Similarities Between Functionalism And Dualism

I would like to begin this paper by addressing what question I hope to answer through the entirety of this paper: is the mind physical? As simple as this question may seem to be, there still, to this day, is not a definite answer. There are, mostly, two approaches to answering this problem, through dualism or physicalism. The dualist, for the purposes of this paper, simply believes that the mind and the body are not equal and therefore, they are not one in the same. The physicalist, however, would come back to say that there are no such things as non-physical objects and therefore, they would conclude that the body and the mind are both physical. After weighing on both sides of this argument, I am going to defend the physicalist ideas and

In essence, Cartesian Dualism attempts to solve the mind-body problem – that is, what is the relationship between the mind and the body? The answer, according to this theory, is that the mind and the body are two distinctly different substances that constitute each person. Here, “mind” can be described as a nonphysical thing that thinks and “body” as a living physical thing that does not think. The mind can also exist independently of the body, and both can causally affect one another.

Theories have been composed and exposed by various philosophers to clarify their reasoning about the mind. Dualism, Behaviorism, and Identity Theory, are well-known theories supported by well-written explanations. A modern theory, Functionalism provides ample insight to the main problem philosophers deal with, the mind/body problem.

In this essay, I am going to write a response to the objection raised by the functionalists towards identity theory. Identity theory is a form of physicalism; it states that a particular mental state is identical to a particular physical state of body and brain, for instance mental sensation such as pain is simply just the firing of C-fibres (Smart, 1959). This is a reductionist view as it reduces our psychological state to a materialistic and physical form. A prominent objection against identity theory is Functionalism, in which the main advocate Hilary Putnam stated that identity theory is too narrow as it ignores multiple realisability. In the next paragraph, I will write a little more about functionalism, and in the end, I will ultimately conclude that functionalism is a better theory than identity theory.

According to J.P. Moreland in his argument for dualism, he states that humans are composed of both an immaterial substance and a physical substance. Moreland notes that there are contrasting differences between the minds and the brains and that they are ultimately separate entities. By defending dualism, Moreland seeks to make nonbelievers believe in immaterial souls, while discrediting materialism. We can look at the arguments in which Moreland uses to support the argument of dualism and belief that the mind and brain are separate entities.

This essay assesses property dualism, a theory of mind. It proclaims the existence of a single, physical substance (unlike Cartesian dualism), but argues that this single substance has two potential properties: physical and mental states that are not reducible.

Leading to conclusion that substance dualism is not a useful or applicable theory of mind (Kim, 2005).

However, during most human activities, the self-analytics of the mind tend to remain quiet, and we instead live in a state where the mind and body can easily be interchangeable. This second observation appears to side against dualism, or, at least, give us pause to too quickly assume it is the case, but it fails to account for orthodox cases. For example, in instances of disabilities such as dissociative disorders, the individual will completely separate from their body, and, at times, have memory loss concerning the events occurring during the separation. In war veterans, their PTSD can result in them losing rational agency and acting out violently. This can be easily defined in dualism as a malfunction between the connection of the mind and body.

One statement is that mental states can’t be true or false unlike where physical states can. One cannot say that it's false to obtain love or it's true to obtain love. You cannot compare the mental state to a physical state being the mental state is a different state of dimension. Using introspection, one can say that he knows his mind via introspection, but he cannot know his brain via introspection. This means that both mental and physical states are indeed different. This means that you cannot translate neural activity that is firing in your brain, but you can translate thoughts, beliefs, and desires that are in your mind. This difference of the mental state in opposite of the physical state validities the argument that dualist

I am faced with the philosophical task of defending either dualism or materialism, depending on which one is most attractive to me. So either I support the theory of dualism, which is the belief that there is both a physical and a spiritual state, or I believe in materialism, which is the belief that everything that exists is material or physical. Although I believe materialism to be easier to prove, I find dualism more attractive to believe. Throughout the following, I will attempt to build a case for the theory of dualism giving insights both documented and personal. I will also shed light on the theory of materialism and the proofs that support this theory; showing that

Functionalism, one of the most influential and widespread theories of mind of our day, proposes a model of human behaviour based on the way certain inputs are processed when the mind is in a given state, to yield certain outputs. This theory concerns itself only what mental states do, rather than the substance with which they are made, or whether they exist at all; this is called ‘multiple realizability’. In other words, the theory is ontologically modest, or flexible, and this enables functionalism to stay compatible with Cartesian dualism or monisms like materialism, an advantage when other theories lose followers due to their ontological preconceptions. The other notable strength functionalism claims is that it avoids some of the pitfalls of its counterpart theory, behaviourism. However each of these apparent strengths has flaws, both in and of themselves and in comparison to other theories of mind. These strengths and their flaws will be assessed in this essay, but allow me first to outline what the functionalist theory of mind proposes.

Are minds physical things, or are they nonmaterial? If your beliefs and desires are caused by physical events outside of yourself, how can it be true that you act the way you do of your own free will? Are people genuinely moved by the welfare of others, or is all behavior, in reality, selfish? (Sober 203). These are questions relevant to philosophy of the mind and discussed through a variety of arguments. Two of the most important arguments with this discussion are Cartesian dualism and logical behaviorism, both of which argue the philosophy of the mind in two completely different ways. Robert Lane, a professor at the University of West Georgia, define the two as follows: Cartesian dualism is the theory that the mind and body are two

Although many people believe in dualism, it still raises a hard problem. How can an immaterial mind interact with the material body? “How can something like the mind reach into the physical world and affect it?” (Velasquez 77). Newton’s first and second laws of motion completely annihilate the interaction of the mind and body as they imply that only material objects can interact with each other and cause themselves to move. They infer that mind must be able to come into contact with the body, yet contact only occurs if there are two or more materialistic surfaces. Therefore, minds cannot come into contact with bodies in order to cause movements. Moreover, the difficulty arises when it is noticed that sometimes the mind moves the body, for example, the intention to question in class causes the raising of one’s arm, and certain motions in the body cause the mind to have sensations. But the problem still remains that how can two substances with completely different natures interact? Could it be that mind is also a material thing having also having nodes shape and motion with thinking characteristics that are also materialistic? Later, Descartes tried to yet again defend his argument by saying that “perhaps the mind interacts with the body through the pineal gland, a tiny gland near the brain” (Velasquez 78). Descartes

Functionalism was an influence that made people believe in the possibility that machines can be intelligent. It also identifies mental states by what they do rather than what they are made of and there in that statement, the mind body dualism is denied by functionalism. Perhaps mental states are more a matter of software, like running a program on your computer (Rosen et al., 355). It is denied not only because there is not enough information to back it up, but because functionalism says that beliefs, desires and emotions fit into the larger system since those types of mental states must be realized by something else other than by what it already is.

Functionalism was first formed as a system but not a school of thought by William James. It was formed in response to structuralism. Structuralism in the context of psychology that refers to the study of components of consciousness and structure of mind but on the counter functionalism analyze the mental processes in a more taxonomic and precise manner. It was Titchener who in 1898 introduced the term Functional psychology. This idea was majorly tempted by the work of William James, Darwin’s theory of evolution and the law of natural selection. Functionalist concentrated on the role of conscious and behaviour and how an individual adapts his mind according to the environment. Functionalists also stressed upon individual differences which had a sound effect on education. The concept of functionalism shaped the theory of behaviorism.