Nietzsche 's Philosophy On The Priestly Figure

Nietzsche is widely known as a critic of religion. In fact, he talks in depth about morality in regards to religion in his essays about the genealogy of morals. But the problem is not within religion itself or within morals. The problem is involved in the combination of the two to create society’s understanding of morality through a very religious lens. In fact, Nietzsche has criticism for almost any set of morals constructed by a group of individuals and meant to be applied to society as a whole. True morality, according to Nietzsche, requires a separation from these group dynamic views of morality- or at least a sincere look into where they originated and why they persist- and a movement towards a more introverted, and intrinsically personalized understanding of what morals mean in spite of the fact that “the normative force to which every member of society is exposed, in the form of obligations, codes of behavior, and other moral rules and guidelines, is disproportionally high” (Korfmacher 6).

Nietzsche then highlights the foundation of what is good and bad as one that sectionalises members of society into their respective classifications. The "good" qualities will be associated with the upperclassmen, the masters, all those who are superior in power; the "pathos of nobility and distance" (Nietzsche, page 113) has seen to it that words like "noble", "powerful", and "rich" tend to be desirable and have positive connotations, and that the lower-class men are almost always laced with terms that have "bad" implications, such as "poor", "weak", and "dishonest". Nietzsche stands behind the idea that notions of good and bad are essentially social constructions, conducted and coined freely by the privileged to establish themselves as an exclusively finer class of society. The lower-class common men, on the other hand, are imposed with generally "bad" features; the common man is often related to terms with negative undermeanings, such as

These two structures are controlled by different intangible themes. The first is ‘good/bad’ in terms of master morality and the second is ‘evil/good’ in terms of the slave morality. Noble classes and races, according to Nietzsche, started by defining their actions, themselves and their way of life as ‘good’, while ‘bad’ simply referred to anything that was not noble – “everything lowly, low-minded, common and plebeian” (OGM, Sec. I.2). In contrast, the morality of slaves discusses a position of weakness rather than strength. It starts by redefining the masters’ values as ‘evil’, while ‘good’ refers to anything opposed to that of ‘evil’. Unable to create their own original values, the slaves instead invert the values of their masters. This makes the master morality affirmative and favorable, while the slave morality is reactant and adverse. Deleuze, in an interpretation of Nietzsche, summarizes these two positions as a constrasting formula: where the master’s saying is “I am good, so that means you are bad”, while the slave’s logic is that of ‘ressentiment’: “You are evil, so that means I am good.”

Throughout his writings, Nietzsche aims to inform his readers that we as humans can only reach our potential by following our passions and ignoring the flawed ideals of the church. Under the doctrine of the church’s morality, innate passions of its followers must be abolished in order to become proper Christians. By destroying the inner passions of its followers, the church is doing a great disfavor by using morality to rule out nature from their lives.

The father that priests all these attributes has fear in himself that affect all others around him. “Do you not know that God damns all liars?” its this fear of being at risk for hell that translates to the father or priest, and then the fear in the religion itself, and then the worry so the people. “No, old man, you have not hurt these people if they are of good conscience. But you must understand, sir, that a person is either with this court or he must be counted against it, there be no road between. This is a sharp time, now, a precise time - we live no longer in the dusky afternoon when evil mixed itself with good and befuddled the world. Now, by God’s grace, the shining sun is up, and them that fear not light will surely praise it.”

Nietzsche sets the scene for the current moral situation of society in the beginning of his allegory: the madman “in the bright morning lit a lantern and ran around the marketplace crying incessantly, “I’m looking for God!” (§125). The madman is distressed because many fundamental beliefs of Christianity--the belief in God and “sin, repentance,

“As soon as a religion comes to dominate it has as its opponents all those who would have been its first disciples.” Nietzsche was one of the first modern philosophers to rebel against rationalism and when World War I came about, the revolution against religion truly became a legitimate statement. Friedrich Nietzsche strongly believed that many of those that practiced religion were led to the acceptance of slave morality. Religion had always played a fundamental role in society as it sets strict boundaries and standards of what is morally correct and incorrect. However, Nietzsche claims that, “Human nature is always driven by “ ‘the will to power’ ”, but religion will tell one otherwise, saying that one should forbid their bad desires. In Nietzsche’s

As of 2013, fifty-four percent of Americans still had a belief in God, although in some other minorities, that number was larger (Gallup). Despite this, there was a time when some of the greatest minds of the time felt as if God had no modern purpose in human’s lives. One such example of this was that of Friedrich Nietzsche, who went down in history as the man who declared God “dead”. Though this might seem like a hypothetical call to atheism, he was instead showing how the people of the world had come to outgrow a need for God with the coming of the renaissance (Lawhead 454). However, the contradictions found within Nietzsche’s argument

