The Failure of the Schlieffen Plan and Its Effects on the German Defeat on the Western Front

The German Command, in planning for a short and swift war, found themselves in a bind when the war started to prolong itself. From the very beginning, their plan started to fall apart, as Belgium, who they assumed would just let them march through to France, took up arms in resisting their approaches (Hull, 2005). The war would get longer and longer and seemed farther away from its conclusion as the months grew colder. As a result of this as well as their Prussian roots, they resorted to dangerously risky and destructive tactics, trying to bring the war to a quicker end while putting more of their resources in jeopardy, a move that eventually did not pay off and ended up leading to the German Empire’s demise (Hull, 2005).

The Schlieffen Plan was a German battle plan to fight a two front war devised in 1905 by Alfred von Schlieffen as the Chief of the General Staff for Germany. The plan called for the German army to apply overwhelming force in France to capture the capital of Paris within six weeks before changing focus to Russia. The plan intended to achieve a quick and decisive victory by sweeping a line of armies through neutral Belgium and into France. In actuality, Helmuth von Moltke made significant changes to Schlieffen’s original plan before and during World War I. Ultimately, the plan ended in failure when the German advance halted at the First Battle of the Marne (Limbach, 2014).

In the year 1961, Fritz Fischer had presented his book, which was known as Germany's Aims in First World War and it had been successful in launching a debate among German historians and scholars as older historians severely criticized and opposed Fischer and his book. However, his contemporaries and younger historians supported his book. The book draws a detailed and comprehensive picture of Germany and its aims during the World War I.

After the Schlieffen plan failure there was a turning point in the war, showing that stalemate was to come. 3 main battles took place which caused stalemate to happen.

The Schlieffen Plan is commonly – though misleadingy – identified with the German western offensive at the start of the First World War in August 1914, which began as a campaign of rapid movement but ended in deadlock and trench warfare. The plan is generally seen as a desperate gamble almost certain to fail, and its recklessness is counted as part of Germany’s war guilt – the plan held out the false promise of a quick victory, and so it underpinned the “short war illusion” that led Germany into a long war of attrition, ending with her defeat and collapse in 1918. This analysis confuses two quite different moments in history. The Schlieffen Plan was not designed to meet the strategic challenge Germany faced in 1914,

To a large extent the failure of the Schlieffen plan was the most significant reason for

When Germany declared war on Russia in 1914, they also had their own military plan, which called for a two front war with France and Russia. It was called The Schlieffen Plan and was developed by General Alfred von Schlieffen in 1903 but was revised in December of 1905. At this time, he was chief of the German General Staff, and Europe was separated into the Triple Alliance, which consisted of Germany, Austria, and Italy, on one side and the Triple Entente, which consisted of Great Britain, France, and Russia, on the other. Schlieffen was sought out by the Kaiser in order to construct an arrangement that would allow Germany to

Although critical for the German war plan, the Schlieffen-Moltke plan was kept a secret to the public, and even staff members of the German Imperial Army. Moltke kept the Schlieffen Plan a secret throughout his service in the army. Even close staff members, such as General Gerog Graf von Waldersee, admitted they had never actually seen the blueprints for the plan. (Ehlert, 90, PPed). A reason that Moltke wished to keep the Schlieffen-Moltke plan a secret was for the reason of altering it if needed without objection from his staff members. Other commander’s opinions may have helped find a better strategy, as well as counter-arguments to flawed areas of the plan. Surprisingly, Moltke did not tell Schlieffen about the changes he had made to his plan. However, Schlieffen found out about his changes and questioned Moltke’s leadership out of spite. (Ehlert, 97, pped).

The Schlieffen Plan was created by Alfred von Schlieffen, and he created it to avoid fighting both France and Russia at the same time. The problem was that France and Russia were on opposite sides of Europe. Which meant they would have to split their army in half. The Schlieffen Plan stated that Germany would defeat France while Russia would be mobilizing itś army. They assumed that Russia would take six weeks to mobilize,and that France was weak and Russia was strong. They didn´t think that GB would be fighting for France because of the treaty signed seventy - five years ago. The Schlieffen Plan had many flaws and assumptions.But instead of taking six weeks Russia took ten days, and started fighting when they weren't ready. Which made

Adolf Hitler, the Nazi Germany’s leader who started the World War II, had a great plan to conquer every single corner of the world with his powerful army. He actually won a bunch of battles; however several mistakes he made finally led him to the loss. In my opinion, Hitler made his fatal blunder on the Operation Barbarossa, which was the invasion operation on the Soviet Union. The Blitz was a tough loss for Germany in which they focused on killing the civilians but only motivated their enemies; however it didn’t reflect the final failure directly. The war declaration on the U.S. was another mistake, which boosted their lost. The Operation Barbarossa was his fatal mistake, and finally led him to his death.

German losses were greater than their army could take. The Germans also lost a significant number of weapons, specifically tanks. German industries would not be able to replenish these materials before the end of the war. American losses were serious, but not nearly as devastating to their army. The battle is significant during World War II because it is Hitler’s last major offensive in the war. While the battle was intended to split Allied lines and force negotiated peace, American forces could contain the battle and inflict heavier losses on the German forces. The Germans lost so many experienced troops and equipment that there was no way their army could launch another attack on Allied forces. The Battle of the Bulge is most significant

Despite significant munitions advancements over the final quarter of the 19th Century and first decade of the Twentieth Century, simultaneous progression in tactics and more importantly strategy, was absent. Certainly, generals such as Alfred von Schlieffen expanded upon the time-honored belief in the supremacy of the offense (Schlieffen Plan) via a grand envelopment that in theory

The Schlieffen Plan was a plan for an attack on France. This was created by General Count Alfred von Schlieffen in 1905. He was chief of the German General Staff, and believed that the best area for any war in Europe would be

Leading into the Fall of 1914, tactics on both sides of the line involved the rapid mobilization, maneuver and envelopment of the opposing side.10 Pre-1914 doctrine took little into account the effects of emerging new technology and their impact on both defensive and offensive operations. This disconnect between doctrine and technology contributed to the failure of early offensive operations in the Fall of 1914 and resulted in staggering casualties.11 Both sides developed doctrine that took into effect the unique terrain and technology that had been developed prior and during World War I. However by the end of the war, a combination of flexibility, decentralized control, and counterattack at every echelon made the German defensive system the most effective.12 This “elastic defense” had three unique characteristics; dedicated counter-attack force at all levels, decentralized command and control, fluid defensive belts and integrated artillery support at the Division level. Under this new doctrine, Corps headquarters had the role sustaining subordinate units, but not directing their actions during battle.13 This defense-in-depth and the lessons learned during the Verdun battles of 1918 were so successful that British forces adopted many of the German tactics with a special emphasis on their counterattack capability.10 Utilizing the new doctrine, by August 1918, Germany had made substantial gains, however had

He attended the Berlin War Academy (1858-61) and was a staff officer during the Austro-Prussian War (1866). In 1891 Schlieffen replaced Helmuth von Moltke as Chief of General Staff. Schlieffen feared that France and Russia would join together to attack Germany. His main concern was to devise a plan that could deal with a war against Russia in the east and France in the west. Four years after being given this position he devised what became known as the Schlieffen Plan. This strategy involved a German invasion of Belgium and a right-wheel flanking movement through Holland and then southwards, cutting off Paris from the sea. Schlieffen retired as Chief of General Staff of the German Army in 1906.