In 1943, The British And American Allies Shared A Common

1573 WordsJan 7, 20177 Pages
In 1943, the British and American Allies shared a common language and a common enemy, but they disagreed on the war’s grand strategy. These strategic differences culminated in the Sicily Campaign when Allied Command and Control exercised by General Eisenhower, Allied Commander, failed to employ the three essential attributes of Mission Command: commander’s intent, full understanding, and mutual trust among partners, as discussed in General Dempsey’s white paper. These failures in Mission Command also limited the Allies’ ability to effectively integrate the vital and complementary joint functions of Fires, as well as Movement and Maneuver. This essay will evaluate the Allies’ Command and Control function, their integration of the…show more content…
Eisenhower did not ensure close proximity between subordinate commands to support planning, integration, and coordination. He never offered or seriously promoted a clear, much less bold, commander’s intent for the operation or an operational end state beyond the capture of Sicily. The committee style of operational planning Eisenhower conducted failed to plan for the possibility of an Axis evacuation of Sicily, and he failed to develop a plan to trap the Axis Forces in Sicily. Once in the fight, Eisenhower never exerted the control over his subordinate commanders necessary to direct them to stop the German evacuation of Sicily. This perhaps changed the trajectory of the war. If the Allies captured the 15th Panzer DIV in Sicily, this weakens the Axis capability to defend Italy possibly, providing the Allies an avenue of approach to Southern Germany in 1943. These deficiencies led his senior subordinates to develop their own diverging commander’s intent. Admiral Andrew Cunningham, Air Chief Marshall Arthur Tedder and General Harold Alexander, all British and Eisenhower senior lieutenants, constructed additional Commander’s intent and personalized operational understanding of Husky that facilitated their own additional operational end states, beyond the capture of Sicily. Admiral Cunningham wanted to ensure the safety of his fleet and refused to operate in the contested waters near Italy. Air Chief Marshall Tedder, above all
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