The Army 's Education Of Field Grade Officers

Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts such as World War II, Vietnam and the Iraq war are still being felt and have created significant strategic repercussions. The failures of these conflicts are the result of our military and political leaders’ failure to quickly adapt to wartime conditions. This occurs because of a general refusal to commit to a military culture of learning that encourages serious debate, critical assessments of our military operations, and challenges to our doctrine in the face of emerging change. Additionally, leaders have struggled with the critical responsibility of forecasting and providing for a ready force, one that is well-resourced and prepared to conduct future operations. It is the responsibility of our military and political leaders to send our military to war with a ready force, and a strategy that will ultimately result in victory. But understanding war and warriors is critical if societies and governments are to make sound judgments concerning military policy.

In this report I will be going over the importance of training and education within the military, and how they both play very important roles to not only leaders, but the service members within our ranks. The military is constantly training and, we train as we fight. However, before soldiers train, they must be well educated in all areas in which they will be training. Proper education is the key to proper training. I will also discuss the importance of becoming better educated while serving in the military, as it will make transitioning back into the

The concept of war as a static and unchanging occurrence is an outdated and dangerous miscalculation. More accurately, war is a fluidic, evolving and shifting phenomenon constantly reinventing itself, rendering stagnant, inflexible principles potentially disastrous. Consequently, as students of war and future players in this transforming theatre, the study of eras of significant development is an extremely relevant pursuit. Recognizing the need for adaptation and the creation of doctrine is now a prerequisite for any effective modern commander. War is unpredictable in nature and particularly so in current theatres of operation, in which change is rapid

Since the inception of human civilization there have been countless cultures and societies which have helped shape the current world today as we know it. The modern human race dates back more than 200,000 years and in that time frame many cultures have risen to great virtue and success only to deteriorate or cease to exist altogether. First before examining one of these cultures we must know what culture truly means. The Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Culture Center defines culture as a “dynamic social system,” containing the beliefs, behaviors, values and norms of a “specific organization, group, society or other collectivity” learned, shared, internalized, and changeable by all members of the society (Watson, 2010). In

The notion of an American way of war informs how scholars, policymakers, and strategists understand how Americans fight. A way of war—defined as a society’s cultural preferences for waging war—is not static. Change can occur as a result of important cultural events, often in the form of traumatic experiences or major social transformations. A way of war is therefore the malleable product of culturally significant past experiences. Reflecting several underlying cultural ideals, the current American way of war consists of three primary tenets—the desire for moral clarity, the primacy of technology, and the centrality of scientific management systems—which combine to create a preference for decisive, large-scale conventional wars with clear objectives and an aversion to morally ambiguous low-intensity conflicts that is relevant to planners because it helps them address American strategic vulnerabilities.

Originally influenced by the strategic events seen throughout the Napoleonic Wars in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the nine principles of war derived from the United States’ Army’s “Principles of War and Operations” outline a basic strategic guide on waging war. Shortly before the military adopted these guidelines, however, the United States of America saw civil unrest as the Southern states seceded to form the Confederate States of America. As the Union Army of the North battled the Confederate Army of the South, strategic principles similar to those outlined in the U.S. Army’s doctrine began to appear on the battlefield. Although the armies of the Union and the Confederacy both utilized strategic elements outlined in the United States’ Army’s “Principles of War and Operations”, the Union army’s stricter adherence to certain strategic principles resulted in their ultimate success.

Webster’s dictionary defines the word profession as a type of job that requires special education, training, or skill. Many Soldiers would not consider the Army as a profession but a way of life. Some think the word profession belongs to everyday jobs like a plumber, mechanic, or doctor. Dr. Don M. Snider stated “the Army is a profession because of the expert work it produces, because the people in the Army develop themselves to be professionals, and because the Army certifies them as such” (Snider, D. M. 2008). In October 2010, the Secretary of the Army directed the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to lead an Army wide assessment of the state of the Army Profession. We have been at war as a Country for over a decade and the Army

Thinking about historical experiences and analyzing their current relevance appears to be an important component of strategy development. Having to balance between political demands and military necessity (i.e., Luttwak’s linear versus paradoxical logic) further complicates strategic art. Regardless, as Corbett, Slessor, Wylie, and Luttwak’s books demonstrate, strategic thinking evolves through an iterative process to arrive at new concepts the fit within the social, political, and economic contexts of the strategist’s time. Although these authors demonstrate the evolution of 20th Century strategic thought, they also show the continuity of themes regarding the achievement of control through economy of effort, consideration of non-military

