In 1943, the British and American Allies shared a common language and a common enemy, but they disagreed on the war’s grand strategy. These strategic differences culminated in the Sicily Campaign when Allied Command and Control exercised by General Eisenhower, Allied Commander, failed to employ the three essential attributes of Mission Command: commander’s intent, full understanding, and mutual trust among partners, as discussed in General Dempsey’s white paper. These failures in Mission Command also limited the Allies’ ability to effectively integrate the vital and complementary joint functions of Fires, as well as Movement and Maneuver. This essay will evaluate the Allies’ Command and Control function, their integration of the …show more content…
Eisenhower did not ensure close proximity between subordinate commands to support planning, integration, and coordination. He never offered or seriously promoted a clear, much less bold, commander’s intent for the operation or an operational end state beyond the capture of Sicily. The committee style of operational planning Eisenhower conducted failed to plan for the possibility of an Axis evacuation of Sicily, and he failed to develop a plan to trap the Axis Forces in Sicily. Once in the fight, Eisenhower never exerted the control over his subordinate commanders necessary to direct them to stop the German evacuation of Sicily. This perhaps changed the trajectory of the war. If the Allies captured the 15th Panzer DIV in Sicily, this weakens the Axis capability to defend Italy possibly, providing the Allies an avenue of approach to Southern Germany in 1943. These deficiencies led his senior subordinates to develop their own diverging commander’s intent. Admiral Andrew Cunningham, Air Chief Marshall Arthur Tedder and General Harold Alexander, all British and Eisenhower senior lieutenants, constructed additional Commander’s intent and personalized operational understanding of Husky that facilitated their own additional operational end states, beyond the capture of Sicily. Admiral Cunningham wanted to ensure the safety of his fleet and refused to operate in the contested waters near Italy. Air Chief Marshall Tedder, above all
Six principles comprise the philosophy of mission command: (a) build cohesive teams through mutual trust; (b) create share understanding; (c) provide clear commander’s intent; (d) exercise disciplined initiative; (e) use mission orders; and (f) accept prudent risk. When combined together, these six principles assist the commander in balancing the aforementioned art of command and science of control. To understand how General Robert E. Lee’s performance at Gettysburg lacked the marks of a great mission commander necessitates a deeper understanding of the individual principles of mission command.
Operational leaders down to the platoon and squad level have recently faced increasingly complex missions in uncertain operational environments. Accordingly, Army doctrine has shifted to officially recognize mission command, which enables leaders at the lowest level feasible to “exercise disciplined initiative” in the accomplishment of a larger mission. The operational process consists of six tenants: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. During the battle of Fallujah, LtGen Natonski understood the intent two levels up, visualizing courses of action for both allies and the enemy, and leading his organization into combat while directing his officers and soldiers to meet his intent. He visualized that Marines alone could not accomplish the mission. He understood that without the support of Iraqi police and a task force from the Army with
On June 6th 1944, the U.S. and allied forces executed an amphibious assault named Operation Neptune, commonly known as D-Day, along the north-western coastline region of France. The operation covered in this paper will discuss a key battle during the Invasion of Normandy. The Invasion of Normandy was a successful operation focused towards German-occupied Western Europe during World War II. This paper will also cover a brief history and key points of The Battle of Omaha Beach. Critical reasoning and battle analysis will be expressed through what intelligence assets were applied, utilized and available during the time era. The analysis outcome will lead to an expressed alternative ending on The Battle of Omaha Beach. A detailed explanation of how intelligence assets could have been used to change the course of the battle will defend the explained alternative ending discussed. The main points of discussion will include Adolf Hitler’s decision to move most of his tank divisions and infantry units 150 miles north to Calais, the significance of the highly effective group known as the French Resistance and a famous illusionist Jasper Maskelyne.
The United States entered World War Two in late 1941, and right away they were thrown into a conflict that involved making important decisions that would affect generations of people, in the United States and elsewhere, for years to come. A most notable decision by the Allies, namely the United States and Great Britain, was the combining of the American and British military chiefs of staff. This joint collaboration was appropriately titled the “Combined Chiefs of Staff”. They worked together as one body, and made war planning decisions and strategized together. This type of alliance was an innovation in war planning for the time, and the decisions made collaboratively by the two powers contributed greatly to the Allied victory in 1945. The relationships involved and the disputes that came up are worth noting, specifically the question of the Allies opening up a second front in the west, particularly titled “Operation Sledgehammer”. The relationship between President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, as well as General George Marshall of the United States and General Sir Alan Brooke of Great Britain were the main actors involved in this undertaking, and they will be the main individuals discussed and analyzed for the purposes of this paper. Ultimately Operation Sledgehammer was delayed and no action was taken upon it. Even though it caused rifts between the USSR, for reasons that will be explained, and the Allies far into the future, in retrospect they may have been
Successful leadership on a battlefield can be measured in different ways. It is possible for a good, successful leader to lose a battle. Conversely, it is possible for an ineffective leader to win a battle, given the right circumstances. What distinguishes a successful leader from an unsuccessful one is his/her ability to oversee an operation using effective mission command. In ADP 6-0, mission command as a philosophy is defined as “as the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations” (ADP, 1).
