In ‘On Sense and Reference’ by Gottlob Frege and ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description’ by Bertrand Russell, both Frege and Russell put forward a descriptivist theory of proper names inspired by problems with the naive semantic principle that [NP2] the meaning of a singular term is nothing but its direct referent; this is also known as direct reference theory (Kemp, 2013, p. 2). The following paper will demonstrate that although Frege and Russell can both be thought of as descriptivists, their theories are very different--Frege thinks that proper names are referring terms and Russell thinks they are not. This paper will argue that the Russellian theory of descriptions is superior to Frege’s theory of sense because Russell’s theory does not cause him to assert that a singular term, such as ‘a unicorn’, both exists and does not exist; he does not go against the law of the excluded middle--all of which, Frege does do.
Descriptivist theories of proper names (descriptivism) say that each proper name N has the same semantic value as the definite descriptions that are associated with N. The meaning of N is the collection of its definite descriptions, while the referent of N satisfies all of its definite descriptions (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy). This paper will address two problems with naïve semantics that Frege and Russell try to remedy. The first is a problem with non-referring terms, which is illustrated in the example given on page 28 of Meaning
"My Papa 's Waltz" by Theodore Roethke and "The Fish" by Elizabeth Bishop depict the seemingly disparate subjects of a rough, playful dance between a drunken father and his son and a fish just pulled from the sea. Different in this way, the poems share an intense desire to render the ambiguity of subjective experience. More specifically, they show how embracing this ambiguity produces rich, potentially ecstatic modes of perception. While "My Papa 's Waltz" centers on the subjective oscillation between what John McKenna calls "love and fright; excitement and concern," "The Fish" probes the dichotomy between life and death, the human and the inhuman (38). Roethke 's speaker seems to remain caught within the binary aspects of his sensory perception, struck by its contradictory richness, but Bishop offers a glimpse of how the oscillation gives way to epiphany, to what C.K. Doreski calls "a leap from perception to wisdom" (112). By directing readers ' attention to the importance of engaging subjective experience in a way that does not smooth over its contradictory elements, both poems are able to powerfully render the heightened modes of being that can emerge from an immersion in the sensuality of daily existence. I will demonstrate this claim via a close examination of the poems ' imagery, diction, tone, and autobiographical contexts.
Descartes’ ontological argument is an echo of the original ontological argument for the existence of God as proposed by St. Anselm in the 11th century. To illustrate the background of the ontological argument, Anselm’s argument works within a distinct framework of ontology that posits the existence of God as necessity by virtue of its definition. In other words, for the mind to conceive of an infinite, perfect God, ultimately implies that there must indeed be a perfect God that embodies existence, for perfection cannot merely exist as a mental phenomenon. God is, according to Anselm, self-evident in the mind. Criticisms to this argument can be found in Anselm’s contemporary, Gaunilo, who argues that such an argument can be used to - put
The Ontological Argument presented by Anselm is false because of premise two. Anselm argues that God’s existence is provable in a priori, this means that one knows God exists simply by reason alone and therefore does not need any prior experience to know it is true. In the next section, I will explain the premises and defend Anselm’s point. In the third section, I will explain how premise two is wrong.
Anselm’s Ontological Argument argues for the existence of an all-perfect God. The Ontological Argument assumes that Existence is a great making property. Critiques of Anselm and his version of the Ontological Argument argue that existence is not a great making property. If the critics are correct, they have completely bested Anselm, and destroyed his argument. In this essay, I will argue on behalf of Anselm’s argument and defend existence as a great making property.
In Meaning and Reference , Hilary Putnam famously produced the twin-earth scenario to argue for semantic externalism (henceforth externalism), the view that the meaning of some expressions is partly determined external to the speaker’s mental states. In this essay I will first lay out Putnam’s argument for externalism. Then I will extend his scenario and show that externalism faces various problems. Lastly, I will cast doubt on Putnam’s idea that the essence of the term “water” is its molecular structure. Hence Putnam’s twin-earth scenario fails to establish externalism.
The linguistic theory of Chomsky has changed the long, traditional way of studying language. The nature of knowledge, which is closely tied to human knowledge in general, makes it a logical step for Chomsky to generalize his theory to the study of the relation between language and the world-in particular, the study of truth and reference. But his theory has been controversial and his proposal of "innate ideas" has been resisted by some empiricists who characterize him as rationalist. In our view, these empiricists make a mistake. In the present paper we attend to his position regarding linguistics as a science of mind/brain, which we believe is an important aspect of his theory that has not been paid enough attention or understood by
See Daddy’s, 109 F.3d at 280. For example, in Daddy’s, the court held that the phrase “Daddy’s” was arbitrary because the phrase lacks any inherent connection with the sale of musical instruments. Id. Similarly, in Little Caesar, the court reasoned that the name “Little Caesars” was an arbitrary mark because the connection between “Little Caesar” and selling pizza was too weak to be a suggestive mark. 834 F.2d at 571. Although the name may convey the idea that something of Italian origin could be involved, the small connection was not enough to find for a suggestive mark. Id.
