The productions of NIE’s are accurate to a degree, but they do not come without any challenges. Some of the biggest challenges that must be overcome in the creation of a useful strategic intelligence assessment include Urgent requests vs. lengthy process and interagency collaboration. As a result of pressure and intensive demands, NIE reports are rushed to be completed in a matter of months or even more than a year. Producing NIE’s at such a rapid rate can result in inaccurate assessment as such was the case for the 2002 NIE on Iraq WMD. It is the responsibility of the NIC to balance the urgency of an NIE request and the amount of time it will take to create an effective estimate. Another major issue that the NIC must be aware of is the interagency collaboration. Any NIE that is produced must the input of the NIC members in it. According to (belfercenter.edu), The interagency collaboration can result in these three things, Gridlock, compromise, and Groupthink. A gridlock refers to when the different interest of members of the NIC results in the slowing down of the analytical process. Compromise result when the estimates only contain “ lowest c’mon denominator” language (Belfercenter.edu). Groupthink is when only one view reigns supreme and opposing views are rejected. …show more content…
These obstacles in the production of NIE’s are manageable and once they are overcome it can lead the NIC to create effective intelligence estimates that are accurate and contain the input or imprint of all its
The newborn and infant physical examination, NIPE, is performed by a qualified NIPE practitioner (Department of Health, DoH, 2015; Public Health England, PHE, 2013), within the first seventy-two hours of an infant’s life. This screening consists of a head-to-toe examination of the infant, including, but not limited to: the heart; the eyes; and the hips. During the examination, the practitioner will take the time to promote good health and wellbeing of the infant, by teaching the family how to identify signs of a well and unwell infant (Someren, 2013). The intention of the examination is to assess whether the infant has any congenital abnormalities (DoH, 2015; PHE, 2013). The NIPE is a developmental examination which is replicated between six and eight weeks after the infant’s birth, to screen for congenital disorders that become prominent in their physiology within this time period.
national information power, that is to say today’s strategic intelligence is the foundation for strategic
In this paper the subject of interest is the role of congress in the oversight of strategic intelligence, or the lack there of. Does congress have a proper role in the oversight of strategic intelligence? If not what should the proper role be? These are the questions best answered by looking at the history of congressional over sight and where it is at today. The next few pages will cover the topics above and shed light on what it is congress calls oversight.
The DNI has modestly more power than the old Directors of Central Intelligence (DCIs), but not enough to give the ODNI/AIS real clout. “Herding cats” remains a decent description of the ODNI’s basic role. The DNI has several duties and responsibilities, but for the subject of improving intelligence information sharing the focus will be directed towards: Improving Analytics, Improving Information Security, Improving Foreign Liaison Relationships, and the end state of Improving Information Sharing.
Special Forces Warrant Officers play a critical role when detachment’s work in Joint Interagency International (JIIM) Environment. If you look at the elements of national power, defined by DIMEFIL, you receive a view of the different players from the JIIM realm. As detachments continue to operate in realms that combine all elements of partial power, fusing our operations with interagency partners will be a key to overall mission success, not just the detachment’s but strategic success as defined by Geographic Combatant Commanders, theatre special operations commands and country teams. The ability to weave our operations into FBI, DEA, CIA and Department of State operations is paramount to overall mission success.
The NIS applies their knowledge of nursing practice theory and informatics to assist in the ongoing modifications of a computerized health care system. They develop strategies, policies, and procedures for introducing information technology to nursing practice. The expertise of a CNO is also critical the success of the committee. They have the skill to develop and implement objective, policies and procedures. They have the responsibility of supervising nurses and nurse managers, which allows for the evaluation of nursing flow in relation to the electronic health record system. They also have experience ensuring operations comply with established standards and regulations. The CFO is responsible for the fiscal functions
Introduction: Throughout the intelligence cycle there are five different phases of gathering information and making decisions on your analysis. The intelligence cycle contains 5 different phases that being planning, collection, processing exploitation, analysis, and dissemination. In the intelligence cycle we dive deep into articles pulling out every viable piece of information that may be useful in a case and do whatever it takes to get that information “no matter how it is obtained”. In the analysis of the intelligence cycle there are many different procedures that agencies follow for gathering information.
