Smithton ltd (formerly Hobart) brought a claim for a loss suffered when the two companies Insureprofit ltd and Mariona ltd failed on their obligations to pay margin calls under contract with the claimant. The claim was brought against Mr Naggar who was a majority shareholder of Hobart and himself and his family owned and controlled the two companies who went insolvent. Hobart alleged that Mr Nagger was either a de facto or shadow director and had breached the duties he owed towards the company. The judge in this case, recognised that there is a distinction in the tests between shadow and the facto directors, as described by David Richards J in the McKillen judgement, however the parties decided not to make a distinction between the …show more content…
Hobart claimed that Mr Pincus, Mr Keane and Mr Morley (the nominated directors) effectively did what Mr Naggar instructed them on what to do rather then exercising their own powers. Mr Naggar however denied any involvement with the day-to-day management of Hobart or that he never gave any directions to the directors on what to do at the Board meetings Re Hydrodam explains that a de facto director is a person who assumes to act as a director. To establish that a person was a de facto director you must prove that he undertook functions in relation to the company that only a director could discharge. It is not sufficient to show that he was concerned in the management of the company’s affairs. Mr Naggar in contrast to the facts of this case never claimed to be a director of the company or acted as one. Some of the claims brought forward by Hobart in relation to Mr Naggar being a de facto director are linked to the fact that he was sent daily Open Position Reports that sets out their lists of every client and market position of the company. Hobart insisted that the fact that he was receiving the OPRs proved that he was a director rather than a client or shareholder. Nevertheless even though Mr Naggar insisted on receiving the OPRs it was merely because is particular situation were he was the joint owner of the group of which both Hobart and the Connected Companies were part of. In the Matter of Mumtaz Properties ltd it was
Directors are not expected to be cyber police micro-managing the company’s Chief Information Officer or personally testing the company’s file servers, even if you have the expertise to do so.
The New South Wales Court of Appeal permitted the organisation 's appeal and reasoned that the spouse had gone about as the wife 's operators in the property 's exchange. The Court in this way held that both the
The Supreme Court of Queensland, in the recent case of Baldwin & Anor v Icon Energy Ltd & Anor [2015] QSC 12, had to give consideration as to whether the ‘ agreement to negotiate’ is legally binding on the parties. The solicitors for the defendants ‘Icon Energy Ltd’ and their wholly owned subsidiary ‘Jakabar PTY LTD’ were Hopgood Ganim. The solicitor for ‘Ronald Baldwin’ and ‘Souther Fairway Investments PTY LTD’ was Clayton Utz.
Smith should have disclosed his share information with the board of directors and voted in favor of Johnsons Skyhooks Limited. Being a board of director of a competing company, he failed to execute his duty in good faith with best interest of the corporation. According to the act, he should be fined up to 5000$ and can go to jail for at least six months.
In addition, he said that it was profoundly unsatisfactory as the reinsurers were claiming the privilege while retaining Halcrow as their expert in the litigation. If the reinsurers were to be entitled with the privilege that they had a right to it, this however seems that most of the material in dispute would have a disclosed anyway. Hence, it was considered to be wasteful and inefficient to spend time just to argue about the claim to the privilege in which the short period of time would be irrelevant.
