David Lewis 's New Work For A Theory Of Universals

To understanding how we use language to describe the world, we need theories to describe and explain our reality. The title quote is taken from Willard Van Orman Quine’s, “On What There Is”, in which he presents a theory of ontology and a position on the problem of universals. The problem of universals questions the existence of universals. Universals are properties and relations which are held in common by shared qualities. In comparison, particulars are concrete entities. The debate is centred around two opposing viewpoints – nominalist and realists. Realists believe in universals, nominalists do not. While realists endorse both universals and particulars, nominalists reject the notion of universals and only accept the existence of particulars. Consequently, there is disagreement among philosophers whether universals exist. Discussion of the titled quote follows an examination of the One Over Many argument which leads to the problem of universals. In this essay, I show that I agree with the title statement and will argue in favour of a nominalist account of universals. I will focus primarily on Quine’s argument for nominalist semantics. This argument will be presented by questioning the universal ‘redness’ and the role of meanings. In examining arguments made by Armstrong and subsequently presenting a response to these critiques via the analysis of Devitt, I will also discuss the infinite regress problem and the validity of the One Over Many argument. My conclusion will be

Anselm’s Ontological Argument argues for the existence of an all-perfect God. The Ontological Argument assumes that Existence is a great making property. Critiques of Anselm and his version of the Ontological Argument argue that existence is not a great making property. If the critics are correct, they have completely bested Anselm, and destroyed his argument. In this essay, I will argue on behalf of Anselm’s argument and defend existence as a great making property.

For nearly a thousand years, the ontological argument has captured the attention of philosophers. The ontological argument was revolutionary in its sequence from thought to reality. It was an argument that did not require any corresponding experiment in reality; it functioned without the necessity of empirical data. Despite flaws and problems found in some ontological arguments and the objections raised to those arguments, ontological arguments still provide a phenomenal vehicle for ontological discussion through St. Anselm’s original ideas and argument, objections raised, and revisions of previous arguments. The ontological argument still intrigues philosophers despite potential objections and flaws

The main crux of this essay is to show how God can exist by referring largely to Alvin Plantinga’s Modal Ontological Argument instead of the outdated, but necessary, Anselm Ontological Argument and definitions. As well as these two forms of reasoning, I will include objections from Averroes, Keene………….

The existence of God is a much debated philosophical argument that has mystified philosophers since the age of the ‘Enlightenment.’ Many of the different arguments put forth and analysed though, have not adequately proven God’s existence. Although in order to move forward, failed arguments must be studied to ensure that mistakes are not repeated. One such argument is the Ontological Argument.

only an ontological debate about what existed in the world, but also one deeply tied to the

Raindrops splashed against the glass; but Jack stared past them, far beyond to the Green Hills. So beautiful. So unreachable.

In this essay, I will discuss the basic history of the ontological argument. This history will be narrowly focused within the framework of the problems it poses for Heidegger. The emphasis will be placed on explaining how Heidegger extracts from, and then extends, Immanuel Kant 's argument that, “being is not a real predicate.” It is my contention that through a proper analysis of Heidegger 's project in part one of The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, the main theory of Heidegger 's philosophy viz., Being, by itself, cannot be being, because being itself, is not an entity, can be better apprehended.

It is argued in this thesis that physicalist ontology can be secure without the constraints and problems of reductionism, through this non-reductive physicalism (NRP for short). Moreover, if identity theory can be reconciled with a view such as functionalism then non-reductive physicalism can be argue it is a robust

Participants in the debate about `ontological commitment' would benefit from distinguishing two different ways of understanding the notion. If the question at issue is `what is said to be' by a theory or `what a theory says there is', we are debating `explicit' commitment, while if we ask about the ontological costs or preconditions of the truth of a theory, we enquire into `implicit' commitment. I defend a conception of ontological commitment as implicit commitment; I also develop and defend an account of existentially quantified idioms in natural language which sees them as implicitly, but not explicitly, committing. Finally, I use the distinction between two kinds of ontological commitment to diagnose a flaw in a widely-used argument

The metaphysical picture conveyed in the works of Leibniz is especially difficult to decipher, given the scattering of his views among numerous papers and their profound interconnection with one another. In this paper, the “World Apart Doctrine” will be explicated as it appears in Section 14 of the Discourse on Metaphysics. As this excerpt alone is insufficient in explaining the role the thesis plays in Leibniz's view as a whole, it will be broken down and analyzed as it relates to connected doctrines, namely those of “Universal Expression,” “Pre-Established Harmony,” and “Predicate-In-Notion.” The compatibility of the World Apart doctrine with each of these fundamental views will be considered, and it will be argued that, in all three cases,

The author of Essay41 askes the philosophical question, “Is arithmetic universally true?” To help the reader, the author defines universally as “something [that] is always true, everywhere” and arithmetic as subtraction, addition, multiplication, and division. The first answer to the question would be yes, arithmetic is universally true. Since many cultures have discovered arithmetic without the influence of eachother and people used arithmetic before it was even defined, we can draw the conclusion that it is universally true. Another might say that arithmetic is not universally true. Since mankind is taught arithmetic and it cannot be seen, arithmetic is not deemed universally true. Overall, the author believes that arithmetic is universally

In the context of a metaphilosophical debate concerning the usefulness and meaning of truth, Anil Gupta writes that “the main problem with deflationism lies in the necessity of strong claims about the meaning of true and that to do so is highly problematic” (5). Therefore, he concludes, deflationism cannot work. The aim of my essay will be to challenge Gupta’s interpretation of the Deflationary Theory of Truth mainly using arguments found in Horwich’s Minimal Theory. After briefly explaining Deflationism and Minimalism, I will point out three main parts Gupta has contentions with and address them systematically. Firstly, his point about “affirming the universal” and “affirming all instances” is correct, however I will show Minimalism avoids that through____. Secondly, his objection about meaning is either fruitless against anti-realist or addressed directly by Horwich.

Affirmative propositions say All S is P. It is general because it talks about each associate of S. It is affirmative because it says that each member of S is involved in P. A true sample of a universal affirmative proposition is "Entirely dogs are animals." We curtail this proposition and cry it the "A" proposition (Agresti, 2012).

To assess the effects of Gödel’s results, the theorems themselves will be outlined, as will the three schools of logicism, formalism and intuitionism, then the effects of the theorems on the schools shall be considered. To appreciate the consequences of the incompleteness theorems there is a need to explain the key terms of consistency and completeness and