Ali Larijani, the current speaker of the Iranian parliament, gave npr an interview detailing his opinions on the new nuclear deal with Iran. Larijani finds the deal “ acceptable…not looking at the specifics...looking at the whole picture” ( Larijani). In other words, Larijani believes that the nuclear accord as it has been struck, has it flaws and is in no way a perfect pact. He views it as more of a placeholder, a sign of better things to come. The real test of this deal, in both Larijani and his country’s eyes, will be the economic reform it can bring for Iran. Larijani thinks it is possible for “ the economy to thrive” and comments that they “ have already passed three legislations…that makes it easier…to invest in Iran” ( Larijani). …show more content…
The matter was taken to the United Nations Security Council, and a program of sanctions against Iran was approved ( “Iran Nuclear Deal” 1). No significant negotiated deal was reached with Iran on its nuclear program until the JPA in 2014. The JPA requires Iran “ to remove two-thirds of its installed centrifuges and reduce its current stockpile of enriched uranium by 98 percent” ( “ Iran Nuclear Deal” 1). The hope behind this is that Iran will have a vastly increased timeframe in which they would be able to produce a viable nuclear weapon. That increase in time needed to produce a bomb plus increased transparency to nuclear inspectors, not only to “Iranian nuclear facilities, but to...uranium mills....the centrifuge production and storage facilities”, would kill Iran’s quest for a nuclear weapon before it could truly begin ( Obama “ A Historic Understanding 1). In return, some sanctions on Iran are lifted and they are able to rejoin the international economic community.
The JPA will prove advantageous to Iran’s economy as the lifting of economic sanctions and the unfreezing of Iranian foreign assets are a key stipulation. For decades, the United States had attempted to influence Iran’s nuclear regime through economic sanctions, meaning no trade or transfer of
This paper will seek to identify three key aspects of US sanctions imposed on Iran. First the paper will briefly introduce the reasons as to why US and Iran relations have worsened since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Secondly, this paper shall outline some of the key sanctions imposed on Iran which have influenced Irans’s behaviour. After sanctions are reviewed, the paper will then summarise the impact of sanctions on Iran. Last but not the least and most importantly, the paper will elaborate how Iran is resisting stringent US sanctions. This paper will argue that despite punitive measures adopted by the US, Iran has found alternative mechanisms to fight them and has reoriented its
The article, written by David Sanger and Michael Gordon from The New York Times on August 23, highlights main controversies about Iran-US nuclear agreement. After months of negotiations between USA and Iran, the deal is waiting to be approved by Congress. However, there are many points of debate regarding the approval of this pact. The main point of polemic is the capacity of Iran to produce nuclear weapons after 15 years, when the agreement is supposed to end. Many people, like the Democrat Representative Adam B. Schiff from California, agree Iran would “have a highly modern and internationally legitimized enrichment capability” (Gordon & Sanger, 2015). Others argue in favor of the agreement because, as R. Nicholas Burns, undersecretary of
With a renewed economy and enhanced military, if Iran elects to pursue a nuclear weapon in the future, critics argue they will be able to effectively withstand renewed sanctions and more ably protect centrifuge sights. Iran is also refusing to release details to the U.S. of its past nuclear activities, critics believe that the release of this information would finally disprove Tehran’s previous statements, that Iran was utilizing a peaceful program and that Islam forbids nuclear weapons. The ambiguity of Iran’s nuclear past has led to incomplete information on the part of the US and incomplete information in international relations is often a catalyst for military action. Furthermore, Critics believe that Iran will not entirely halt their nuclear program, but rather has significant incentive to misrepresent what they are developing, and will in fact work, in secret, on smaller-scale projects, such as specialized high-explosives that could act as a trigger in a nuclear bomb. Finally, according to many critics of this deal, the US is, in essence, allowing the Iranians, who in their opinion will have no incentive to abide by the limitations of this deal after they receive the pay out of lifted economic sanctions, to build a bomb. To them this
When the deal was signed on July 14, 2015, it successfully achieved the limitation the aforementioned threats, as Iran will have no nuclear weapons and be subject to intense U.N oversight for at least ten years. This oversight, sanctioned by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), consists of stringent daily facility and centrifuge inspections, with a clause that states “the IAEA will have access where necessary, when necessary” (Chin and Lincy, Iran Watch). To quote President Barack Obama, the Iranian Deal “is not built on trust; it is built on verification” (Chin and Lincy, Iran Watch). Lifting sanctions placed on Iran in exchange for these allowances is not a difficult decision. A deal that restricts and checks enrichment, and also renders Iran a non nuclear- weapon possessing country is a good deal that allows states around the world to sigh a breath of relief.