Today’s strategic environment, whether government or corporate, is volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA) often times characterized by “wicked problems” or unsolvable problems. Compiled during the early 19th century, Clausewitz’s manuscript “On War” arguably posited the same conclusion in relation to the strategic level of war. He described war as uncertain, unpredictable, and marked by chance. The more the scale moved from the tactical realm to the strategic realm, the more complex war became due to the aforementioned variables. Society today must contend with the impacts of globalization, which has led to significant changes in economic, social, and cultural norms. These changes have resulted in compressed timelines and reduced decision space. With so much information available, the risk of information overload has presented challenges to how individuals approach problem solving. As a result, society has become over reliant on what Guy Claxton defines as deliberate mode (d-mode), “a way of knowing that relies on reason and logic.” (Claxton, p2)

Clausewitz defines war as an “act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” The nature of war is enduring yet the character of war changes over time. Current US strategic guidance is advancing the point of view that since the character of war has changed to focus on irregular wars then the US military should prepare for a future of irregular wars. This shift in focus forgets that the nature of war is enduring and in order to be successful, we must prepare for all types of conflict. This paper will define the types of conflict and the likelihood of each followed by a discussion of US strategic guidance and ending with an analysis of the training resources and force structure requirements needed to achieve success for all types of

Rousseau (2011) defines strategy as a link connecting military power and political purpose. He emphasizes that strategy entails the use of threat and force to achieve policy objectives. Given the unfortunate centrality of war to world events, strategy becomes a significant aspect in providing a theory of success. The perennial popularity of books on military and application of works of wisdom in the use of force today is unequivocal. Particularly, books that generally focus of the theory of strategy, studies with varied meanings for all purposes, technologies, places, and times are increasingly rare. In the past 2,400 years, only 3 classic works are significant on this subject and no more than five have an enduring value (Rousseau, 2011). Sun-Tzu’s classic work on The Art of War is one such classic works basing on strategic theory that has implications for all purposes, places, times, and technologies. Sun-Tzu wrote his book in China in ca. 400 BC during the era of “Warring States, 403-221 BC” (Rousseau, 2011, p. 79). Henri de Jomini’s The Art of War that he wrote in 1838 also deserves an honorable mention.

Throughout the 20th century, the anthropological views of culture have evolved significantly. Anthropologists view culture as the learned and accumulated experience. A culture of a particular community or society integrates the socially transmitted patterns of behaviors characteristics of a specific social group. However, the definition is still evolving with some scholars defining culture as the knowledge, beliefs, art, morals, customs and another element of life acquired by an individual in society. Kroeber defined culture as a mass of learned and transmitted motor reactions, habits, techniques, ideas, and values. Since Krober’s definition, anthropologists have defined culture in several other ways, although the core elements of Kroeber’s original definition are still relevant. Most o the modern definition of culture agree that culture is learned, widely shared, is responsible for most of the differences in ways of thinking and behaving and is essential in completing the psychological and social development f individuals. Cultural anthropologists often use the term when emphasizing the unique or most distinctive aspects of a specific group’s customs and beliefs. For instance, when we refer to Japanese culture, it refers to whatever customs and beliefs the Japanese people share that make them distinct or different from other people. In this scenario, the definition does not imply that the

As military members we are educated to think very linearly about strategy. For many years we have been trained to have a strategic thought process based on the use of a methodology that espouses three major steps: Ends (Objectives), Ways (Strategic Concepts), and Means (Resources). (Barber 1997)

It is hard to exaggerate the complicity of the question of “why strategy is difficult”. Any one aspect – definition, design, implementation, evaluation, and theory – is a topic for developing a series of books. However, none of them can shy away from one question: what is the purpose of strategy? Therefore, what lies at the heart of the difficulties mostly comes from answering this question. In this article, it argues that the purpose of strategy is to make war usable for policy. Therefore, to achieve this purpose, strategy must fulfil three requirements: mastering the grammar of war in order to make the most of military engagement for political ends while keep it under policy’s control;

While “The Art of War” was written by Sun Tzu during the 6th century B.C., long before the colonization of the Americas, the onslaught of the Crusades, and before the Persian Wars of around 490 B.C., it remains relevant to this day. There is also strong evidence that the work inspired Napoleon and was used in the planning of Operation Desert Storm. “The Art of War” has withstood the sands of time due to its simplistic approach, and its applicability to non-military strategies. “The Art of War“, interpreted by Gerald, A. Michaelson, as well as other authors, use Sun Tzu’s timeless strategies and apply them to the modern day corporate world.