Ieds In Military

commercial off the shelf (COTS) vehicle, senior leadership involvement, and ample funding. The MRAP program acquisition methodology should not be repeated for other major defense acquisition programs. Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) became a wicked problem for the U.S. military in Iraq, especially for the ground forces. The MRAP program was a leadership driven, a partial operational solution, not a strategic solution. Accordingly, the MRAP program showcased positive and negative effects of a rapid acquisition

Mark Centurione Saint Theresa School This article about war dogs and how our military uses them in the battle field. One of the main purpose they use the dog is to find IEDs (improvised explosive device). The military uses a variety of dogs; the most common are such as German shepherds, Labrador retrievers, and especially the Belgian Malinois. But even with the smartest dog in the world you can’t find all IEDs. These dogs do so much more in the battlefield then people actually think, they save

enemy’s Improvised Explosive Device (IED) capability and the lack of doctrine and concept development led to inaction. To support this position, this essay describes the strategic environment with its competing demands, and it highlights the roles of senior leaders, the Armed Services and the Combatant

revolved around the three year delay from when the field initially identified its need until its production. This paper asserts that while MRAP development and production speed was impressive, the slow reaction to the enemy’s Improvised Explosive Device (IED) capability and the lack of doctrine and concept development led to delay. To support this position, this essay describes the strategic environment with its competing efforts, and it compares the MRAP acquisition to normal Major Defense Acquisition

The problem of IED attacks in Iraq highlights the need for better protection of U.S. forces. The IED emerged as a “weapon of choice” by 2003 and evolved as the war progressed.1 As up-armored Humvees proved inadequate, field commanders requested more armor for troop protection and decided on mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles as the best option. Due to limited funds and the Department of Defense (DoD) approach for fielding capabilities, acquisition of MRAPs proved to be a prolonged process

The military did not deploy the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle using a rapid acquisition process which delayed fielding of MRAPs and should not be repeated for critical needs. Three primary processes drive the current Department of Defense (DoD) Major Defense Acquisition Programs. They are requirements, acquisition, and funding. The requirements approval process within the existing Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) was the greatest factor in the MRAP

processes are required to specifically address current joint urgent operational needs, and funding is limited and restricted for rapid acquisition programs. Between the time initial MRAP tests were conducted and the initial approval in 2006, the military was transitioning away from the original Requirements Generation System (RGS) to the current JCIDS. Requirements from the field through each service branch drove the RGS process resulting in standalone solutions to specific threats often not considering

Figure 3 As coalition forces deployed their new counter IED equipment, insurgent forces began to adapt their methods of attack. The changes in insurgent tactics, and resulting increased casualties on the battlefield, directed a new approach to the counter IED struggle. Beginning in 2007, the US and its allies shifted their counter IED strategy from exclusively IED response operations to a more holistic systems analysis and defeat construct (Moulton, 2009). Two critical elements needed

How Improvised Explosive Device changed the US Armored Vehicles In the early stages of the war on terror the United States military flooded the Middle East with equipment that had not been updated since Desert Storm. Troop carriers and up armored Humvees were flown in to the Middle East along with being sent by naval vessels to accomplish the mission at hand. However, with the changing of times the opposing forces and tactics adapted to impact the US-led invasion. The outdated equipment of yesteryear

soldiers to IED attacks. Two critical vulnerabilities of US forces were the insufficient protection platforms for transportation and limited road network available to move troops rapidly. The insurgent’s ability in 2006 to attack US ground forces with IEDs was a critical capability which compromised US forces combat mobility and effectiveness. In June 2006, IED incidents reached more than 2,000 per month. At one point in 2006, coalition forces in Iraq were experiencing almost 100 IEDs per day . The