Every now and then, ASIC’s media releases and other sources would report that a director of a company has been disqualified. By way of background, section 206F of the Corporations Act allows ASIC
This was also a review in name only. This was effectively an investigation initiated in relation to specific actions, activities or
The issues were illustrated in 2012 in the case of Haulotte Australia Pty Limited v All Areas Rentals Pty Limited whereby the liquidator was required to investigate actions undertaken by the referrer prior to liquidation, and accordingly was removed due to the inability to maintain the required appearance of independence. Further to this in the case of Lehane J observed in Wood v Targett that;
The company in this case has been regarded by Vaughan Williams J. as the agent of Aron Salomon. I should rather liken the company to a trustee for him - a trustee improperly 20 brought into existence by him to enable him to do what the statute prohibits. It is manifest 21 that the other members of the company have practically no interest in it, and their names have merely been used by Mr.Aron Salomon to enable him to form a company, and to use its name in order to screen himself from liability. This view of the case is quite consistent with In re George Newman & Co.[4] In a strict legal sense the business may have to be regarded as the business of the company; but if any jury were asked, Whose business was it? they would say Aron Salomon 's, and they would be right, if they meant that the beneficial interest in the business was his. I do not go so far as to say that the creditors of the company could sue him. In my opinion, they can only reach him through the company. Moreover, Mr.Aron Salomon 's liability to indemnify the company in this case is, in my view, the legal consequence of the formation of the company in order to attain a result not permitted by law. The liability does not arise simply from the fact that he holds nearly all the shares in the company. A man may do that and yet be under no such liability as Mr.Aron Salomon has come under. His liability rests on the purpose for which he formed the company, on the way he formed it, and on
To increase their corporate transparency and as required by Code of Corporate Governance, Wing Tai has to disclose their process for selection and
Mr Lay gambled away all of the company’s assets and reserves which is a wrongdoing under s.361 Insolvency Act 1986. He knew that there was no reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvency as the company was bankrupt and failed to minimise the potential loss to the company’s creditors. Therefore, s.214 (2) IA 1986 applies in this case and the court may declare that Mr Lay is to be liable to contribute to the company’s debts as this is a wrongful trading under s.214 IA 1986. This is similar to the case of Brooks v Armstrong (2015) where the three principle conditions for wrongful trading were outlined. Furthermore, he carried on business affairs with no intent to pay the company’s debts and for fraudulent purposes. This is an offence under s.993 CA 2006 and s.213 IA 1986. This is similar to the case of Contex Drouzhbu Ltd v Wisemen And Another Ca (2007) where the representation was made fraudulently as the director knew the company was insolvent and unable to pay.
Mr Lay gambled away all of the company’s assets and reserves which is a wrongdoing under s.361 Insolvency Act 1986. He knew that there was no reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvency as the company was bankrupt and failed to minimise the potential loss to the company’s creditors. Therefore, s.214 (2) IA 1986 applies in this case and the court may declare that Mr Lay is to be liable to contribute to the company’s debts as this is a wrongful trading under s.214 IA 1986. This is similar to the case of Brooks v Armstrong (2015) where the three principle conditions for wrongful trading were outlined. Furthermore, he carried on business affairs with no intent to pay the company’s debts and for fraudulent purposes. This is an offence under s.993 CA 2006 and s.213 IA 1986. This is similar to the case of Contex Drouzhbu Ltd v Wisemen And Another Ca (2007) where the representation was made fraudulently as the director knew the company was insolvent and
Salomon was a boot and shoe maker who has been working for over 30 years. He took all the shares of the firm except six, which were held by his wife, daughter and four sons. Part of the payment for the transfer of the business was made in the form of debentures issued by the company to Salomon. Salomon transferred the debentures to Mr. Broderip for 5000 pounds, in exchange for a loan. Liquidation was not long in coming. The sale of the company’s assets did not realize enough to pay the lenders. The liquidators claimed that the debentures have been deceitfully issued and were invalid. He denied that the business was transferred lawfully from Mr.Salomon to the company. The judge who heard the case initially conceded that the transfer has been legally done and could not be upset. He suggested (Broderip v Salomon ) that Mr. Salomon has employed the company as an agent and that he has to indemnify the agent. In the court of appeal Salomon’s appeal was
The common law position was that a director had two types of duties; one a fiduciary duty and the other a duty of care, skill and diligence. The fiduciary duty contains within it the duty to act bona fide in what the director believes is in the best interests of the company . The duty of care, skill and diligence is an overarching arm of the fiduciary duty itself. The Re Fawcett case highlights
Field et al (2013) argued that accumulation of multiple-directorships could help enhance the knowledge and experiences of the directors. With greater experience and better connectivity, directors would be in better position to critically analyse the business issues in greater depth and thus increasing the effectiveness of their oversight function.