Military Policy

The policy and procedures connected to the DoD definitions of abuse are one of the multiple practices that camouflage prevalence rates. Others include database deficiencies, fatality reviews, oversight framework, chaplain training, commander training, Lautenberg Amendment, and the most egregious the index severity index. All, were deficiencies previously addressed by the Governmental Accountability Office (GAO) in their 2006 and 2010 reports; yet they remain outstanding.

I stated earlier in my paper that the use of ground forces is essentially obsolete in 2017, and the United States should make it a greater priority to utilize other resources to engage in combat. With my predictions of what the United States national defense policy will be like based on what I have learned from experts in the field, ground forces will be a thing of the past. When we were asked what Harvard professor Nathan Tarcov would do in confronting ISIS, I said the exact same thing. Tarcov would recommend to the current administration to not send significant ground forces. There is no clear principle of action for the United States military in confronting ISIS, much less the war on terror as a whole. No matter how many insurgents you take

Strategists will argue that civilians have control of the military. This is in line with Clausewitz notion that war must be subordinate to policy. One will hope for a healthy relationship between both entities; in a sense, while there is no clear line of defined responsibility, both parties should have overlapping knowledge and understanding. As easy as this concept may appear, its applicability can often create discordance among stakeholders. This in turn will create a lack of coordination and participation, all of which are detrimental to the effective integration of

Shortcomings identified during the OIF planning process led to the Adaptive Planning and Execution System (APEX) concept initiated by Secretary Rumsfeld. Although still under development, this process provides a continual dialogue between civilian strategic leaders, combatant commanders, and planners. APEX incorporates key fundamentals of mission command that were absent during OIF including responsive interaction across the entire strategic planning network. The current doctrine for joint operational planning, JP 5-0, also incorporates valuable lessons from the OIF initial planning and execution failures. The development of an operational approach equips planners with detailed commander’s guidance, leads to understanding of the operational environment, and defines the problem. This well-defined process yields an operational approach to achieve the end state. Many of these elements were absent or lacking during OIF. The operational design process provides an array of tools that aid planners in achieving an accurate perception of the operational environment, frame the problem, and determine an approach. These areas were particularly lacking during planning for Iraq. The final component of operational art is assessment and it offers a direct relationship to mistakes in the OIF initial planning and execution. This doctrinal assessment process leads

In addition, Ellis focuses on the political aspect of governance over military operations. Political involvement explicitly affects the planning, financial, logistical, media, and assets available to the military. From my professional experience, multiple layers of restrictions on every aspect of program operations makes it difficult to carry it out effectively. In sum, he balanced the political constrictions and still won the war over Kosovo.

The art and science of warfighting is an amazingly broad and deep subject with complexities that bridge the technical aspects of war and the social interactions that win them. Whether we discuss tactical intricacies of the battlefield or bureaucratic complexities at the Pentagon, multi-faceted problem sets bombard our branch. The government directed Budget Control Act of 2011 in concert with sequestration, the Holistic Aviation Assessment Task Force, the Aviation Restructure Initiative, and a significant operational transition from counterinsurgency to decisive action are just some of the complex, ill-structured, or so-called "wicked problems" that exist. The second and third order effects of these programs and the consequences of decisions

Barack Obama, the 44th president of the United States, began his presidency dealing with many foreign policy issues left behind by his predecessor, George Bush. President Bush was unable to solve many foreign policy problems faced by our country prior to leaving office. Some of these included the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Arab-Israeli conflict, illegal immigration, and improving U.S. relations with Cuba. President Obama was faced with the question of how to handle the number troops in Iraq and Afghanistan and ultimately how to end or lessen U.S. military involvement in these nations. Similar to other presidents, President Obama had to tackle improving the relationship between Arabs and Israelis. He was also faced with the problem of how to handle illegal immigrants and border patrol. A weak relationship between the U.S. and Cuba was another foreign policy issue that President Obama was faced with having to improve. This is President Obama’s last year as president. Overall, he has done a decent job with foreign policy, excelling in some areas, and falling short in others.

the administration's failure to adequately prepare for post-operation occupation was a consequence of an assertive group of policy elites advocating for war and marginalizing those who presented information that could potentially weaken the case for war. These biases in small group decision making are well known, and combating these biases in favor of group conformity requires active encouragement of dissent. future administrations should thus devise consultation and decision making structures that actively encourage dissent, for example, by assigning a devils advocate to ensure all sides are considered in policy discussions, and inculcate the process as much as possible from political pressure.

