Lakatos’ view is founded on the premise that demarcation can be settled by looking at the theory and deciding whether or not it has the ability to predict a future event. Lakatos begins his paper by arguing that certain propositions that came before him do not truly address the issue of demarcation and rather they tend to cause problems when viewing the issue as a whole. Lakatos notes a glaring flaw with prevailing ideas as it does not address the fact that most scientists would disregard such falsities as anomalies or create an auxiliary to serve as an addendum to their theory. Lakatos claims that for a theory to be considered a science, that it must have the ability to forecast occurrences. That is to say that these theories must have the ability to predict something to happen. The application of Lakatos’ view is clearly explained by a few examples that he notes namely the reoccurrence of Halley’s Comet. Lakatos notes, “Halley, working in Newton’s programme, calculated on the basis of observing a brief stretch of a comet’s path that it would return in seventy-two years’ time; he calculated to the minute when it would be seen again at a well-defined point of the sky. This was incredible. But seventy-two years later, [when both Newton and Halley were long dead,] Halley’s Comet returned exactly as Halley predicted” (Lakatos transcript) exemplifying his idea regarding the necessity of a theory to predict a future event. However, it must be noted that the future event does not
progression of one event to another. A scientific outlook, however, proves that time is far from
Many aspects of scientific knowledge are hypothetical ideas, however, they contribute the same level of importance compared to a logical fact. A scientific explanation is shaped from existing intelligence to develop future studies and
The author of the time lag argument seems to feel that by simply arguing from admitted facts of physical laws, one will realize that belief about objects of vision are mistaken. However, in this paper, I will show that the author has failed to realize that the key to the argument is the notion that we perceive things happen when they happen, and not later; and we perceive things in the states in which they are, at the time when we perceive them. I argue that the argument pivots on the ordinary use of the word “perceive”. So the real argument is how “perceive” ought to be used.
* We use scientific theories to understand events beyond what our imaginations can often handle, ie; Newton’s theories on attraction of masses.
"For those of us who believe in physics, this separation between past, present, and future is only an illusion, however tenacious." Albert Einstein
When time is considered being a straight progression of events, it can be argued from a hard deterministic standpoint that there is no possibility for the slightest alteration of the events to occur due to the fact that each event in the causal chain is responsible for causing the event that follows. In science fiction, such themes surrounding time would include travel and alteration of the timeline. This essay aims to show how with a progression-based perspective on time, hard determinism must be found as the correct view on sequences of events, and the idea of an alteration of timeline is found to be logically impossible. To fully display this the Futurama episode Roswell That Ends Well will be utilized to adequately describe how events that happen are required to happen, and are unavoidable in their existence seeing as they exist as a part of the causal chain. The short story “A Sound of Thunder”, written by Ray Bradbury, will also be discussed.
Slater, Timothy F., and Roger A. Freedman. "Predicting the Motions of the Stars, Sun, and Moon." Investigating Astronomy: A Conceptual View of the Universe. 2nd ed. New York: W.H. Freeman, 2014. 1-32.
This is the assumption underlying all our ideas of causality. If the future does not resemble the past, then all our reason based on cause and effect will crumble. When Hume proposed questions such as “Is there any more intelligible proposition then to affirm that all trees will flourish in December and January, and will decay in May and June?” (49), Hume demonstrates that it is not a relation of ideas that future will resemble the past; it is possible that the course of nature will change. Therefore, what happens in the future is neither a relation of ideas, nor a matter of fact. “It is impossible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of past to future, since all these arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance.”(51)
Furthermore, there are three main aspects which were customarily associated with a science: metaphysical, theoretical and methodological assumptions. Under metaphysical it is believed that to gain scientific status requires the certainty that the subject matter i.e. human thought/ behaviour, is similar to that of other accepted sciences. This could then be true for Psychology, as particularly since Darwin’s suggestion of a continuity between behaviours of humans and other species, behaviour has become more scrutinised. However, this must be assumed in respect of determinism, suggesting predictions could be made. ‘Heisenbergs uncertainty principle’ suggests that when relating evidence of indeterminism within the universe to human behaviour, it proves ambiguous, and with parts of the discipline believing strongly in free will it seems difficult to establish a common ground (Valentine E.R. page 2).
The idea that the future is already determined is known in philosophy as determinism. There are various definitions of determinism available; but in this essay, I shall use the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy definition, which is ‘the metaphysical thesis that the facts of the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the future
She recognises the provisional character of her research, because a complete work would require “other means”. In fact, her final remarks are closer to advise for further researches than to substantive conclusions. For example, she claims that laws of nature shouldn’t be understood as a defined concept; all further study should take as its starting point the ambiguities implied in the spreading of such a metaphorical, varied word. In her view, talking about a defined concept of law would amount to talk of a well-delimited conception of physics (Roux, 2001, pp. 569–572). Because of this, Zilsel and Oakley’s solution, in her balance, fail to offer a proper answer because capitalism and theological voluntarism are “extremely general to be effectively true”. In other words, the solutions offered only point to specific parts of the amalgamation to which she has pointed. However, Roux’s long paper still conceals the connections of the emergence of the laws of nature with the raising of modern science. In truth, both terminological approaches and historical studies tracing the origins of a defined concept fail in their intention to offer a detailed historical explanation of the way in which laws were involved in the origins of modern science. As valuable and necessary as the collection of uses of the word laws can be, they fail to explain how laws were related (and contributed) to the most basic but characteristics historical phenomena associated to the scientific revolution: the raising of mechanism, the recovery of ancient atomism, the redefinition of disciplinary boundaries, the growing and rapid development of mathematics, the achievements in dynamics, astronomy and optics, among others. In other words, if the study of laws of nature is not connected to the historical phenomena on which they seem to rely, we are still far from appreciating their full significance in the origins of modern science. In opposition to
A far more likely explanation for the formation of these theories and one that plays a part in the
“Can there really be a unified theory of everything?”, Stephen Hawking’s concern seems to be the most challenging question for scientists for years. The beauty of science underlies in its uncertainty - because we do not know anything for sure, we do more research to form a complete understanding of the universe we live in. The more we understand, the less we know. Science seeks to explain our physical and natural world through experimental and mathematical reasonings. That is the reason why science is so fascinating and this is where my academic interests lie.
In chapter two, LaVeist discusses how race factors in conceptual issues in the United States. He states, In the United States, race and ethnicity is a factor in nearly every aspect of society, including politics, economics, music, art, and literature.” (LaVeist, 2005, p. 15) Race and ethnicity is used so frequently in health studies that is important to say that is included in the conceptual issues that a lot of people face. The point of what race and ethnicity really means was discussed in this chapter. In this chapter it was said that race undergoes four major problems. These problems are, “ (1) the concept has not been clearly defined nor consistently applied, (2) there is no consensus definition of race, (3) race is often confounded
Laudan (1983) claimed that the problem of demarcation can be traced back to ancient Greece and Aristotle. Aristotle asserted that from general laws one can deduce scientific theories that are consequently truthful statements. Pseudoscientific theories according to Aristotle are not deductively formulated and therefore cannot be considered scientific. However this method of demarcation is flawed: pseudosciences such as astrology can be vacuously true and most are reluctant to say astrology is scientific. We can already see from this early stage that the distinctions between science and pseudoscience are murky and the formulation of demarcation can be challenging.