In the summer of 1862, the confederates found themselves as the aggressors. In the Eastern Theater, Lee’s army of Northern Virginia had driven the Union Armies away from the Confederate capital, Richmond and was preparing to invade Maryland. In the western theater, the confederate armies were also moving strong, into Kentucky. Due to the war France and Britain were feeling the strain as cotton from the southern states was starting to diminish.
President Lincoln was thinking of taking a risky step to seal victory. At this point in time he came to the realization that he needed to move in a different direction. The strategic goal to restore the Union was not a good enough reason to keep the Northern states interested and behind the war.
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He was instructed to hurry.
Hurrying was not a trait that McClellan was known for. McClellan took his time and began to draw out on paper how this battle would be won. He then began moving troops around, combining armies from all regions. As McClellan was doing this President Lincoln became inpatient and ordered McClellan to move.
Lee had outlined his whole strategy and told of the troubles the confederacy was having in Special Order 191, he copied and sent it out to all commanders. Lee also sent these orders to one of his division commanders that had been detached. On September 13, 1862 a Union corporal found these orders wrapped in three cigars at an abandoned Confederate camp near Frederick. These orders were quickly delivered to McClellan and this gave him a unique opportunity. Despite this knowledge McClellan still believed that Lee’s troops outnumbered his own. Word of this reached Lee and he dispatched the long street corps to perform damage control at south mountain. Lee ordered the remainder of his troops to concentrate near the Potomac on a little crossroads on Antietam Creek, In the town of Sharpsburg#.
McClellan’s men were ordered to cross over south mountain and quickly found that Lee had fortified this area. McClellan pushed through and took this area as a victory. Since Lee knew of McClellan’s fortune in finding the 191 orders he quickly began
It was well believed until Jackson’s forces began unloading rounds on the Union army stopping McDowell’s forces from advancing, holding the line like “a stone wall.” As the new Union recruits witnessed battle for the first time and felt the lack of preparation, they were quick to retreat back to Washington DC. The Southern victory and the tens of thousands of lives lost proved to the Union that this war was not going to be easily won.
Abraham Lincoln also offered a better explanation to his own people of what they were fighting for. He displayed this leadership through his progressive steps towards emancipation, one early example being the contrabands of war. The army and congress determined that they would not return escaped slaves who went to Union lines and classified them as contraband. They used many as laborers to support Union efforts and soon began to pay them wages. This would seem exceedingly important as the war turned into one against slavery.
On the third and final day of the battle, General Lee needed a Confederate victory.
The Union believed that if they defeated the Confederacy no further attacks would be carried out. In addition, President Lincoln aimed to re-establish Federal law in the Southern states that had seceded from the nation. He also wanted the Union Army to stop Confederate legislators from meeting in the new Southern capitol of Richmond, Virginia. President Lincoln believed that this would bring a speedy end to the war. BG Beauregard held a strong position in Manassas Junction. Manassas offered railroad access which would lead to the center of Virginia, by way of Orange and Alexandria Railroads. It was essential that Beauregard was able to maintain this position.
McClellan’s caution in waging war is evidenced clearly in the Army of the Potomac’s Peninsula Campaign. McClellan was charged with leading the assault on Richmond, delivering what could have been a fatal blow against the Confederacy. During the Army of the Potomac’s movements towards Richmond, McClellan repeatedly delayed, believing he had inferior numbers to his initial adversary, Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston. Johnston knew the caution McClellan was prone to, and slowly drew McClellan closer to Confederate forces defending Richmond. At the Battle of Seven Pines, Johnston reinforced the idea in McClellan’s mind that caution was necessary. (McPherson, 1988, p. 461) The surprise attach by Johnston’s forces, though ultimately defeated by the Army of the Potomac, delayed McClellan’s advance as he called for more reinforcements from Washington. Johnston was wounded in the battle, and replaced by General Robert E. Lee. Lee, whose prowess as a tactician bordered on legendary, led a series of surprise attacks against McClellan’s Army of the Potomac in the Seven Days’ Battle. McClellan’s forces were pushed back, and he was relieved of duty as commander of the Army of the Potomac, until later in 1862. (McPherson, 1988, pp. 462-470)
Although James McPherson presents Lincoln as having numerous qualities that defined him as a brilliant leader, he wastes no time in revealing what he believes to be Lincoln’s greatest strength. In his Introduction, McPherson states regarding Lincoln’s political leadership: “In a civil war whose origins lay in a political conflict over the future of slavery and a political decision by certain states to secede, policy could never be separated from national strategy…. And neither policy nor national strategy could be separated from military strategy” (McPherson, p.6). Lincoln could not approach the war from a purely martial standpoint—instead, he needed to focus on the issues that caused it. For the catalyst of the war was also the tool for its solution; a war started by differing ideologies could only be resolved through the military application of ideology. This non-objective approach to the waging of the war almost resembles the inspired approach McPherson brings to his examination of Lincoln himself.
