made it to Jalalabad in critical conditions. Major General William Elphinestone failed to provide purpose and direction to his staff and subordinate leaders prior to the retreat of Kabul. General Elphinstone did not establish the use of mission order and he did not create a cohesive team through mutual trust. Elphinestone didn’t create a shared understanding, and did not provide a clear commander’s intent to his staff and subordinate leaders. The military commander in Kabul was Major General William Elphinestone, generally regarded as “elderly” although he was only 55 years old. Elphinestone had fought in the Battle of Waterloo in 1815, whose health was deteriorating and not fit for the job. Right after the assassinations, the British
Mission Command: The unity of command principle favored Colonial forces and their allies. General Washington refined his command climate through years of troubled multinational operations. He painfully understood the importance of synergy towards an end state. General Washington’s clear communication of intent and subordinate leader empowerment contrasted his adversaries. General Clinton’s combative command climate with Lord Cornwallis exacerbated their demise. Clear intent allowed the Colonial coalition to seize a fleeting opportunity at Yorktown.
Operational leaders down to the platoon and squad level have recently faced increasingly complex missions in uncertain operational environments. Accordingly, Army doctrine has shifted to officially recognize mission command, which enables leaders at the lowest level feasible to “exercise disciplined initiative” in the accomplishment of a larger mission. The operational process consists of six tenants: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. During the battle of Fallujah, LtGen Natonski understood the intent two levels up, visualizing courses of action for both allies and the enemy, and leading his organization into combat while directing his officers and soldiers to meet his intent. He visualized that Marines alone could not accomplish the mission. He understood that without the support of Iraqi police and a task force from the Army with
Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0 defines mission command as “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations” (U.S Army, Training and Doctrine Command, Combined Arms Center, Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, 2015, p. 1). The six principles of mission command direct leaders to build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, provide a clear commander’s intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk. These principles enable subordinates that understand their commander’s intent to accomplish missions by adapting to the situation and taking advantage of opportunities as they arise (U.S Army, Training and Doctrine Command, Combined Arms Center, Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, 2015, p. 2). Various battles throughout history provide examples of the application of the principles of mission command as well as the failure to adhere to them. The Battle of the Little Bighorn is an example of the latter and marks the “most decisive Native American victory and the worse U.S. defeat during the long Plains Indian War” (History.com Staff, 2009).
Successful leadership on a battlefield can be measured in different ways. It is possible for a good, successful leader to lose a battle. Conversely, it is possible for an ineffective leader to win a battle, given the right circumstances. What distinguishes a successful leader from an unsuccessful one is his/her ability to oversee an operation using effective mission command. In ADP 6-0, mission command as a philosophy is defined as “as the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations” (ADP, 1).
In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.
Maj. Gen. “Fighting Joe” Hooker demonstrated an excellent example of failed mission command during the Battle of Chancellorsville in April 1863. He had thought he would defeat General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia by maneuver beginning in Chancellorsville as he pushed Lee toward Richmond. His commitment toward his own plan for Lee’s response would overshadow his operational planning and ultimately lead to a mission command failure at Chancellorsville despite outnumbering Lee’s troops 128,000 to 60,000. Through decentralized execution, Hooker could have empowered agile and adaptive leadership to operate under uncertainty, exploit opportunities, and achieve unity of effort. Instead, he failed in exercising at least four principles of mission command. He did not provide a clear commander’s intent, create shared understanding, exercise disciplined initiative, or accept prudent risk.
