The national security objectives of the U.S. include homeland security and that of our allies, a strong open economic system, respect for universal values, and international order promoting peace, security and opportunity through cooperation. USSOUTHCOM is committed to uphold national security objectives through joint and combined full-spectrum bilateral and multilateral military operations and exercises. Exercise Tradewinds, a three week multi-national maritime security and disaster response exercise in the Caribbean, is a perfect example of how military exercises support national security objectives. The exercise supports the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), a U.S. Department of State regional security partnership. Tradewinds
(3) Military: Continues positive trends to security cooperation & reform. Received U.S. Foreign Operations Appropriations (FY 08; FMF: $4.3 million & IMET: $1 million) in lieu of FSA waivers. They seek security integration & strategic partnerships to counter terrorism, organized crime & drug trafficking. Conducts regional (GUAM) joint military exercises in order to disrupt decentralized targeting of critical infrastructure; participates in NATO Partnership for Peace program.
The United States from the Cold War and into the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) continues to face challenges in translating military might into political desires due to its obsession with raising an army, electing politicians and assembling a diplomatic corp that continue to gravitate towards State-to-State engagements that if not rectified could lead to substantial delays in fighting terrorism and non-terrorist adversaries or worse total failure of the United States Military’s ability to properly carry out it’s politicians objectives due to being blindsided.
United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has been working to build regional and interagency partnerships to ensure the continued stability of the Western Hemisphere and the forward defense of the U.S. homeland for more than fifty years. U.S. Southern Command is responsible to the Secretary of Defense and the President of the United States for national security interests through roughly one half of this hemisphere – 31 countries, 16 dependencies and areas of special sovereignty, and approximately four hundred and sixty million people. SOUTHCOM’s area of responsibility includes the land mass of Latin America south of Mexico; the waters adjacent to Central and South America; and the Caribbean Sea. (United States Southern Commamd n.d.) SOUTHCOM priorities are: (1) Countering Transnational Organized Crime; (2) Counterterrorism; (3) Building Partner Capacity; (4) Contingency Response; (5) Detainee Operations. SOUTHCOM missions are carried out by its component commands: (1) U.S. Army South; (2) 12th Air Force (AF South); (3) U.S. Marine Corps Forces South; (4) U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command; (5) Special Operations Command South; (6) Joint Task Force Bravo, Soto Cano Air Base; (7) Joint Task Force Guantanamo; and (8) Joint Interagency Task Force South. (114th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee 2016)
Operations in the post-9\11 era have been a major defence strategy to safeguard international security. As detailed in the Canada First Defence Strategy, the military will deliver the ability to conduct six core missions within Canada, North America and abroad, one of them being “lead and/or conduct a major international operation for an extended period” . Operation Artemis is one of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) participation in counterterrorism and maritime security operations. In this essay, I will describe in detail how this operation is linked to Canada`s security and its importance in demonstrating solidarity with partners and allies, working together for peace and security in the maritime environment of the greater Middle East region
The national security of the United States takes on many ideas. It is not only protecting out boarders, but also deterring and defeating an enemy before they come to the United States. Today the U.S. biggest threat is defending terrorism; either by a foreign group or from within our boarders.
An obstacle that arises in securing ships and ports is that of travelling to foreign ports. Security professionals are are encouraging the United States government to extend U.S. boundaries to foreign ports, which would put much emphasis on security at loading points (70). The fear is that attackers will board a ship at a foreign port and sail to American soil where they could practice terrorism. A way that shipping security has changed is that of the plan of the Container Security Initiative (CSI), which calls for international security criteria to identify high-risk cargo containers for pre-screening at their point of shipment (70). The Coast Guard has also increased patrols in the U.S. ports and waterways, specifically around the nation’s critical petro-chemical facilities (71). By 2004, The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code took effect requiring ship operators to develop security plans, appoint ship and company security officers and maintain a minimum level of on board security, while port officers are required to develop similar plans and hire a port facility security officer (71). This code made it mandatory for all ships to be secure both while still in ports and also while travelling. Not only does this protect passengers aboard the ship, but also citizens of the United States as threats cannot enter the country through shipping
It is abundantly apparent that joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) interactions are vital when combating the adversaries of the United States. Conflict has significantly changed over the years and new threats have emerged that require specific countermeasures. Modern warfare presents insidious dangers from an ever-evolving enemy or adversary. According to Mr. Wall’s article, “Demystifying the Title10 – Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence Activities & Covert Action,” he claims that to combat unconventional and cyber threats (or to conduct unconventional warfare and cyberwarfare) a correct understanding between the relationship between Title 10 and Title 50 is crucial. Mr. Wall states that these Titles “…create mutually supporting, not mutually exclusive, authorities.” His article details the facts about Title 50 and Title 10 and states that
Some of those collaborating are Marine Transportation System National Advisory Council (MTSNAC), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), Committee on the Marine Transportation System (CMTS), the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). The IMO is leading an initiative in collaboration with many United Nations (UN) organizations in an attempt to create national legislation that will outlaw piracy. NATO is continuing to enhance its collaboration with its partners and international actors such as the European Union to ensure maritime security. Additionally among other programs that NATO oversees, Operation Ocean Shield is assisting in the fight against piracy off the Horn of
The threat environment has expanded from a strategic, nuclear, symmetrical threat from bombers, ICBMs, and air-or-sea-launched cruise missiles, to a continuing symmetrical threat in addition to an emergent asymmetric threat, focused across all domains, borders and agencies. Accordingly, our political leaders recognized a need to transform the military for a new ‘home game’. United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) was established to assume responsibility for the defence of the US homeland, and this new Command was tasked to provide military assistance to civil authorities (MACA).