Civil War historians view the Battle of Chancellorsville as General Robert E. Lee’s “greatest and most remarkable” victory (Sears 1). Lee, facing an army twice his size, defies all military doctrine and divides his army multiple times in order to out-maneuver and surprise the Union forces. The daring maneuver succeeds and ultimately forces the Union’s Army of the Potomac to retreat. The victory was another major blow to Union troops, but it came at a huge cost to the Confederacy: the loss of General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson. By evaluating the battle through the lens of the mission command activities, one can see how Lee’s daring maneuver was actually very calculated and his only option for victory. Throughout the rest of this paper, I will describe the timeline of the battle and how General Lee used the mission command activities of understand, visualize, assess, and lead to ultimately achieve victory at Chancellorsville.
The civil war was a conflict about the expansion of slavery into western territories. The compromise of 1820 and 1850 tried to maintain an unbalanced government between free and union state. The southern states seceded from the union because they feared Abraham Lincoln in 1860 when he got elected. The war started 1861 through 4 long 4 bloody years later. The Northern Union states fought against the southern Confederate states. The northern Union won the civil war. Their was 620,000 death toll. The battle of Antietam took place in Sharpsburg, Maryland. The battle of Antietam was the first battle in the civil war to be fought on northern soil. The impact of Antietam was that it turned out to be the bloodiest day in American History.
General Lee had at his disposal two army Corps, the First Corps was commanded by Lieutenant General James Longstreet and the Second Corps was commanded by Lieutenant General Thomas Jackson. Both of these corps comprised of 35,000 men for a total of 70,000 men. After leaving Maryland, Lee decided to divide his army by sending the Second Corps to the Shenandoah Valley towards Winchester Virginia and the other towards Culpeper station Virginia in order to see what the North was going to do. The Confederate cavalry were a little slow in detecting the move of Sumter’s grand division, and it was three days before Lee knew about it and could order Longstreet to intercept the Federals. This allowed the first elements of Northern forces to arrive at Falmouth two days after the
Confederate victories in summer of 1862 began to convinced Europe that the Union could not subdue the south and as a result, England and France (who were both suffering from cotton shortages) were close to recognizing the confederacy (McPherson, pg. 56/94). If they took this step, the rest of Europe would follow their lead resulting in “foreign recognition of the Confederacy [which] would be a grievous, perhaps a fatal blow” for the Union (McPherson, pg. 37). England and France also began discussions about intervening to mediate the war’s end, which would likely dissolve the Union and grant the Confederacy independence (McPherson, pg. 56). England just needed a bit more assurance of the Confederacy’s ability and a battlefield victory in Maryland would have been enough for England and thus France to finally recognize the Confederacy (McPherson, pg. 94). After the results of
Jaquez:the northern battle strategy was to Wait across the river and wait for the confederate soldiers to try and cross the river and get easier shot on the confederate
The Battle of Antietam could have been a devastating and fatal blow to the Confederate Army if Gen. McClellan acted decisively, took calculated risks, and veered away from his cautious approach to war. There are many instances leading up to the battle and during the battle in which he lacks the necessary offensive initiative to effectively cripple and ultimately win the war. This paper is intended to articulate the failure of Mission Command by GEN McClellan by pointing out how he failed to understand, visualize, describe and direct the battlefield to his benefit.
In late June 1863, Confederate General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia passed through western Maryland and invaded Pennsylvania. General Lee believed that by invading the North, he could draw the Union Army of the Potomac away from their defenses and force them to come after him. He also assumed the people of the North would be so demoralized if the Union were to lose another major battle, especially if it was fought on Northern soil, that President Abraham Lincoln would be forced to negotiate a settlement of the Civil War. On 01 July 1863, then Colonel Joshua Chamberlain, and his 20th Maine received word to begin movement to
The armies left in the early morning, Grant arriving first, waiting for Lee's army. Every one of Lee's soldiers knew that Grant's ranks were heavily supplied, and aware of the fact that the odds were against them. The Confederates had unshaken
Gettysburg,Virginia - June 30 , Confederate soldiers started marching to Gettysburg, in search for shoes.The general retreated from the path way.In which they would come in the next morning instead.With in the next day ,July 1,Lee came back with 25,000 men .Beating the Union with less men. After time of fighting ,each general went to there own ways. Thinking that the he would