P1 STUDENT PASSES EXAM

The emergency rescue of the Royal Bank of Scotland in 2008 has cost the UK government thus the British taxpayer a huge amount of money. Many people are upset about the high bonuses the RBS management board have received, both because of the outrageously high amount and because the performance of the bank on the long-term was not good at all.

There are three internal and one external governance mechanisms used for owners to govern managers to ensure they comply with their responsibility to satisfy stakeholders and shareholder’s needs. First, ownership concentration is stated as the number of large-block shareholders and the total percentage of the shares they own (Hitt, Ireland, Hoskisson, 2017, p. 317). Second, the board of directors which are elected by the shareholders. Their primary duty is to act in the owner’s best interest and to monitor and control the businesses top-level managers (Hitt, Ireland, Hoskisson, 2017, p. 319). Third, is the

Conclusion: Overall Duncan has done a fantastic job bringing the bank to place that other local banks model themselves after, however during the road to this great domain he failed to look at the potential costs associated with raises over time and merit increases staying reasonable. While others were meeting some marks for their level of service the tellers were going to always have an advantage because they are the core of the bank because the customers interact with them more regularly, the customers get to know them, making it easier to be more productive and positive, hence giving them an incentive to do great work every day.

Managers and shareholders are the utmost contributors of these conflicts, hence affecting the entire structural organization of a company, its managerial system and eventually to the company's societal responsibility. A corporation is well organized with stipulated division of responsibilities among the arms of the organizational structure, shareholders, directors, managers and corporate officers. However, conflicts between managers in most firms and shareholders have brought about agency problems. Shares and their trade have seen many companies rise to big investments. Shareholders keep the companies running

On 27 January 2009 Strathfield Group limited suffered from a financial crisis and moved into voluntary administration by ending its long run on stock market owing $25 million to the bank (Sharma & Sainsbury, Strathfield goes into admin, 2009)

To the extent of prevention of corporate failure, I argue that three ASX principles and recommendations could halt the demise of Dick Smith. Firstly, the 2nd principle which is “Structure the board to add value” by structuring the board with a majority of independent directors would prevent CEO dominance because some suggest that independent outside directors can reduce the influence of dominant individuals (ASX, 2014, p. 17). In accordance with Gallagher and Bennie (2015, p. 20), the independent directors are likely to focus on the company’s objectives and not to make decision relying on others. Furthermore, an addressing of independent directors would reduce the reliance on management, and create the effectiveness on monitoring (Dechow et al. 1996 cited in Christensen, Kent, and Stewart (2010)), as well as capability to lessen the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders (Hardjo & Alireza, 2012, p. 4). Thus, DSE’s board would be more active to monitor the CEO’s performances because independent directors pay attentions to the interest of company (Gallagher & Bennie, 2015, p. 20) and shareholders (Hardjo & Alireza, 2012, p. 4)

So investors should worry that Alibaba wouldn’t be share a significant amount of the value created with them over the time. Actually, lots of global public companies have a large shareholder with a lock on control, but normally controlling shareholders often won a substantial portion of the equity capital that provides them with beneficial incentives. In the case of Alibaba, investors need to worry about the relatively small stake held by the members of the controlling Alibaba Partnership (Bebchuk, 2014). All those factors shows Alibaba’s structure does not provide adequate protections to public investors. So investors expect Alibaba changes its Corporate Governance strategy, for instance Jack Ma need to reduce his stake in Alibaba within 5 years, including by having shares in Alibaba granted to Alibaba employees. It also should give more power to the shareholder’s to guarantee shareholder’s right which will seeks to allay investor concerns. If Alibaba change their strategy, giving its stockholders’ strong confidence, the business success of Alibaba might be large enough to make up for the costs of diversions and give public investors with good returns on their investment in the

Both were pushing to appoint their own administrators. The banks wanted to appoint McGrath Nicol

The downfall of Tesco has resulted in their chief executive, Philip Clarke stepping down and their UK chief executive Chris Bush, UK finance director Carl Rogberg, UK food commercial director John Scouler and food sourcing director Matt Simister all being suspended after an investigation into how it had happened. Tesco overstating their profits has affected them

This was good news. Larry was leaving and I would have the Garden Shop all to myself until they found another Garden Shop manager. I knew Larry was going to retire one of these days but I had not expected it so soon. This meant only one thing, I couldn't quit now.

The ASX Corporate Governance Council defines the ‘corporate governance’ as the framework of rules, relationships, systems and processes within and by which authority is exercised and controlled within corporations (Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations, 2014). The term “failure” of a corporate can be described as “Insolvency” in Australia (Michaela Rankin, 2012). And the reasons for corporate failure can be grouped into six categories: 1. Poor strategic decisions. 2. Greed and the desire for power. 3. Overexpansion and ill-judged acquisitions. 4. Dominant CEOs. 5. Failure of internal controls 6. Ineffective boards(Michaela Rankin, 2012).

John’s departure was imminent at the end of the last financial year, when material adjustments to profit were made during the audit of the accounts. The announcement resulted in a 20% decline in shareholder value overnight. There’s now a broad recognition that things have to change.

The rise and fall of the Royal Bank of Scotland is characterized by poor corporate governance which allowed for the complete dominance of the executive management over the board of directors and a massive principal-agent problem. Positive social dynamics and the power of weak ties allowed for compliance while intimidation and bullying tactics silenced questions, concerns and opposition. The board’s utter compliancy and borderline negligence enabled rampant, unchecked empire-building at the cost of shareholder value and led to a spiral of unaccountability and gross incompetence. Stakeholders’ loss of confidence from misinformation and misdirection was an inevitability that sealed

Corporate governance is founded on laws, policies, processes, systems and behaviours and together they provide a system for the way in which an organisation is directed, administered and controlled. As such, the Charity Commission, (the ‘Commission’) recognises that to deliver its strategic aims, objectives and priorities successfully, it needs sound corporate governance arrangements in place, (Charity Commission UK). Corporate Governance is not - or should not be - about debate and discussion on executive compensation, shareholder protection, legislation and so on. In recent times, corporate governance became not only a subject of fierce debate and public outcry, but also, as a result of this and arising legislation, a subject which been wearisome for many company directors. The hidden gem here is to a great

Companies better understand how good corporate governance contributes to their competitiveness. Investors – especially collective investment institutions and pension funds acting in a fiduciary capacity – realise they have a role to play in ensuring good corporate governance practices, thereby underpinning the value of their investments. In today’s economies, interest in corporate governance goes beyond that of shareholders in the performance of individual companies. As companies play a pivotal role in our economies and we rely increasingly on private sector institutions to manage personal savings and secure retirement incomes, good corporate governance is important to broad and growing segments of the population. The review of the Principles was undertaken by the OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance under a mandate from OECD Ministers in 2002. The review was supported by a comprehensive survey of how member countries addressed the different corporate governance challenges they faced. It also drew on experiences in economies outside the OECD area where the OECD, in co-operation with the World Bank and other sponsors,