What might have been the setback we previously faced in making decisive, clear or sound effective decisions? Was it a defect in how Commanders and Leaders led units or troops, or perhaps the philosophy in which we chose to command and control every aspect of the battlefield? What does it mean to recognize or comprehend the art of Command and the science of Control? The six principles of mission command are key in developing a cohesive team that will support all aspects of the mission. Asking “why” is now encouraged when it pertains to certain situations or missions. Understanding the purpose of why a course of action or desired outcome is necessary, leads to mission success and a cohesive unit with thinking leaders. Thinking clearly usually isn’t an issue for most leaders, but position an individual in a situation of extreme stress or complexity, then there might be a reason to be concerned. Through
Commanders at all levels face increasingly challenging scenarios as the operational environment changes. Some instinctively motivate and empower their subordinates to think and act independently, thereby influencing actions during combat. However, those who understand the commanders' activities of mission command will influence not only subordinates, but the outcome of the battle as well. Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders.1 Commanders who understood the importance of mission command was Major General Horatio Gates. General Gates at the Battle of Saratoga successfully
Operation Verbal Image is an exercise based on command and control. It used many leaders who used command and control to accomplish their assigned mission. This command and control shaped the battlefield and took the fight to the enemy. This paper will discuss, how important command and control is, what is command and control, what does command and control do, and command and control in the information age. This paper will also discuss how command and control was used, how it affected the outcome of the battle, and my personnel opinions on how command and control could have been done differently.
There are various reasons why leaders fail. It always depends upon the situation how the leader is acting and what is the need of the situation. In the context of the film various reasons why leaders fail are as follows:
Six principles comprise the philosophy of mission command: (a) build cohesive teams through mutual trust; (b) create share understanding; (c) provide clear commander’s intent; (d) exercise disciplined initiative; (e) use mission orders; and (f) accept prudent risk. When combined together, these six principles assist the commander in balancing the aforementioned art of command and science of control. To understand how General Robert E. Lee’s performance at Gettysburg lacked the marks of a great mission commander necessitates a deeper understanding of the individual principles of mission command.
They wanted change to be present immediately, but King Shah knew that such radical and widespread change couldn’t be accomplished overnight. The first hints of a possible coup came as Dauod Khan, who was the prime minister of Afghanistan at the time, discussed rebellion for over a year. His discussion of rebellion and his promises to return the country to a state of traditional rule appealed to military officers. Khan planned the coup with an army trained by the Soviet Union (“Dauod’s”). In 1973, when Zahir Shah was out of town, Dauod Khan officially rebelled and took over power. While there weren’t any killings or violence during the coup, gun shots rang throughout Kabul. The citizens could hear rioting on their formally-peaceful streets. The military coup was bloodless, but a wave of fear swept over the people of Kabul during this time period
The assassination of President Taraki and the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1979 catapulted Afghanistan into a civil war between the Soviet Union and their Communist supporters and the Mujahideen rebels. Following Taraki’s assassination, Hafizullah Amin emerged as the leader of Afghanistan. Amin began secretly meeting with US diplomats to discuss the invasion and Soviet communist tactics thus leading to his murder. Babrak Kamal is then established as the new leader of Afghanistan. On December 24th, 1979 the Soviet Defence Ministry ordered Soviet troops to occupy Afghanistan from ground to air to combat against the growing Mujahideen insurgency that not only consisted of Afghans but now citizens from Pakistan, China, and Iran.
Now the real invasion starts to take shape. The Soviets sent a reinforced airborne division to the airbase in Bagram. Then, the Soviet advisors to the Afghanistan military forces advised the army to go through a series of maintenance cycles for their tanks and other equipment, leaving the forces much less able to resist (Unknown Author. (Unknown Date). Encyclopedia: Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Retrieved April 4, 2004 from the World Wide Web: http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Soviet-Invasion-of-Afghanistan.). Communications in Kabul were completely cut off. The now President Amin moves to Dar-ul-aman Palace, as he believed it to be better fortified (Unknown Author. (Unknown Date). Encyclopedia: Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Retrieved April 4, 2004 from the World Wide Web: http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Soviet-Invasion-of-Afghanistan.). The Soviets seized control of every airfield within and near Kabul, as
The book Black Hearts opened my eyes to how leadership from a single Officer can have a grappling effect on such a wide range of soldiers from the lowest of ranks. One of the best takeaways from Black Hearts is to never do anything: illegal, unethical, or immoral. Although this is a easy statement to repeat, Black Hearts demonstrates the difficulties that lie behind these words. It has also painted a picture of how leadership can topple extremely quickly from a top down view. The Army is portrayed in a bad light throughout the book relentlessly. This is due to the concentration of poor leadership of the 1-502nd Regiment (Referred to as “First Strike”), a battalion of the 101st Airborne Division.