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Reasonable Doubt History

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The Evolution of the Doctrine of "Beyond Reasonable Doubt"

the "beyond reasonable doubt" standard has characterized the Anglo-American criminal justice system for more than two hundred years. That system has always depended heavily upon the jury so that any study of reasonable doubt necessarily must be linked to an examination of the jury. From the surviving records, it does not appear that judges initially concerned themselves much with the question of the jury's evidentiary duties. Early jurors reached decisions on the basis of a mixture of their own personal knowledge of events and the testimony of others. By the sixteenth century most of the personal knowledge had dropped away. Once jurors were clearly perceived to be reaching decisions …show more content…

If judges felt they now had to instruct jurors on how to know about matters of fact and on how much to know, it was natural for them to turn to the ideas of their contemporaries who were principally concerned about knowing and who were attempting to convey their ideas about knowing to the lay population from which juries were drawn. This tendency was reenforced by the relative isolation of the judges from their normal source of professional sustenance, the bar, when dealing with jury matters. In normal circumstances, lawyers appeared for neither side in ordinary criminal …show more content…

Their efforts were both shaped and complemented by the enormous upsurge in epistemological thinking that was a part of what is commonly called the "scientific revolution." Thus the judges confronted twin sources of epistemological guidance. One was the English religious tradition, particularly the casuistical tradition, which sought a rational method of decision making in everyday life. The other was the scientific movement of Bacon, Boyle, and especially Locke and the empirical philosophers, who sought to establish scientific truth from the evidence they gathered. This paper is about how judges created the beyond reasonable doubt standard for the jury, and so it is also about the religious and philosophical thinking from which that standard was derived.
There are two kinds of rules of evidence in common-law jurisdictions. The first, which deals with what kinds of evidence may get to the jury when and in what form, can be understood without much reference to nonjury developments. The second deals with the evaluation by the jury of the evidence, and how it is to decide whether there is sufficient probative evidence to justify a verdict. Such rules are drawn from the culture's general understanding of how we "know" things to be true. This paper deals with this second variety and

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