The Language Wars have been waged in the realm of English Literature, Language and Linguistics for years. Both sides of the argument are staunch believers in their position, but are more than willing to concede points to the other sides’ favour. In Bryan A. Garner’s essay, “Making Peace in the Language Wars”, he describes himself as a ‘descriptive prescriber’ (Garner, Making Peace in the Language Wars 2008, 270), and offers a truce that fulfils both sides of the argument as the crux of his essay. While the separate sides of the argument are relatively easy to define, it seems that no one sticks to them religiously, and the argument is between individuals fighting over individual points. The two sides are that of the descriptivist and that
One consequence of viewing ontology and identity as relative is that properties and universals hardly seem much more problematic. Although universals obviously do not exist on a fundamental level, I think both David Lewis and David Armstrong provide helpful suggestions on the scope of universals in practical discourse.
Descartes’s theory of knowledge is essentially based in skepticism. He argued that in order to understand the world, first a person has to completely suspend their judgements of the world around them. This is the impression that the world makes on their mind. In this way, the physical world is not what leads to knowledge. Instead, the mind finds rationally seeks knowledge. The question is, essentially, “should we believe beyond the evidence?” (Kessler, 2013, p. 332). In this way, the ideas are rooted in the nature of doubt. This is an inherent nature of the mind, which is the result of the nature of man as made by God. In this way, the mind is guided by god towards knowledge in its infallible ability to reason about reality. In this way, the mind’s reasoning ability, even in the absence of physical reality, can ultimately lead to knowledge. I don’t fully agree with Descartes’ proposition that only the mind can produce certain knowledge and that our senses are constantly under the attack and being deceive by some evil deceiver. In order to go against Descartes propositions concerning about doubt I will use Locke to oppose it.
In respect of the theory of cognition, where Duns Scotus had placed between the perceiving subject and the object perceived a "sensible species" and an "intelligible species," Ockham considers these as superfluous machinery. Objects call forth sense-impressions in us, which are transmuted by the active intellect into mental images. These images are thus a product of the intellect, not species which flow from the object into the intellectus possibilis. The reality of these images is thus, in the modern use of the terms, not objective but subjective. This is true not merely of the "terms of first intention" formed directly from sense-impression, but also of the "terms of second intention," i.e., the abstract terms which take note of common attributes, or universals. These latter correspond to a tendency of the human mind, which can not perceive individuals without at the same time attempting to form a general concept. A white object simultaneously suggests abstract whiteness; an extended, related, enduring object forces the conception of extension, relation, duration. The result of this line of reasoning is the absolute subjectivity of all concepts and universals and the limitation of knowledge to the mind and its concepts-although these are real entities because of their subjective existence in the mind, reproducing the actual according to the constitution of the mind. Thus Ockham is really the pioneer of modern epistemology. The
or that death is not the end. There is no way to prove that this is
We live in a strange and puzzling world. Despite the exponential growth of knowledge in the past century, we are faced by a baffling multitude of conflicting ideas. The mass of conflicting ideas causes the replacement of knowledge, as one that was previously believed to be true gets replace by new idea. This is accelerated by the rapid development of technology to allow new investigations into knowledge within the areas of human and natural sciences. Knowledge in the human sciences has been replaced for decades as new discoveries by the increased study of humans, and travel has caused the discarding of a vast array of theories. The development of
Knowledge can be defined as information gained through sense perception, emotion, language and reason, while it is defined by Plato as “justified true belief.” The claim that knowledge takes the form of a combination of stories and facts is however not accurate in history and biology. First, it brings up the questions of what are stories and what are facts. Stories are accounts of past events from somebody’s perspective, while a fact is the truth. When looking at the two areas of knowledge, they each favour one side of the combination over the other. For example, knowledge from history mostly takes the form of stories, while knowledge from biology mostly takes the form of facts. This distinction between the different types of knowledge leads to the knowledge questions of “How do we obtain knowledge in the different areas of knowing?” and “To what extend is knowledge in certain areas of knowledge subjective or objective?”
The second part will base on the observation in first argument and argue that implication of term is part of the process of interpretation. Along the argument, author will strive to argue that the criticisms towards Lord Hoffmann’s are unconvincing.