According to Army ADP 6-0, mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander, using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent, to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations (CAPE, 2012). Effective mission command can generally be analyzed according to the six principles outlined in ADRP 6-0. The six principles of mission command are to: build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, provide a clear commander’s intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk (CAPE, 2012). This paper provides a brief overview of the
General Washington 's adherence to mission command principles promoted the environment needed to win. Senior allied partners deferred decision making to Washington based on trust and collaborative input. Effective communications encouraged subordinate commanders to propose constructive alternatives aimed at streamlining action. The Siege of Yorktown embodied the approach effectiveness. Admiral Lafayette’s decision to avoid a major naval battle in Chesapeake Bay demonstrated this. Lafayette’s understood Washington’s intent, and the established trust ensured vital Colonial waterway supremacy. This decisive act ensured Lord Cornwallis’ entrapment throughout the siege. (COL Jerry A. Turner, 2015)
In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.
Commanders at all levels face increasingly challenging scenarios as the operational environment changes. Some instinctively motivate and empower their subordinates to think and act independently, thereby influencing actions during combat. However, those who understand the commanders' activities of mission command will influence not only subordinates, but the outcome of the battle as well. Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders.1 Commanders who understood the importance of mission command was Major General Horatio Gates. General Gates at the Battle of Saratoga successfully
Operation Verbal Image is an exercise based on command and control. It used many leaders who used command and control to accomplish their assigned mission. This command and control shaped the battlefield and took the fight to the enemy. This paper will discuss, how important command and control is, what is command and control, what does command and control do, and command and control in the information age. This paper will also discuss how command and control was used, how it affected the outcome of the battle, and my personnel opinions on how command and control could have been done differently.
The development of the allied military strategy in World War II (WWII) presented challenges for the U.S. and Great Britain as they worked together to defeat the Axis powers. First, this paper will review the environment at the time of WWII when Admiral Stark penned the “Plan Dog” memorandum and MAJ Wedemeyer’s War Defense Team put together the “Victory Plan”. Next, it will look at the advantages and disadvantages of coalition operations with supporting examples. Then, a review of two major meetings between U.S. and Great Britain will identify what strategic decisions were made and the effects they have on the war. Finally, this paper will explore the foundations of strategy (Clausewitz and Sun Tzu) by which the allied forces used and
In any mission, the Commander is the most imperative participant. He or she guides the mission to the intended outcome. It is through the commander’s activities that the directed outcome is achieved. Through successful understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading and assessing the commanders of Soldiers are able to accomplish the directed mission and thus winning wars. Throughout the role of commander in the Battle of Hamburger Hill, Lieutenant Colonel Weldon Honeycutt attempted the complete these commander’s activities. (ADRP 5-0) The successes and failures of mission command he had, will be explained, giving a better understanding of the Battle of Hamburger Hill and the pivotal turning point in the Vietnam war.
Following their success in North Africa, the Allied decision to invade Sicily was an appropriate next step towards defeating Axis powers. Operation HUSKY, the first phase of the Italian campaign, supported the Allied strategic goals of opening Mediterranean shipping lanes, diverting German forces off of the Eastern front and encouraging Italy to exit the Axis. HUSKY resulted in Allied Forces securing the island, despite leadership failures and the ineffective coordination of joint functions at the operational level. A two part analysis of the Allied Force operational level joint functions during Operation HUSKY follows. The first will evaluate the joint function of command and control using the three attributes of mission command from joint doctrine: commander’s intent, mutual trust, and understanding. The second will evaluate the integration of two of the remaining joint functions using the definition of integration from joint doctrine.
As the operation began, the Americans and British hoped the French would not resist the Allied landings, and further expected French forces in North Africa would rejoin the anti-Axis alliance. In order to facilitate these hopes, the Allies designated General Dwight D. Eisenhower to command the invasion forces. With an American general leading the forces, the Allies sought to restrict any resistance from Anglophobic French officials and officers in the areas around the invasion beaches and ports. Despite such measures, however, the French did put up some level of resistance at nearly every landing point. Nonetheless, dissension among the various French factions in North Africa limited the cohesiveness and effectiveness of the opposition. Ultimately, the magnitude and rapidity of the Allied
On July 10, 1943, U.S. and British forces began Operation Husky, an invasion of the island using troops deployed by gliders, parachutes, and boats. Many of these landings were disrupted by high winds, making it difficult for Allied troops to regroup once on the ground. During the first few days, the invaders encountered significant resistance around Sicily’s main airfield, but it was quickly overcome. On July 22, the Sicilian capital of Palermo fell to the Allies, and Sicily was secured.