Gibbons Vs Ogden Case Analysis

Facts: Gawley was a police officer who worked for Indiana University for several years. She sued the college because she noted sexual harassment by a higher-ranking officer than she was. She also sued because she felt she was part of a hostile work environment and that officers in her department retaliated against her for filing a complaint with the college. Her final argument was that there was spoliation of evidence. The district court found in favor of the employer. The case did not go to trial because the district court granted summary judgment. Summary judgment is used to avoid trials. The decision was made based on two key decisions made by the Supreme Court in other cases and that the university was able to establish an affirmative defense. The university “may assert an affirmative defense that examines the reasonableness of the employer’s and the target’s conduct” (Kaplin & Lee, 2014, p. 167). Gawley then appealed to the United State Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. This case brief will outline the question, holding, reasoning, and significance of this case as it was decided by the United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Ogden was brought in front of Chief Justice, John Marshall (New York State Library, “Steamboat Timeline”). He will examine the Commerce Clause of Article 1, section 8 (“McBride, “Landmark Cases”). The clause read that “Congress shall have power to regulate commerce among the several states.” They first examined the word “commerce” which meant more than just articles of interstate trade but also, how the articles will navigate among the states (“McBride, “Landmark Cases”). This is where the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Commerce Clause states that the federal government has the power to govern the interstate commerce among several states (“McBride, “Landmark Cases”). The decision invalidated the monopoly that the New York Legislature granted to Livingston, Fulton and especially to Ogden (McBride, “Landmark Cases”). As the result of this ruling, in-state licensing on waterways ended and competition was encouraged. This delighted Vanderbilt. This ruling will later benefit Vanderbilt when he leaves Gibbons to start his own steamboat business n 1829

Throughout an 18-hour period on October 26, 1989, the appellant Marc Creighton, a companion Frank Caddedu and the deceased Kimberley Ann Martin consumed a large quantity of alcohol and cocaine. The afternoon of the following day on October 27, the three planned to share a quantity of cocaine at Ms. Martin’s apartment. The evidence and later testimony indicates that all of the members involved are experienced cocaine users. The appellant acquired 3.5 grams (“an eight-ball”) of cocaine; he did not try to determine the quality or potency of the cocaine before injecting it into himself and Frank Caddedu.

In the decision regarding Gibbons v. Ogden, Marshall ruled that a state can't grant a monopoly when it is related to interstate commerce. This gave supremacy to the national government in issues regarding interstate commerce. Through his interpretation of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, John Marshall successfully increased the power of the national government.

The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.” Despite its silence as to the effect of that affirmative power, federal courts have recognized the Framers’ wish to create a unified national market and have found a dormant congressional authority in it. Since the landmark case of Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), that dormant authority has limited state regulations that burden interstate commerce, even in the absence of congressional regulation. Congress has the power only to restrict the scope of permissible state regulation but it does not absolutely preclude states from affecting commerce. "[T]he states retain authority under their police powers to regulate matters of 'legitimate local concern', even though interstate commerce may be affected." A challenged statute is upheld if its effect on interstate commerce is merely incidental. On the other hand, a state regulation that is facially or practically discriminatory will be defeated unless it shows a legitimate local purpose that cannot be accomplished by any less discriminatory alternatives.

This lowered the tariff gradually over a decade and prevented any armed conflicts.”(.loc.gov) This shows the strength of the federal government over all the states.

The Commerce Clause was originally designed for congress to regulate commerce among the states. After this decision, Congress can now go beyond the external boundary (Smith, pg. 317). Being one of Chief Marshall 's most important cases, Gibbons v. Ogden vastly expanded the Commerce Clause (Smith, pg. 315). The case of Gibbons v. Ogden in 1824 allowed Congress to interpret their powers to regulate any type of commerce that went through state lines including modes

