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Scheffler's Non-Consequentialist Moral Theory

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Williams defines consequentialism as a maximizing principle which regards actions as valuable only in relation to the goodness of the state of affairs they produce. Actions are not intrinsically ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, but rather an action is morally correct “in virtue of its causal properties of maximally conducing to good states of affairs” (24). Williams extends this causal relationship to include negative responsibility. He argues that from a consequentialist perspective, an agent is equally responsible for the actions they allow or simply do not prevent as they are for the actions they take themselves. All varieties of ‘causal connections’ between an action (or inaction) and a produced state of affairs are equal in importance. Thus, if one …show more content…

He first defends consequentialism as a whole by illustrating the absurdity of non-consequentialist moral theory, which incorporates what he calls “agent-centered restrictions”. Agent-centered restrictions dictate that there are certain actions which are always morally impermissible for that agent, regardless of situation or consequence. These restrictions can prohibit an agent from an action that would produce the best state of affairs, and an agent is not required to do so anyway. Scheffler dismisses this type of philosophy as incoherent: he claims that there is no logical reason why the restrictions on an agent’s actions are what they are, nor why they are binding. Restrictions could possibly stem from a principle against violating other individuals, but, as Scheffler points out, in many examples of moral deliberation, someone will be violated regardless of which choice is made. Thus such a principle is self-defeating and, again, irrational. Additionally, there are many situations in which this type of philosophy fails to provide moral guidance, as it dictates only what one cannot do and offers no suggestion as to what one should do. Thus, Scheffler concludes, moral philosophies involving agent-centered restrictions are insensible and inadequate, and consequentialism is superior for its simplicity and clarity. Scheffler then addresses the problem of integrity by presenting a hybrid philosophy which preserves the rationality of consequentialism by rejecting agent-centered restrictions and acknowledges that humans are not capable of a completely impartial perspective. He calls this compromise an “agent-relative prerogative” philosophy. Under an agent-relative prerogative philosophy, an agent is not morally forbidden from any actions that would produce the best state of affairs, but is also not morally obligated to produce the best

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