Vital to this are on-going threat assessments. Effective threat assessment is the need for abundant, timely and useable intelligence, about potential terrorist sponsors, perpetrators, activities and targets, as well as intelligence to guide our prevention and preparation activities and programs. Despite the transnational nature of many terrorist groups, challenges to integrating foreign intelligence with domestic law enforcement information remains.
The United States Intelligence community draws on advanced technology and analytical techniques. An intelligence process that sets objectives, collects, analyzes, and report findings, with feedback loops integrated throughout. Explicitly, the intelligence community advantages technology and tradecraft within a proscribed process. However, estimation of threats and decision-making are outcomes of human thinking. Analysts and policymakers create mental models, or short cuts to manage complex, changing environments. In other words, to make sense of ambiguous or uncertain situations, humans form cognitive biases. Informed because of personal experience, education, and specifically applied to intelligence analysis, Davis
The challenge to an intelligence analyst, as mentioned by Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, is the lack of experimental, independent testing within a controlled environment. That does not necessarily mean that the intelligence analysis process lacks a formal process or is absent scientific methodologies. Based on Knight (2010), intelligence research identifies patterns through observation so that an analyst can develop a hypothesis to predict future events the very premise of the scientific method. However, the IC has acknowledged a scientific gap and has been migrating towards a more ?coherent scientific discipline? based on the need to improve performance of intelligence analysis (Johnston, ). Furthermore, intelligence analysts are provided with scientific methodologies at their disposal that they can use to strengthen their estimates. In the analyst?s toolkit there are a variety of techniques that can be used to strengthen processes and conform to more valid scientific methods. Heuer (1999), the author of Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH), use ACH as an eight-step procedure using basic insights from cognitive psychology, decision analysis, and the scientific method. According to Bruce, ACH attempts to eliminate cognitive bias and provide other explanations with possible outcomes through testing hypotheses in an attempt to refute or ?disconfirm? them (Bruce, 2008, p. 175). After all, the challenge to inductive inference is not in supporting a study?s conclusions, but refuting them through scientific means. Heuer?s ACH methodology attempts to reconcile this weakness and has become a recognized advancement towards this goal. In Bruce?s essay (2008), he acknowledges that had the 2002 Iraq NIE utilized this methodology, the estimate?s weighty findings should have exposed the
To conduct effective analysis, which leads to decision-making, it is important to have an understanding of cognitive biases and how they impact the analysis provided. How does our government decide if they are going to get involved in a war? A lot of information is provided and analyzed to form the intelligence they use to arrive at their final decision. The concern with this is the amount of cognitive bias involved. Most people make decisions all day long without realizing the biases they have. When it comes to things like National Security it is imperative the agencies, committees and individuals all have an understanding of their own biases. One case of National Intelligence where you can see cognitive bias play a role is with the Iraq
The analysis is then given to consumers and policy makers, once it is checked by the analyst supervisor and peers. The analyst should also be ready to give a briefing on short notice. But both the analyst and the policy maker or consumer have to be aware of at all times, is that the intelligence field does not know everything. “On any given subject, the intelligence community faces what is in effect a field of rocks, and it lacks the resources to turn over every one to see what threats to national security may lurk underneath” (Pillar).
Thus, intelligence cycle process as an integral part of the Intelligence System has intrinsic weaknesses within the “process” itself due to the interplay of different pathologies within the system. It may emanate in every phase of the process from Planning and Direction, Collection, Processing, Analysis and Production, and Dissemination. Julian Richards in his book “The art and science of intelligence analysis” discussed the problems associated with intelligence cycle. The sources of failures in the intelligence arena: Cognitive and analytical processes undertaken by the analyst when they assess the material available to them, and the organisational structure and flow process of the intelligence machinery itself (Richards, 2010). In which
In most cases these INTs community compete among each other to provide needed intelligence information to policy makers to justify their budgetary allocations (Lowenthal, 2014). However, intelligence collection can be divided into five main categories referred to as “intelligence collection disciplines” or the “INTs”. These include Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Signals Intelligence
High level policy makers are not only concerned with intelligence; they are constantly concerned with reelection. A policy maker who is identifying requirements could decide to focus resources on an issue that is less vital to the nation’s security in order to obtain information that will get them reelected. High level threats could be pushed to the side in order to address an issue that is not necessarily as vital but is a hot topic in news media, and public opinion. This would be followed down by the intelligence community and the more dangerous area or individual threat could be left unmonitored.