Disadvantages Of Mission Command

It was well believed until Jackson’s forces began unloading rounds on the Union army stopping McDowell’s forces from advancing, holding the line like “a stone wall.” As the new Union recruits witnessed battle for the first time and felt the lack of preparation, they were quick to retreat back to Washington DC. The Southern victory and the tens of thousands of lives lost proved to the Union that this war was not going to be easily won.

The purpose of this paper is to identify the uses and application of mission command within Operation Anaconda. Operation Anaconda took place in the Shahikot Valley of eastern Afghanistan in early March of 2002. The ground commander selected to lead the operation was Major General (MG) Hagenbeck of the 10th Mountain Division, and for the purpose of this operation, Coalition and Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain. Due to the limited number of troops under his command currently available in Afghanistan, MG Hagenbeck was given command in addition to one of his own organic battalions, the 3rd Brigade, 101st Air Assault Division, some Special Operations Force (SOF) units, and Coalition Forces. This paper will identify MG Hagenbeck’s, his staff’s, and higher command’s use of the mission command principles during this operation. The principles of mission command are accept prudent risk, use mission orders, exercise disciplined initiative, provide a clear commander’s intent, create shared understanding, and lastly, build cohesive teams through mutual trust (Mission Command, 2014).

This paper will examine the British and American Southern Loyalist defeat in the Battle of Kings Mountain and discuss the assumptions the British made including loyalist support, logistic support, and terrain advantage.

LTC Honeycutt continuously assessed the situation at every turn of the war. He knew that the enemy wanted to fight and he was more than happy to oblige. Members of the 3-187th located some documents from the enemy and determined it was the 29th NVA, which signified that they were up against a sizeable enemy force. After a heavy firefight on the fourth day, Honeycutt was able to assess that the enemy strength was more than just a company. He concluded the enemy strength size was a battalion. His assessment required him to develop new frontal attack plans. The companies were able to advance up the hill but they suffered multiple casualties which resulted in them pulling back to their previous night defensive positions. The 3-187th lost ground, troops, and the motivation to

It was General Bragg’s lack of confidence, previous performances, and relationships with his subordinate commanders that ultimately caused the battle plan to not be executed correctly. Bragg was unable to successfully implement the first principle of mission command: build cohesive teams through mutual trust. He also had a history of not utilizing the sixth principle of mission command: take prudent risk. Bragg’s lack of competence regarding these two mission command principles ultimately set conditions for a poor mission command climate within General Bragg’s unit. Bragg’s sub-commanders, Generals Hindman, Buckner, Polk, Longstreet, and Hill were all skeptical of Bragg’s leadership and battle plans from his previous campaign at Chattanooga, where he retreated from the city. Bragg was well known for retreating at the first Battle of Chattanooga, and also for predictably employing frontal assault offensive tactics. His history of predictable plans, retreats, and inability to take prudent risk, caused his subordinate leaders to lose trust in his ability to plan and lead his army. One of Bragg’s sub-commanders, General Hill, stated

Confederate troops would make an uphill attack in an attempt to take a ridge from

Civil War historians view the Battle of Chancellorsville as General Robert E. Lee’s “greatest and most remarkable” victory (Sears 1). Lee, facing an army twice his size, defies all military doctrine and divides his army multiple times in order to out-maneuver and surprise the Union forces. The daring maneuver succeeds and ultimately forces the Union’s Army of the Potomac to retreat. The victory was another major blow to Union troops, but it came at a huge cost to the Confederacy: the loss of General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson. By evaluating the battle through the lens of the mission command activities, one can see how Lee’s daring maneuver was actually very calculated and his only option for victory. Throughout the rest of this paper, I will describe the timeline of the battle and how General Lee used the mission command activities of understand, visualize, assess, and lead to ultimately achieve victory at Chancellorsville.