Former President Ahmadinejad set Iran back years by putting Iran into extreme isolation from the international community. His continued badgering with the international community, eventually lead to a nuclear stand-off with world powers. With what seems to be the Ayatollah’s blessing, President Rouhani has so far shown promise to ease the country’s relations and assume a solution on the nuclear issue. “For Washington, meanwhile, the election offered stark confirmation that its strategy is working, at least to a point. The outcome confirmed that political will for a nuclear deal exists within the Islamic Republic. In other words, the path out of isolation and economic crisis is perilous, but Iran’s new president, who has sometimes been dubbed “the sheikh of diplomacy,” may just be the right man at the right moment to walk it.” (Maloney, 2013)
Tehran can threaten major energy market fluctuations from oil production and maritime security through control of the Straits of Hormuz. The Strait of Hormuz link the Persian Gulf and the flow of oil to the world. Iran is aware of the significance of the Strait of Hormuz. “While Iran’s capability to actually “close” the strait is questionable, there is little doubt that it could quickly wreak havoc on the global economy by doing much less.” (Iran and the Strait of Hormuz.: Part 3 Stratfor, 2009). Global stability is constantly in jeopardy through Iran’s continued support of terrorist activities. (Rhode, H., n.d., The Sources of Iranian Negotiating Behavior) states “Yet the Iranian government has not been dissuaded from sponsoring and implementing terror tactics, and has not been convinced to halt its illegal nuclear program.” Iran has demonstrated their intent to continue their nuclear program regardless of international sanctions and admonishment. They continue to support terrorist activities throughout the region. There is no sign that if Iran was able to produce weapons grade nuclear material that it would not be used by a violent extremist organization. Iran can disrupt or control maritime trade and security of the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian leadership views compromise and requests for negotiations as a sign of weakness and an opportunity for exploitation. “Compromise (as we in the West understand this
As you are all too aware, the United States and its Allies have faced troubles in the Middle East for many decades. Much of this is due to well-funded and well-protected terrorists operating in the region under the protective umbrella of participating countries, including Iran. Understandably, the thought of a nuclear capable Iran is terrifying to many of you. I wish to propose a different option than the current economic sanctions that have been taking place, one in which Iran becomes both more powerful and aligns it’s views with that of the United States.
Again, others say that Iran has agreed to stop enriching as much uranium to possibly create nuclear weapons of mass destruction. In contrast, Iran will have a thirty-day notice before any inspection of their equipment or facilities. Thirty days is ample time to hide any illegal enriching and stockpiles of uranium for nuclear weapons.
Additionally, the deal with Iran will not only give relief for Iran but also give guarantee for the United States and the rest of the world that Iran’s nuclear capacity leftovers solely nonviolent with no probable military dimensions and with sufficient time for the international community to notice a breakout, should Iran ever feel the unlikely need to “dash for the
The U.S. should prevent Iran from developing or acquiring a bomb as it would pose a specific security threat to Israel and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states which are important strategic allies of the U.S. The ultimate goals of U.S. policies towards Iran are to limit Iranian uranium enrichment program, to relieve sanction and to ensure inspections conducted by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) through new sanctions against and diplomacy with Iran. Liberal institutionalism provides the best approach for dealing with security issues regarding nuclear proliferation in Iran because diplomacy would satisfy both Iranian and U.S and its allies’ interests. This memo explains the assumptions of liberal institutionalism, introduces the Iranian nuclear program background, provides liberal institutionalism diplomatic options, and offers specific strategic options with recommendations.
have nuclear and hydrogen weapons, but for Iran, which is not a member of NATO and its security is not guaranteed by any country in the world, the simple principle of self-defense becomes so problematic?” (Vaez, 2017). The JCPOA satisfies Iran’s demand for increased influence while maintaining the priority of international nuclear stability. With worldwide peace and proliferation safeguards an international interest, the United States should utilize a selective engagement mindset, specifically in regards to a great powers focus, to maintain leverage and unity within the multilateral agreement, “Selective engagement endeavors to ensure peace among powers that have substantial industrial and military potential – the great powers” (Posen, & Ross, 2000). By prioritizing vital interests, the great powers can develop a collaborative and effective strategy to force Iranian nuclear cessation and maintain unity to avoid Iranian partnerships with nations seeking to increase their sphere of influence. Additionally, the international response to Iran establishes a
As the Iranian economy continues to strain under mismanagement, the obsession for nuclear power, corruption, and crippling subsidies, the strategy of engagement provides incentives to build trade ties. The military and strategic threats Iran poses to the U.S. interests are serious and diverse. The threats will require determined efforts for engagement. History shows engagement and détente undermine governments more quickly than exclusion and enforcing an estrangement
Around 2003, the hidden Iranian plan of becoming a nuclear power and producing atomic bombs was revealed by a major opposition group: Mojahadeen. The U.S and other Western countries have been seriously discussing this matter with Iranian authorities after they verified the validity of the news. Iran has undergone billions dollars in expenses, in attempts to gain nuclear power. Generally, the main sanctions are divided into four different groups: U.S sanctions (Executive Order), European sanctions, UN sanctions, and sanctions imposed by the U.S congress. During the beginning years, the effect rate of sanctions weren 't very high until sanctions were imposed on Iran’s oil/energy sector and the banking system (Slavin, 2007).
However, naivety cannot cloud the fact that the deal ensures that Iran reduces its Uranium stockpile by 98%. It stops Iran from enriching Uranium past 3.67% for 15 years, where 90% enrichment is needed to create a nuclear bomb. These figures by themselves are primary advocates for the signing of this deal, as they show how the deal, if held, ensures Iran is incapable of developing a nuclear bomb for over a decade.
Direct U.S.-Iranian relations date back as far as 1923 when the United States sent an economic advisor to Iran in an attempt to help provide independence and stability to the Persian economic system. The relationship between these two countries however, has not remained as positive as it began. Over the course of the last 70 years the United States has been both close allies and distant enemies with Iran; never seeming to make constructive diplomatic relations last. This troublesome history between the U.S and Iran has created a climate in which long-lasting successful diplomatic relations are unlikely. Considering this, the United States must continue on a path of aggressive foreign policy in regard to Iran in order to ensure the interests of the U.S are adequately protected.