Political leaders and civilian advisors usually rely on senior military leaders’ advice and inputs when it comes to use of force. One of many best examples can be General Colin Powell’s well calculated and timely request of sending an extra corps to the Gulf, which eventually helped President Bush and the United States as a whole to achieve national strategic objectives in the first Gulf War . His recommendation to use overwhelming force with definite and attainable objective, and clear exit strategy in that circumstance proved to be the most influencing factor to enable the U.S. led coalition’s swift success . Take away from his brilliant advice to political leaders is that senior military leaders must possess extensive knowledge on military strategy and requirements to succeed as well as they should be courageous enough to express their needs. With that, I really want to improve my knowledge on strategy, strategic level decision making, and factors to shape those decisions while I am here. This will definitely help me to give sound and conversant advice to my national political leaders when time requires to do so in the

These failures ensured a gap between the POTUS’s strategic ends and CENTCOM’s ways and means, this invited strategic risk as defined in JP-5-0. These initial planning deficiencies centered around Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld and CENTCOM commander General Tommy Franks. Franks ignored the operational environment addressed in General Anthony Zinni’s OPLAN 1003-98. Zinni and his planners clearly recognized sectarian strife in a power vacuum as a potential Iraqi post invasion problem. , Franks instead relied on Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s “slices” which, though operationally useful, provided very little strategic value to guide his planners or insight on Bush’s National Strategic Objectives or the needed military end-state to support them. Franks never constructs his own OIF operational design. Without his own original operational design Franks could not refine or develop his own commander’s operational approach. He and his CENTCOM planners never analyzed the elements of operational approach necessary to frame the operational environment or define the problem. These elements included, military end-states, termination, and the center of gravity. Without an original or comprehensive operational approach, neither Franks nor his CENTCOM planners produced a complete or coherent plan that “promoted mutual understanding and unity of effort through out the echelons of command and partner

As contemporary war evolves, there are many critical factors military leaders need to be aware

As the case studies of the Civil War, WWII, Containment, and the Gulf War demonstrate strategies conceived with clear objectives, with political and popular will, multi-laterally, with the intangible elements of strategy in mind and proper whole of government resourcing, outcomes are successful. In contrast, those strategies undertaken without the elements above and devoid of understanding the culture, geographic, and ideological factors may win tactically but will probably fail strategically. Howard sums best with, “it was the inadequacy of the sociopolitical analysis of the societies with which we were dealing that lay at the root of the failure of the Western powers to cope more effectively with the revolutionary and insurgency movements that characterized the postwar era, from China in the 1940s to Vietnam in the 1960s” and I submit this same weakness cripples the US strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan

As seen through today’s prism of operational art and design, the U.S. military’s campaign planning for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) was not successful. This failure resulted from flaws in the planning process itself, and the conclusions that flowed from that process. The lack of adequate advance planning for Phase IV stability or transition operations proved especially problematic. This contributed directly to rising levels of violence in Iraq, and indirectly to increased public scrutiny of the war at home. Throughout 2006, the U.S. public, pundits and military planners debated the way forward in Iraq. The plan that emerged from this period, known as the surge, successfully overcame the deficiencies in the initial planning and execution

Though several models provide a way to analyze America’s decision to invade Iraq and overthrow Saddam Hussein in 2003, only one model sufficiently explains the decision. The Rational Actor Model only evaluates the nation’s actions as one entity and does not look at any of the organizational or individual behaviors that contributed to the decision. On the other hand, the Organizational Behavior Model explores the processes that supported the war’s justification and developed the military’s recommendation, but does not explain why the administration chose to focus on Iraq. Only the Governmental Politics Model explains the focus on Iraq by looking at the actors within the administration who framed Hussein’s regime as the problem and worked to build consensus in support of military action. While all three models provide some meaningful analysis of different aspects of the decision, the Government Politics Model is the one that best explains why the administration focused on attacking Iraq.

Since General Ne Win’s seizure of power in 1962, the military regime controlling Myanmar has called itself many things. Throughout the 1960s to 80s, it was the Burmese Socialist Programme Party; during the late 80s to 90s, it was State Peace and Development Council; and in the present day they’re known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council. Though each of these different names represent a different era of Burmese military control, with different policies and different political dynamics, one thing is for certain: no matter the name, figurative political head, or purported change in objectives, the military regime is still firmly entrenched into the country’s political workings - and they wish to keep it this way. As the Burmese people look to the future, this is the biggest and most obvious obstacle standing in the way of progress. There is much debate and discussion amongst the international community and within Myanmar itself as to how the Burmese should move forward, but it is unanimous that the problem lies fundamentally with the military regime and its policies.