How Do Recent Legislative Developments Affect The British Constitution

'The House of Lords is now more effective than the House of Commons in checking government power'. Discuss

One strength of the UK constitution is the flexibility that it has, for the reason that the constitution is uncodified or unwritten and is therefore not entrenched in law. Due to the fact that the UK’s constitution is uncodified or unwritten, it has an opportunity to modernise itself to the ever changing society or any other new circumstances that may arise. An example of the flexibility of the UK’s

One of the three main theories that work as basis of the organisation of the United Kingdom is the Doctrine of separation of powers, such as Parliament sovereignty and the rule of law. This essay is going to critically discuss whether the United Kingdom needs and have the clear separation of powers.

In this essay, I would like to analyse why the reform of the British constitution is seen as unfinished business. Constitutional reform is when the system of government and how government institutions interact is changed. This has also meant the codification of some components of the constitution in the UK. Between 1997 and 2007, there were a considerable number of constitutional reforms introduced by the Blair governments. These reforms included devolution in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, decentralisation, reform of the House of Lords and Commons, creations of new legislation granting greater freedom and rights within the UK, and so on. However, some of them are yet to be accomplished or in progress related to the electoral and

The UK’s unwritten constitution, formed of Acts of Parliament [AoP], Royal Prerogative [RP], Constitutional Convention [CC] and Case Law [CL], prompts much debate about the ease of which constitutional change can be introduced. A written constitution is, by definition and practice, hard to alter however it remains to be seen whether it is any easier to change an unwritten

Contrary to what Jowell and Oliver wrote, the British constitution is arguably not like “most constitutions”. This is because it has changed, and continues to change, far more than other constitutions, and certainly has since 1997. Primarily this is due to its non-entrenched quality where “no special procedure is required for modification of the constitution” (http://www.constitutionnet.org/what-entrenchment) where, in the UK, constitutional changes only requires a simple majority in the Houses, yet an entrenched constitution, such as the US require a “supermajority” for constitutional changes. This means that in the UK a majority government has the ability to amend the constitution passing simple legislation, providing the conditions for lots

The HRA 1998 has been heavily involved in the gradual change towards the wider judicial interpretation we have seen over the last 50 years. Drawing attention to S.3 of the act which states ‘So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights.’ This was the first time the British courts had such powers of reviewing primary legislation and saw a shift in the way people looked at the principles of the constitution. Although academics such as Wade saw this as a constitutional milestone towards a new legal culture, others such as Ewing thought the act represented a shift in political power towards the judiciary, either way it has been thought to strengthen

Discourse vis-à-vis the constitution of the United Kingdom has historically been particularly contentious. The issue of its character – whether legal or political – is no exception. This paper will address the increasingly legal character of the constitution (beginning from the 1970s, and more markedly from 1990) and how this development highlights the need for a diverse judiciary. It begins by describing both the ‘political’ and ‘legal’ constitution, and how the United Kingdom has historically been viewed as a having a political constitution. It then analyses the ways in which the political constitution has been weakened and infused with legal elements over the past three decades, and how this increased legal character necessitates a diverse judiciary.

Lord Woolf, for example, has expressly stated that if Parliament ‘did the unthinkable’ and introduced laws that clearly undermine the rule of law then it should be noted that even the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is subject to certain limits ‘which it is the courts’ inalienable responsibility to identify and uphold. Similarly, Baroness Hale threatens that the court might even reject any attempt to undermine the rule of law by removing governmental action affecting the rights of the individual from all judicial powers’. It is understandable from these statements that the courts are now willing to question the supremacy of parliament. Also, they now regard the rule of law superior to parliamentary sovereignty as they would strike down later if it conflicted with rule of law. One must find a noticeable change of attitude from the judges towards the rule of law as in Manuel v Attorney General and Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Bruke the judges expressly stated that the courts do not exercise the authority to invalidate an Act of Parliament. This is indeed a significant change in judicial thinking away from a formal approach to the rule of

Parliamentary sovereignty leads us on to distinguish another feature of the Westminster Model: the executive branch. This is formed of MPs in the cabinet who have all have been appointed to their roles in the government’s office by the head of the government. Although the Westminster Model recognises the monarch as the head of state, the monarch’s powers are ornamental. ‘Therefore, in practice, the most important person in the British political system is the Prime Minister’ (Darlington, 2015) followed by the second most important executive branch member, who is the Chancellor of the Exchequer. In practise, legislature and judiciary are also important politically but they play a role which primarily strengthens the importance of the executive.

The Royal Prerogative can be deemed as a difficult concept to define as unlike other countries, the UK’s constitution is uncodified, where there is no single legal document which sets out the fundamental laws outlining how the state works. Therefore, the definition is open to interpretation, which is illustrated through Dicey’s and Blackstone’s explanations. William Blackstone, a renowned judge, offered the interpretation that the prerogative is a power that; “the king enjoys alone, in contradistinction to others, and not to those which he enjoys in common with any of his subjects.” However, a broader definition is offered by A.V. Dicey, an eminent constitutional scholar, who states; “the prerogative appears to be both historically and as a matter of actual fact, nothing else than the residue of arbitrary authority [..] left in the hands of the Crown.” Hence, through these contrasting views, it highlights how not having any written framework leaves a scope for the Executive, involving the Prime Minister and his ministers, to abuse the Prerogative Powers.

It has been suggested that the British Parliament was once supreme (or sovereign) but that its supremacy has been eroded as a result of Britain’s membership of the EU and its signature of the ECHR. In order to examine this proposition, it is necessary to consider the origins or traditional doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy and differing theories of supremacy. This essay will also consider evidence that Parliamentary sovereignty has suffered severe trammelling due to obligations arising from membership of the EU by enumerating the specific issue of partial entrenchment. The essay will also

Judicial review’s role in governing administrative law is important, as Farwell LJ explained; judicial review is important part of constitutionalism because he believed that ministerial responsibility is no more than ‘the mere shadow of the name’. He described judicial review as ‘the only defence of the liberty of the subject against departmental aggression’ implying that judicial review is an applied answer to the weakness of ministerial accountability. Lord Mustill in a later dated case also explained:

To analyse the Act’s significance I have looked at the position prior to the Act and what the Act changed, before moving on to examining and critically

The present constitution in the United Kingdom is unwritten. There has been much dispute as to whether or not a written constitution, as implemented by many other countries such as France and the United States of America, should also be adopted by the United Kingdom. The working mechanism of government is conditioned by a system of procedures, which regulate on one level of the principle organs of the state, whilst others govern the conduct of official business. Amid these usages are ones that have the position of a convention. Lord Wilson describes these conventions as ‘...political principles which regulate relations between the different parts of our constitution and the exercise of power but which do not have legal force.’ Since they do not have legal force, certain questions emerge, such as whether constitutional conventions should be codified, and whether their unclassified nature would permit such alteration. This essay will consider the arguments of the codification of constitutional conventions if a written constitution were to be implemented by the United Kingdom. Reasons proposing and opposing codifying conventions will be considered, specifically focusing on these foremost resolutions: legally enforcing codified conventions, allowing codified conventions to be regarded as non-legal rules, specify a selection of conventions to be codified, or quite simply leave them as they are, uncodified. This analysis will outline the varied views on codifying conventions