. In considering such a movement, the court interprets all sensible true surmising for the non moving gathering.
Because this is an appeal from the denial of a motion for summary judgment, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to Poe, the non-moving party. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 261 F.3d 318, 324 (2d Cir.2001).
While the Fifth and Ninth Circuits both agree that Jurisdictional Determinations are conclusive as to federal jurisdiction (meeting the first Bennett prong), they are not reviewable under the APA as “final agency action.” In Belle Co., LLC., v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Fifth Circuit held that Sackett does not settle whether JDs are final. Applying the test for finality established in Bennett v .Spear, the Court concluded that JDs are not final agency actions, since the issuance of a JD does not create any legal obligations or consequences. Thus, Belle was not entitled to judicial review. In Fairbanks North Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Ninth Circuit found jurisdictional determinations conclusive as to federal jurisdiction (first Bennett prong), but not reviewable under the APA as final agency action for the same reasons as the Fifth
Before many writers even thought of writing detective novels the Chinese were known for creating these works of literature explaining the cases of important magistrates. One of the most famed or popular of these judges was judge Dee. Judge Dee lived in the seventeenth century AD. This book was written during the eighteenth century by a person well versed in Chinese legal code. In this story there are three crimes that get solved. The three cases that get solved are the case of the strange corpse, the case of the double murder at dawn, and the case of the poisoned bride. When reading this story the double murder was the simplest to grasp, an argument that arose between two traveling silk merchants that quickly turns into a fight ultimately leading
Frist of all the judge as no right to decide happy endings for people if both parties are not in agreement with such arrangement or decision; and what the judge should have included is to ask the case worker to supervise the placement of Sandy with her mother, by making sure everything is going well. Also, the judge would have given the other advocates the chances to address their concerns by discussing their investigative research on the case.
I, Michelle Estrada, am presenting this letter to you -----the judge name----- to support my father Luis Raul Estrada and Stephanie Ciani Messick during this process of hardship. I am aware that my biological mother, Cindy Estrada, is demanding to have full custody of my two siblings, Christina Marie Estrada and Alex Anthony Estrada.
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth Circuit. R. 22–30. The decision and order of the United States District Court, District of Wisteria denying Plaintiff’s Motion for a New Trial. R. 13–21.
Summary judgment is proper when a court’s judgment is in favor of the moving party shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Accordingly, to obtain a judgment under Rule 56(c), the moving party must come forward with evidence it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and must explain why summary judgment should be entered in its favor. Orme School v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 310, 802 P.2d 1000, 1009 (1990); Allyn, 167 Ariz. at 195, 805 P.2d at 1016. National Bank of Arizona v. Thurston, 180 P.3d 977. The facts of this case are undisputed. Despite its relocation, Malone cannot show that the land art was modified by human interaction that would have made the land art artificial. Thus, Herrera is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Plaintiffs (Lloyd) leased property to defendant (Murphy) in 1941 for the purpose of selling cars. In 1942, the US government restricted car sales due to World War 2. Defendant repudiated the lease, and plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment to determine whether defendant's obligations under the lease were terminated by the US government's restriction on car sales and, if not, to recover the unpaid rent.