The defense, security, and safety American citizens enjoy each and every day is a result of dedicated professionals committed to Homeland Security and Homeland Defense. These broad initiatives require well-defined missions, organized and focused tasking, and finally, clearly understood duties, responsibilities, and operations. Organizations charged with these responsibilities must be better resourced than those of the enemy. Success in each of these objectives requires a well-organized infrastructure with clear mission sets. The afore mentioned areas of responsibility, related planning, and resource/personnel management are fluid (rightfully so) and are constantly reevaluated, restructured, and/or reinforced to best counterattack our Nation’s vulnerabilities before they become casualties.
The purpose of this paper is to compare the 1971 White Paper on Defence and the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy. More specifically, this paper will compare the strategic environment, Canada’s greatest allies, the alliances Canada supported, and Canada’s security and defence priorities in the 1970s and under the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS). As this paper will demonstrate, the key differences witnessed in the 1971 White Paper on Defence and in the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy is in terms of the specificities of the foreign and defence policy presented, the perceived types of threats to national and international security, and the Canadian Forces’ capability to respond to such major challenges. However, both the 1971 White Paper and the 2008 CFDS clearly demonstrate that the Canadian Forces are there first to defend Canada and Canadians, then to defend North America in cooperation with the United States, and finally to contribute to international security. Furthermore, both papers emphasize on the importance of defence policy in achieving foreign policy objectives.
At the strategic level I developed an operational plan that consisted of AMOC’s Project and Plans, Operations, and Systems Directorates, AMO Headquarters (HQ) Test and Evaluation (T&E), and the South East Region to participate in the Maritime Lab Demonstration. The Maritime Lab intends to demonstrate the use of a tethered aerostat outfitted with a maritime radar to improve maritime security operations. The demonstration will also include the use of the Minotaur Mission Management System to share surveillance data among aircraft, vessels and command centers. I developed the desired Critical Operational Issues for the Maritime Lab with the Program Manager Rob Brown. The plan I provided consisted of roles and responsibilities, action items, goals and expectations of activities during the maritime demonstration. As the Lead Maritime Operational Representative for Customs and Border Protection, and Deputy Project Manager for the Dark Vessel Detection Project (DVD-P), I initiated the activity to develop a maritime sensor database and coordinated with DHS components and offices with maritime equities to ensure inclusion as the database is developed. I queried the United States Coast Guard, United States Border Patrol, and National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office to obtain their functional needs in using the maritime
Ensuring the safety of the American people and homeland is the first and most fundamental obligation of the American government. Current policies are not fulfilling that obligation and are unlikely to do so if continued. This planning exercise has therefore focused exclusively on the problems that threaten the safety and prosperity of the American people and on ways of ensuring their security today and into the future. No secondary considerations – democracy promotion, humanitarian activities, or support and expansion of American values, for example – have been allowed to intrude into our deliberations, despite the importance we and many Americans attach to each.
CBP/OAM’s strategic objectives is to establish and maintain effective control of air, land, and maritime borders with the appropriate mix of infrastructure, technology, and personnel. OAM’s mission is to protect the United States from aircraft, vessels, and people engaged in illicit smuggling, terrorism and/or illegal immigration. Persistent Surveillance directly supports Strategic Goal One: Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime, and Goal Two: Advanced Comprehensive Border Security and Management in CBP’s Vision and Strategy 2020 and the National Southwest Border Counternarcotic Strategy. In the Air and Marine Operations Vision and Strategy 2025, the core competencies of interdiction, investigation, domain awareness, and contingency
“North America – Our Nation’s most vital interests are the safety and security of our people and territory and our way of life. We will defend the homeland and play a critical role in supporting homeland security. We will work with the Department of Homeland Security, particularly the Coast Guard, to improve air, maritime, space, cyberspace and land domain awareness to help secure the approaches to our continent and Nation.” (National Military Strategy, Mullen, 2011, p.10) The National Military Strategy outlines specifically that the U.S. military will work synergistically with the Department of Homeland Security to ensure the security of our nation’s core territory and interest. The requirements levied upon the homeland defense mission are very overt in nature. The military takes bold action to the conventional threats against the United States such as nuclear inter-continental ballistic missiles or unwarranted territorial expansions. Today we see violent extremism spreading across and controlling other nations which poses a major threat