Union officer William Tecumseh Sherman observed to a Southern friend that, "In all history, no nation of mere agriculturists ever made successful war against a nation of mechanics. . . .You are bound to fail." While Sherman's statement proved to be correct, its flaw is in its assumption of a decided victory for the North and failure to account for the long years of difficult fighting it took the Union to secure victory. Unquestionably, the war was won and lost on the battlefield, but there were many factors that swayed the war effort in favor of the North and impeded the South's ability to stage a successful campaign.

The Battle of Gettysburg was fought for three days from July 1 to 3. The Army of the Potomac, led by General George Meade, repelled the attack of the Confederate’s Army, led by General Robert E. Lee. The purpose of this paper is to examine General Lee’s effectiveness by analyzing his utilization of the mission command, and its principles.

The Battle of Antietam could have been a devastating and fatal blow to the Confederate Army if Gen. McClellan acted decisively, took calculated risks, and veered away from his cautious approach to war. There are many instances leading up to the battle and during the battle in which he lacks the necessary offensive initiative to effectively cripple and ultimately win the war. This paper is intended to articulate the failure of Mission Command by GEN McClellan by pointing out how he failed to understand, visualize, describe and direct the battlefield to his benefit.

Mission Command: The unity of command principle favored Colonial forces and their allies. General Washington refined his command climate through years of troubled multinational operations. He painfully understood the importance of synergy towards an end state. General Washington’s clear communication of intent and subordinate leader empowerment contrasted his adversaries. General Clinton’s combative command climate with Lord Cornwallis exacerbated their demise. Clear intent allowed the Colonial coalition to seize a fleeting opportunity at Yorktown.

As commanders understand the operational environment and the problem, they can begin visualizing the desired end state and solutions to solving the problem.6 After noticing that Confederate artillery fire had slackened, COL Chamberlain’s experience told him that Confederate troops were coming and quickly began to envision an operational approach that would achieve his desired end state to hold his position on the far left of Little Round Top. Through his critical and creative thinking, COL Chamberlain showed a skill common within good tactical leaders. He mentally visualized possible countermoves against imagined threats to his unit. While analyzing the terrain he could see that the 83rd Pennsylvania was forming on his right but there was nothing at all on his left. COL Chamberlain could see a dark bulk of a larger hill to the left of his men and determined that if the Confederates got an artillery battery on its crest the Confederates could take Little Round Top and subsequently drive off the Union Army. Visualizing how this could affect his desired end state, COL Chamberlain decided that he would send a company to the 20th Maine’s

Commanders at all levels face increasingly challenging scenarios as the operational environment changes. Some instinctively motivate and empower their subordinates to think and act independently, thereby influencing actions during combat. However, those who understand the commanders' activities of mission command will influence not only subordinates, but the outcome of the battle as well. Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders.1 Commanders who understood the importance of mission command was Major General Horatio Gates. General Gates at the Battle of Saratoga successfully

Leading from the front is the best way to implement Commander 's intent. According to The Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0, “The Commander drives the operations process through Understanding, Visualizing, Describing, Directing, Leading and Assessing the operational environment” Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP 6-0, pg. 1-4) (2012). The Command Sergeant Major and Sergeant Major both echo the Commanders directives in driving the operational environment. The Command Staff is to provide timely and effective reporting to the Commander providing a more in-depth analysis. As a senior NonCommisioned Officer (NCO) representing the command, the Sergeant Major (SGM) has high regard with Unit command and subordinate unit Soldiers. The SGM has influence in the Command Staff to drive and verifying timeliness of staff reporting. I will support Mission Command using my influence as a Sergeant Major in planning, problem-solving, assessing, motivating, and echoing the commander’s intent throughout the command.

At around 2253 hours Sunnyvale local time, Mission Control has received a multiple Code Blue Phone calls at our Yahoo Champaign Office. It was conducted by Security Officer Visel with University of Illinois Police Department had conducted a Code Blue Testing at our site. She had confirmed there were multiple code blue units that are inoperable.