Essay On Sago Mine Disaster

The CMA received a follow up stating that everything had been corrected. Another letter was sent from the CMA asking for details in March of 1947. On March 25, 1947 the explosion occurred (Martin 1948). I believe that if someone actually went to inspect these corrections that were made the explosion or the 111 causalities could have been avoided.

In addition to long working hours, miners paid for the supplies including open head flame lights and detonators. The miners were more or less like craftsmen using their tools and self-acquired skills to produce the maximum output. Consequently, the explosives led to numerous accidents leaving the miners injured badly and dead in many instances. Numerous workers (about 60 each year) were killed as a result of these explosions. The families of the deceased were rarely compensated. Occupational hazards, deterioration in health overtime, inadequate pay in the form of “strips” resulted in conflicts between the labor and the management.

The immediate cause of the disaster is the result of a poorly maintained longwall shearer that sent a spark which could not be extinguished because of inoperative water sprayers. This spark ignited a pocket of methane gas that accumulated at the coal face over the course of a year because of poor ventilation. This resulted in an explosion that fireballed throughout the mine because of the accumulation of flammable coal dust that was not properly treated with rock dust as instructed by the MSHA. Although this was the immediate and most detrimental cause of the disaster, I believe Don Blankenship was largely responsible for the disaster. For almost twenty years, Blankenship had near-total control over Massey Coal Company, and later Massey Energy. During this time, he had decisive impact over the culture, policies, and practices of the company. He directed a management system that gave priority to productivity, which was running coal, over all other concerns, including environmental impacts, worker health and safety, and legal compliance. As a hands-on manager, he was completely and fully aware of everything that was going on in the company, all the way down to the last tank of gasoline or ton of coal. Therefore, he should bear the ultimate responsibility for the Upper Big Branch mine disaster.

The case study points out some of the deficiencies mentioned by Wilson in his article, specifically how political appointments lead to a weak administrative system and the tendency to corrupt the individual. Also due to the coal industry being so entwined with the state politics, the industry’s need for monetary gain came before the workers’ need for safety. Had there been a clear separation of politics and administration, it is feasible to believe that the incident at the mine could have been

The Company also violated 29 C.F.R. § 1926.652(a)(1) for failing to protect employees from cave-ins (www.osha.gov):  Williams had reason to know that its employees would enter the trench on the day of the collapse and had actual knowledge that two of its employees entered the trench prior to the cave-in. It is unavailing for Williams to argue that employees must take greater care to avoid placing themselves in harm's way or that management can “expect an employee not [to] intentionally place himself in danger.” Such a claim misconstrues the purpose of

During interviews that were conducted during the investigation, it became evident that a lot of employees are no understanding of the OSHA regulations and had received no training on trench safety. The second violation states that Williams did not ensure that their employees did not have to travel more than twenty-five feet to a safe zone. The trench that the employees were working was more than forty-five feet long and only had one exit. At the time of the collapse the employees in question were deep into the trench trying to clean out the water pumps that were in place. This causes a hazard for them because they were unable to reach safety or escape once the walls collapsed. The third violation stated the there was no “competent person” on the job that had extensive knowledge of trench safety. It is regulation by OSHA to have at least one person on cite that is able to spot existing and potential hazards on the job cite. During the investigation it was clear that no employees had knowledge of OSHA or any of the regulations related to trench safety. The fourth and final violation was that Williams failed to ensure that the walls of the excavation were either sloped or supported. It was stated early in the case that the support provided by a hydraulic jack was removed the night before the collapse causes the walls and work environment to be un-stable.

“Blasting itself produced immense quantities of mineral particles. The common practice of returning to the work face soon after the detonation of charges meant entering an area filled with particulate matter. (Derickson 3)” Also, as labors transported, unloaded, and cleaned the extracted material dust was inhaled even though they were away from the mine. So no matter what technique used the coal dust still made it in the air and into the miners’ lungs. There were no safety regulations in place about how long to wait after blowing up coal, no regulations about how many particulates in the air were safe, no mask or safety precautions and no mandatory venting. Although some of these things were easily usable to the safety the company felt it was too costly. “An elaborate system of fans and blowers was ‘too costly’, so the miner had to pay for the bad ventilating by ‘miners’ asthma’ and other ailments caused by bad air. (Derickson 4)” Basically the coal operators did not care enough about the miners safety to provide vents and things that could have helped the air quality.

Could you imagine dying from no air?!! Bear Creek Montana suffered one of the worst mine explosions in US history.

In his book “Deep Down Dark: The Untold Stories of 33 Men Buried in a Chilean Mine, and the Miracle That Set Them Free,” Hector Tobar recounts the story of 33 miners who spent 69 days trapped more than 2000 feet underground in the Chile’s San Jose mines following the collapse of the mine in 2010. According to Tobar (2015), the disaster began on a day shift around noon when miners working deep inside the mountain excavating minerals started feeling vibrations. A sudden massive explosion then followed and the passageways of the mines filled with dust clouds. Upon settling of the dust, the men discovered that the source of the explosion was a single stone that had broken off from the rest of the mountain and caused a chain reaction leading to

The “Benoni Mine Incident” is a situation that encompasses an episodic case of illegal mining that took place in South Africa. A rescue operation was set in motion in February of 2014 at an abandoned mine shaft near Johannesburg in attempt to rescue a number of illegal mine workers. It was first thought they were trapped due to a rockslide, but was later revealed that a rival crew of illegal miners had trapped them in there. In the beginning reports first suggested that there were 200 trapped and were later estimated to it actually being 30. After several miners were rescued, word had gotten back to the rest of the miners below that they were being arrested and the remaining illegal workers refused to leave

In fact, death was not a stranger to the miners. One sabotaged accident left fifteen victims presumed dead. Negrel, the head engineer and supervisor, had the opinion that "not one of the victims could still be alive, all fifteen must certainly have perished from drowning of asphyxia..." (455) Even despite all the danger the workers had to suffer major injustices. Etienne argued against the Company saying "You cut down the price per tub and then pretend to make up for the cut by paying for

On the 19th of September 2010, what was to become known as the Pike River Mining Disaster began in the close proximity to the town of Greymouth. At an occupied mine of 31 miners and contractors, an initial explosion occurred in the West Coast Region of New Zealand’s South Island at approximately 3:44pm. Two were fortunate enough to walk away from the scene and were treated for moderate injuries at hospital, then later released the next day.

In some aspects I can say they had the right idea in mind before the disaster, but not on the right track. Honestly if a company is doing business safety needs to be a concern. They know the risks involved with this line of work. As well employees do to, but without your employees a company is nothing. Eleven people died that did not have to. Yes they make have had some things planned which is great for them at that time. Although not having things up to standards is not excuse. Especially when that is such a dangerous line of work. Not to mention their carelessness to standards impacted so many.

The Deepwater Horizon was one of the largest offshore oil-drilling rigs in the world. During its more than nine years of service, all of which were under lease to the British Petroleum Company, numerous inspections were conducted by the federal Minerals Management Service (MMS). The exact number of inspection cannot be verified due to lack of proper recordkeeping and supporting documentation. The number of inspections has varied between eighty-three and eighty-eight, with as many as forty-eight being conducted since January, 2005. (Kunzelman & Burke, 2010). One of the safety violations documented during an inspection was on the blowout valve that failed causing the fireball that ignited the drilling platform. The question arises as to

Pike River Mine tragedy took place on the 19th November, 2010 and resulted in deaths of 29 workers. Many factors led to this tragedy especially poor decisions made by PRCM and Department Of Labour. In this Report, many aspects of the tragedy will be discussed.