Ogden. In 1807, Robert Fulton invented the steamboat and it was able to be used as a transportation method on rivers. Since a new system of transporting was on the rise two men were quick to obtain a license to cross various bodies of water. One of these men was, Aaron Ogden got a license from the State of New York to travel between New york City and the Jersey Shore. He was a steamboat operator and he would run his steamer between New Jersey and New York City. He bought a franchise from Fulton. Ogden decided to have Thomas Gibbons as a partner in that franchise. Gibbons was also a steamboat operator. Their partnership wouldn’t last long. Gibbons began a dispute towards Ogden because of a license that he had. Ogden had an “exclusive license to operate steam boat ferries between New Jersey and New York City on the Hudson River.” Gibbons began to think that Ogden was challenging him. Gibbons wasn’t able to have access to the Hudson Bay, and therefore he sued Ogden. In other words, this was a problem between the national and state government. Ogden received state permission, and Gibbons received federal permission. So in the end it depended on which one has the highest power. Gibbons and Ogden took the case to the Supreme Court. When it was brought to the Supreme Court’s attention, they cited Article 1 Section 8 which was under the elastic clause. They used the commerce clause which gives Congress the

Ogden, American industrial and commercial development were heavily dependent upon judicial nationalism. In 1808, the state government of New York lent a monopoly on steamboat to Aaron Ogden to operate his business between New Jersey and New York. Thomas Gibbons, another steamboat operator, competed with Ogden on the same route, but he held a federal coasting license issued by Congress. Frustrated with the competition, Ogden filed a complaint in New York in an effort to stop Gibbons from using the same water route, but Gibbons argued that the Constitution gave Congress the sole power over interstate commerce. Eventually, John Marshall ruled in favor of Gibbons, for the Court interpreted the Commerce Clause as Congress had the rights to regulate commerce between states. In his explanation, the Chief Justice justified that, “[T]he prevailing motive was to regulate commerce; to rescue it from the embarrassing and destructive consequences, resulting from the legislation of so many different States, and to place it under the protection of a uniform law" (Landmark Cases). Following this decision, the Commerce Clause has enabled expansive congressional power over the commercial development in the United States and increased authority for the federal government. Therefore, this meant that Congress could overturn any commercial activities if it was somehow related to interstate commerce which signified a great deal of power since almost all

This became known as the Munn vs. Illinois case, in which the Granger family too action and formed laws to protect them and the common people from the corruption and abuse from the railroad industry. These Granger laws basically stated that the federal government should establish a set passenger and freight rate, and make it illegal to discriminate against anyone. After many debates, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Grangers, giving states the power to regulate railroads that went through their state, protecting the common people from abuse. Along with this, this decision officially set up government regulation over industries, to ensure they are working in the people’s interests. With this new power, the federal government decided that they wanted to have full regulation, and not have the states regulated anything. To ensure this, they nullified the Granger laws and passed the new Interstate Commerce Act in the year 1877. This gave the federal government full regulation of the railroad network throughout the entire nation, and a five person Committee would be responsible for doing

In 1808 the government of New York gave ownership to a steamboat company to operate its boat on the state's waters. Aaron Ogden owned a license under this monopoly to run steamboats between New Jersey and New York. Thomas Gibbons was another steamboat operator who competed with Aaron Gordon on the same route but had a federal coasting license given by Congress. Ogden filed a complaint in the New York court to stop Gibbons from running his boats. Gibbons disagreed arguing that the U.S. constitution gave Congress the power over interstate commission. After losing twice in the New York courts Gibbons went to the Supreme court

Since steamboats can be licensed the same as sailboats, the New York enjoinment that inhibits any vessel from using its waters conflicts with Congressional power and is unconstitutional.

Throughout history one can look through cases to find where race played a part tin the conviction and sentencing of a case. However, in the case of Georgia vs. Dixon did race play a part in convicting Dixon? Did the jury know what they were doing? Was the sentencing initial to give a harsher charge? By looking at the facts of the case, legally defining all the charges, and explain the outcome and the issues that surrounded the case one can answer the basis of these questions.

In response to the botched Oklahoma execution of Charles Warner, the Glossip vs Gross court case, and the fact that Governor Nikki R. Haley called for the death penalty the defense team of Dylann Roof, who was accused of killing nine black people in a 2015 South Carolina church shooting, is challenging the death penalty’s constitutionality because the prosecutors declined his request to serve life in prison without parole. Roof’s defense team argues that nobody can be lawfully executed under the constitution no matter what crime they committed. Multiples Justices, including Stephen G. Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, stated that it might be time to review the death penalty to see if it is actually constitutional. Breyer also stated that the

1. How, if at all, can you distinguish Greber from other instances of payment for professional services? Suppose the percentage Dr. Greber paid to the physicians had not exceeded Medicare’s guideline? Would that payment still amount to prohibited remuneration in this court’s eyes?