Regionally Aligned Forces

In this lesson you will continue to review the key agencies and major force management processes used in developing warfighting capability provided to combatant comman

Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) are the vital link between those who determine national security policy and strategy and the military forces or subordinate JFCs that conduct military operations within their AORs [JP-1]. GCCs takes on a lot of responsibility they are normally responsible for a large geographical area; not mention the effective coordination of operations within that area falls on the shoulder of the GCC. Directives flow from the President and SecDef through CJCS to the GCCs, who plan and conduct the operations that achieve national or multinational strategic objectives. GCCs provide guidance and direction through strategic estimates, command strategies, and plans and orders for the employment of military force. One plan

Training objectives must support the mission profile and meet the commanders desired end state. Prior to the 56TH train up at the National Training Center (NTC) the deployment location changed from Iraq to Afghanistan (case study). Changes to mission essential tasks were not identified prior to NTC, resulting in the BCT training on collective tasks and validated during MRE based on the Iraq mission profile. However, the shift to the Afghanistan mission profile created gaps in training not identified until units arrived at Bagram Air Field (BAF). i.e. the BCT had to establish an MRAP drivers training program at BAF extending the RSOI process. Training gaps were not limited to company level shortfalls as battalion and brigade staffs were not able to anticipate potential threats and capitalize on opportunities. (case study 2)

The ASCC G-1/AG, in coordination with the TSC (with the support of the HRSC), reconciles prioritization issues to ensure required HR support structure is available for the theater. As outline in FM 1-0, Human Resources Support publication, the ASCC G-1/AG’s primary function is to plan and prioritize HR support to assure a unity of purpose and effort that maximizes the readiness and operational capabilities of forces within the theater. With that being said unlike most Sustainment WFF, the personnel functions of our allies and partners work independently of US capabilities and are adequate to fill their current needs. Unlike a truck or a medical kit, we cannot sign over an officer corps culture or conscription system. Most of the militaries of our partner nations are not just instruments to project hard military power, but are also the cornerstone of their government's stability and power base.

Military planning and operations in the 21st century must take into consideration a number of different issues. One of the ways in which the late 20th century evolved was the change in economic, political, and cultural movements that, through technology, seemed to move countries of the world closer together.

Three short years ago, the 4th ABCT was considered among the best maneuver brigades in FORSCOM. In all areas, the brigade shined. Morale was high and it exerted a pull on the best and the brightest officers and non-commissioned officers. Leaders lead, Soldiers soldiered, and a family atmosphere of support emanated within the brigade. The work ethic was strong. Competition amongst the battalions was positively oriented toward the success of the brigade and there was frequent coordination among peers to share information, resources, and lessons learned. Now, after a jaded Afghanistan deployment, it appears that the climate has shifted and the battalions are striving to make themselves distinct from each other and the brigades rather

The brigade will empower our staff through the chaplains, medical professionals, and leaders to openly communicate and address the stresses of combat. The brigade holds town halls and encourage the battalions to do so as well because these stressors extend beyond our formation. We will provide guidance to ensure leaders and Soldiers understand the importance of addressing these matters and how they correlate to trust. The brigade’s goal is to communicate a vision and command philosophy that demonstrates our specific purpose, empowers our leaders and effectively manage the systems that drive the organization. These elements need to be articulated at the lowest level so that Soldier’s understand our mission, to fight and win the nation's wars.

3) Department selected for training: As a part of the Army Reserves, ARMEDCOM is not divided into typical business department but rather is separated into more typical military units. Brigades, Battalions, and Companies are the basic constituent "departments" that can be identified in the company, and these all essentially "downtrace" (ARMEDCOM, 2012). That is, they exist in a hierarchy wherein each incorporates multiple of the next. Each of these specific types of units within ARMEDCOM have been identified by the Department of the Army as capable of mobilization, meaning that these are the functioning or action-capable units of ARMEDCOM and thus the units to which

Given the context of current strategic guidance, it is important to ask if the U.S. can be prepared to conduct both conventional and irregular warfare successfully. The answer is yes. However, preparation for conventional operations should always be the priority. Preparation for irregular warfare should not come at the expense of conventional warfare preparation. This is necessary because of the reasons discussed below: the strategic limitations of irregular warfare, the enduring nature of conventional war, resource constraints, and prioritization of operations and training.

The Army provides combatant commanders with trained and ready units, leaders, and individuals. Army expeditionary forces are prepared to conduct unified land operations in support of unified action. The Army accomplishes this by conducting tough, realistic, standards-based, performance-oriented training, which is based on eleven principles of training and seven principles of leader development.

In 2008, Department of Defense and restructuring of the major combatant commands resulted in a new command, United States Africa Command (U.S. AFRICOM). As a full-spectrum combatant command, AFRICOM is responsible for all U.S. Department of Defense operations, exercises, and security cooperation in the African continent, it’s island nations, and surrounding waters. AFRICOM is part of a diverse interagency team that reflects the talents, expertise, and capabilities within the entire U.S. government. Elements include but are not limited to U.S. Africa (USARAF), U.S. Naval Forces Africa (NAVAF), U.S. Air Force Africa (AFAFRICA), U.S. Marine Corps Forces Africa (MARFORAF), Combined

In March 2012, United States Army Chief of Staff announced an initiative to align brigades with each of the six global combatant commands (GCCs). Those units assigned or allocated to GCCs are Regionally Aligned Forces (RAFs). RAFs provide tailored, trained and consistently available Army forces, responsive to all requirements, including operational missions, bilateral and multilateral military exercises and theater security cooperation activities. In theory, the RAFs concept provides a scalable, tailorable capability to meet combatant commanders’ steady-state and phase zero shaping requirements. Additionally, the RAFs concept improves the Army’s ability to provide culturally and regionally aware forces for specific missions.

The Army’s mission is to build forces capable of Unified Land Operations, able to operate effectively with Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners across the range of military operations to provide capable and ready forces to combatant commanders (CCDRs) in support of the National Security and National Defense Strategies, while sustaining and maintaining the quality of the All-Volunteer Force. (United States, 2014)

Since 2007, NATO has accepted to assist the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by providing strategic airlift and sealift in support to AU member states willing to deploy in Somalia under AMISOM. NATO has also provided subject-matter experts for the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD). The PSOD is responsible for the planning, conduct and management of AU operations and missions, including AMISOM. NATO experts, working side by side with AU counterparts, offered expertise in specific areas for a period of six to twelve months, renewable at the AU’s request. OPERATION IN MIDDLE EAST, COUNTERING THE ISIS:

Clausewitz defines war as an “act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” The nature of war is enduring yet the character of war changes over time. Current US strategic guidance is advancing the point of view that since the character of war has changed to focus on irregular wars then the US military should prepare for a future of irregular wars. This shift in focus forgets that the nature of war is enduring and in order to be successful, we must prepare for all types of conflict. This paper will define the types of conflict and the likelihood of each followed by a discussion of US strategic guidance and ending with an analysis of the training resources and force structure requirements needed to achieve success for all types of