In Nietzsche’s aphorisms 90-95 and 146-162 he attacks what he believes to be the fundamental basis of the “slave” morality prevalent in the Judeo-Christian tradition as well as other religions and societies. From the beginning, he distinguishes the two different types of moralities he believes to exist: the “master morality”, created by rulers of societies, and the “slave” morality, created by the lowest people in societies. The former stresses virtues of the strong and noble while looking down upon the weak and cowardly. This type of morality, however, is not as widespread as the “slave morality” that has been adopted by so many religions. Nietzsche looks through the psychology and logic of

Humanity’s natural aggression means that civilization is “constantly threatened with disintegration” and it must make every effort to ensure these urges are curbed, in order for its continued existence. He continues in this vein, by stating that, in order for people to “forgo the satisfaction of their tendency to aggression” civilization encourages us to form into groups, however for this to work their must continue to be “outsiders,” that the aggression can be turned towards. This is in accordance with On the Genealogy of Morals, where it is the Slaves ascetic nature that forces them to also control their instincts. Likewise, both Freud and Nietzsche assert that these restrictions cause people to internalise their aggressions, turning inward.

To begin with, Nietzsche’s contribution to the study of ‘morality’ has three core aspects: a criticism of moral genealogists, modern evolutionary theory, and a critique of moral values (Ansell-Pearson, xv). For Nietzsche, reading morality is complex due to the numbers of errors people have incorporated into their fundamental ways of thinking, feeling and living (Ansell-Pearson, xvi). Furthermore, these errors are the example of an individual’s complete ignorance of oneself and the world. For years, people have been

On the Genealogy of Morals by Friedrich Nietzsche is typically listed as one of the most important philosophical works of the modern era. It is only modern, of course, to philosophical standards, being a mere 129 years old. It is also one of the most controversial works of its time, having the dubious distinction of being connected to Nazi ideology; it also has a not very subtle racist, sexist, and Darwinist bent that is a reflection of Nietzsche himself. That being said, I think that it is also serially misunderstood. Nietzsche directly mentions the role of interpretation in ethical discourse in the Genealogy, and the interpretive element factors heavily into one’s understanding of the polemic and by extension, ethics philosophy as a whole. Throughout the book, Nietzsche uses interpretation as a tool in itself to make a constructivist and existentialist argument about the history of ethics as whole. His idea that man has used interpretation throughout history, and the interpretive elements in Genealogy outside of the historical analysis, seem to say that almost all ethics are derived from interpretation and therefore constructivist in nature, which is a heavily existentialist argument. For example, the entirety of the first essay is based heavily upon the role of interpretation in the development of the early ethical systems that Nietzsche argues are built on the

We have grown weary of man. Nietzsche wants something better, to believe in human ability once again. Nietzsche’s weariness is based almost entirely in the culmination of ressentiment, the dissolution of Nietzsche’s concept of morality and the prevailing priestly morality. Nietzsche wants to move beyond simple concepts of good and evil, abandon the assessment of individuals through ressentiment, and restore men to their former wonderful ability.

Another philosophy of Nietzsche was related to the notion of ressentiment. Defined, ressentiment is any cautious, defeatist, or cynical attitude based on the belief that the individual and human institutions exist in a hostile or indifferent universe or society and an oppressive awareness of the futility of trying to improve one's status in life or in society (dictionary.com). In the work, On the Genealogy of Morals, ressentiment is illustrated in the way the Jewish clerics act in response to the authority of the Romans. Nietzsche states, “the Jews, that priestly people, who in opposing their enemies and conquerors were ultimately satisfied with nothing less than a radical revaluation of their enemies’ values, that is to say, an act of the most spiritual revenge. For this alone was appropriate to a priestly people, the people embodying the most deeply repressed priestly vengefulness.” The feeling of ressentiment is subconscious and communicates Nietzsche’s analysis of

3). In his most basic claims, Nietzsche implicitly negates the possibility of a “disinterested” or “objective” truth. He would not urge so definitively for an affirmation of reality, if he held out for the possibility of fantasy or god. The ‘innocence of becoming’ is a clear example of how Nietzsche, for all intents and purposes, “debunk[‘s]” the relevance of claims made by traditional authorities. In essence, Nietzsche basically nullifies the relevance of societal hierarchy. Not only this, but the further claims made by such a society regarding morality and philosophical thinking, are seen to be – at best – gullible and naïve. The ‘innocence of becoming’ refers to even the lowest classes of society finding power in their status. In lieu of accepting that we are completely alone in the world, Nietzsche asserts that we have a constant need to blame others for our state. It is simply much easier to do than to accept that everything we do has no genuine or reaching consequences. While the ‘innocence of becoming’ is not necessarily an innocent process as those we choose to blame are usually blameless, it is fair to say that we are innocent of it; much like the ‘will to power’ it also works through self-deception. Evidently we are able to commit to life affirmation by essentially taking no responsibility for our weakness. Christianity itself is closely connected with the ‘becoming’ process as in its