Intelligence Cycle Biases

Human Intelligence (HUMINT) can be more affected by redundancy in combat zones when more than one tactical element working in the same area of operation. “reduce redundancy of effort, and take advantage of positive relations that are built by the secondary HUMINT collectors. It is important to note as each secondary HUMINT asset is examined that some have a secondary mission to collect intelligence.” (Wright, David N 2003). These different echelons working in the same area will collect information about cases and report it to the chain of command, it will process to intelligence. In the operational level, when all these reports gathered and summed together, it will create redundancy, and can be work positively to confirm the data and validate the source or the case. In the other hand, it can be represented a wasting of man power and trained collectors all summing their efforts to the same case or source. These situations created due to tracking of tracking system or a structural issue in the organizations. The structural reformation in the intelligence agency or element it will take a long process, from studying, training, funding, set up communication channels, recognize the rule of the new structure in the process of collecting intelligence, and places its proper spot in the intelligence cycle to agile the whole process. Also, to have a better product than before, less redundant,

Intelligence is one of the most valuable aspects of the United States’ to the national security. It provides a foundation for the national policy and decision makers within the United States government, and Intelligence Community (IC). The five basic collection components are (HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, GEOINT, and OSINT) which, allows for a variety of different forms of the collection in order to execute the overall mission. In order to understand how intelligence is important to the national security and policy makers, one must understand the intelligence process and the collection components.

The analysis is then given to consumers and policy makers, once it is checked by the analyst supervisor and peers. The analyst should also be ready to give a briefing on short notice. But both the analyst and the policy maker or consumer have to be aware of at all times, is that the intelligence field does not know everything. “On any given subject, the intelligence community faces what is in effect a field of rocks, and it lacks the resources to turn over every one to see what threats to national security may lurk underneath” (Pillar).

Intelligence analysts in the IC, DHS, and FBI are tasked with the primary responsibility of developing threat assessments against the United States and national critical infrastructure. The

Intelligence gathering and collection in the United States has significantly increased over time. This paper examines how intelligence reporting and pre-mission planning was crucial to the success of the United Nations involvement at The Battle of Inchon during the Korean War. By examining how intelligence played a role in this battle, you will be able to understand why it is important to gather and collect intelligence prior to every mission executed. Intelligence collection should be the baseline for all military operations. Inchon Landing has an ample amount of actionable intelligence; collected and disseminated appropriately we will discuss how it played a role in a low probability mission accomplishment to the last great amphibious assault in history. This paper provides detailed explanations on why The Battle of Inchon was a success and what could have been the outcome had it gone the other way.

In today’s modern world of security threats, intelligence and the ability to respond to incidents are the keys to survival. As technology continues to change and advance, we also must change our security procedure and techniques. Dina Evans from LookingGlass has a good definition of threat intelligence, “We define threat intelligence as the combination of technical and contextual information regarding existing or emerging threats from all available sources. It has been evaluated and analyzed for accuracy, timeliness, and relevancy, and implemented among an organization’s tactical, operational, and strategic stakeholders.” (Evans, 2016). The process of threat intelligence feeds into all

“National intelligence is still organized around the collection disciplines of the home agencies, not the joint mission. The importance of integrated, all-source analysis cannot be overstated. Without it, it is not possible to “connect the dots.” No one component holds all the relevant information.” While all agencies collect information, only through joint integration can we truly paint an accurate assessment of the facts. As a reference, the report cites the Goldwater Nichols legislation of 1986, in which Operations as a whole were better envisioned though joint co-operative training. It shows the strengths of these types of events and why we must incorporate more joint intelligence to be successful.

Depending on the situation commanders and leaders are faced with, analytic decisionmaking can be applied. But, because there are often large amounts of information gathered that needs to be clearly evaluated before a decision can be made, it is time consuming. If the conditions of the mission change, such information will require a complete reevaluation, which can delay decisions. Where there are rapidly changing situations that require quick effective decisions, analytic decisionmaking will not apply. (ADRP 6-0, 2-9).

Knowledge accumulation and investigation fuel the world-changing choices of policymakers consistently. The pioneers of nations, their prompting staff, military pioneers, and government organizations all depend on auspicious, exact reports keeping in mind the end goal to choose the destiny of a military unit, a nation's military, or a nation itself. These policymakers need worldwide, national, and nearby occasions clarified in a way that inspects all ramifications and conceivable results of a situation. It is the Intelligence Community's business to gather, examines, and reports these occasions to the policymakers. So as to serve the nation most successfully, an insight examination report must Webb 2 be client engaged, tending to the client's

This paper will emphasize the benefits and importance that actionable intelligence plays in the mission planning process. Obstacles have existed for years that have hindered the process in which information has been collected from the local populace. ; however, iInstead of identifying how to correct the issues the US Army has continuously revised the process to fit the current situation and/or demographics. This paper will explain how the US Army has begun to revise their thoughts its procedures and methods thereby reducing the hindrances and rectifying the process. They have begun to take steps to earn the trust of the local populace which has resulted in improvements in the data gathering process.

Information bias is a type of cognitive bias that describes the tendency to seek information when it does not affect action. People can often make better predictions or choices with less information: more information is not always better. An example of information bias is believing that the more information that can be acquired to make a decision, the better, even if that extra information is irrelevant for the decision. I find myself always trying to collect the most information possible and a majority of the time it is irrelevant to the final decision. One specific example of me using information bias, is when I was trying to decide which cough medication I should purchase. I read all the bottles and googled which product other people had like, but when it came down to finally making the decision I bought the cheapest one. All the research and reading were for nothing because ultimately, I didn’t use the knowledge to make the decision.

The United States Intelligence community draws on advanced technology and analytical techniques. An intelligence process that sets objectives, collects, analyzes, and report findings, with feedback loops integrated throughout. Explicitly, the intelligence community advantages technology and tradecraft within a proscribed process. However, estimation of threats and decision-making are outcomes of human thinking. Analysts and policymakers create mental models, or short cuts to manage complex, changing environments. In other words, to make sense of ambiguous or uncertain situations, humans form cognitive biases. Informed because of personal experience, education, and specifically applied to intelligence analysis, Davis

After learning about the common attributional biases, I decided to reflect on how I usually make attributions. It was then that I realise I have been attributing causes erroneously. Out of the three most common biases, namely, fundamental attribution error, actor-observer effect and self-serving bias, I feel that I am most susceptible to the actor-observer effect.

(Bundy, 1995) Due to the fact, we have a limited collection capability on covert collection, it is essential not to waste any unnecessary resources, especially HUMINT collectors because it causes great damage to intelligence community and our national security. Regarding on send question, it is necessary to know how intelligence functions such as its four phases of Research, Requirements, Reports, Reaction. Whether it turns smoothly or develops an eccentric wobble depends very considerably on the relation between analyst and collector. This relationship is the key to a pair of most critical and sobering problems--how to get the indispensable information, and conversely how to avoid choking the intelligence stream with the luxuriant water hyacinth of trivia. (Dunleigh, 1995). Intelligence collectors and analysts are bonded together and they are inseparable in terms of mutual understanding and responsibilities for their intelligence customers because our national top decision makers are depending their intelligence to protect our national security. This is why intelligence professionals need to know how its subsequent intelligence process

In most cases these INTs community compete among each other to provide needed intelligence information to policy makers to justify their budgetary allocations (Lowenthal, 2014). However, intelligence collection can be divided into five main categories referred to as “intelligence collection disciplines” or the “INTs”. These include Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Signals Intelligence