The Iraq War: An Examination of Curveball and the HUMINT Officers

The study of George Tenet’s actions leading up to the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan leaves little doubt about the dysfunction within our government from the appointment of officials to the decision making process itself. Tenet was appointed by President Clinton as Director of the Intelligence (DCI) in 1997, just 19 months after becoming deputy to DCI. It was noted that Tenet had never managed a large organization, worked as an intelligence officer or serviced in the military, all of which would have provided the experience and expertise needed

The invasion and the war in Iraq remains a continuous topic of divisiveness and sensitivity in today’s America. One of the negative evaluation of the war is attributed to the false impression of the length of the war which lasted seven years, not six months as presumed in 2003. As the invasion initiated, the ideologies of American government then failed to perceive the large number of troops required, casualties and the financial toll in the interest of the preventive war doctrine. However, when weighing the failures of this war, there are successes brought home that relate mostly to the lessons the American military and the government learned with the use of counterinsurgency tactics after “winning the hearts and minds” of Iraqis (Young). Nevertheless, with evaluation through levels of analysis, the accomplished agenda of ending Saddam Hussein’s regime justifies success and failure, mutually.

The 1776 united States of America Declaration of Independence contain the words that succinctly describe our national objective, strategy, and message, “We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.” In today’s United States of America, the world acknowledges American’s as the preeminent owner of individual freedoms, holding and promoting these three basic principles for some 240 years. During these years, the U.S. has employed the use of intelligence to shape its objectives and strategies, and then in times of war used the same intelligence to shape strategic messages against foreign powers. However, as hostilities decline and give way to the restoration of relative peace, the use of intelligence for strategic messages against foreign powers ceases. Under these circumstances, the void created by secession of U.S. messages, provides a communication opportunity to foreign powers for transmission of anti-U.S. messages. Attempts have been made to reinstate the offices that during war countered these anti-U.S. messages to a comprehensive reorganization of the U.S Government intelligence community. This paper does not support creation of a new agency or department to utilize existing strategic intelligence.

Since the war on Iraq began on March 20, 2003, at least 1,402 coalition troops have died and 9,326 U.S. troops have been wounded in action. This is no small number and the count grows daily. One would hope, then, that these men and women were sent to war with just cause and as a last resort. However, as the cloud of apprehension and rhetoric surrounding the war has begun to settle, it has become clear that the Bush administration relied on deeply flawed analyses to make its case for war to the United Nations and to the American people, rushing this country, and its soldiers, into war. This is not to say that this war was waged against a blameless regime or that our soldiers have died

According to this now-infamous study, Saddam had "so overextended his capital in the war with Iran that he was not in a position to undertake any significant hostile action for, at the very least, three years"�. The CIA grossly underestimated Saddam's penchant for military expansionism. Critics of the quality of US intelligence abound. Freedman and Efraim have concluded that "Operation Desert Storm was a low point for Marine Corps intelligence. It revealed an antiquated architecture that was unresponsive to the needs of the United States Army"� while Seliktar writes of an "unprepared organization" and of "considerable in-theatre limitations and restrictions."� Arguably, the military success camouflaged these intelligence failings. Surprisingly, these intelligence failures during the Gulf War were carried over into the Iraq War.

Further research regarding the sociological and psychological effects of Counterinsurgency Human Intelligence operations, and how a compulsory may change intelligence guidelines and procedures to modify motivation structures and reduce civilian violence associated with foreign Human Intelligence agent networks. What authority approves recruiters to operate outside the scope of intelligence gathering?

“Los Angeles Times reports, top Central Intelligence Agency(CIA) officials apparently ignored warnings in late 2002 and early 2003 that an informant code-named "Curveball," the chief source of prewar United States intelligence about Iraqi germ weapons, was unreliable” (Drogin & Miller, 2005). In an assortment of sources including the CBS News, the Los Angeles Times, and 60 Minutes would suggest "Curveball" was the informant assisted in the arguments on the invasion of Iraq (Simon, 2007).

Since the publication of the notable failure that was the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), the National Intelligence Estimate process has changed. The failures of the Intelligence Community (IC) were highly publicized in the wake of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. Due to the highly visible nature of this failure, the NIE process was changed and certain safety measures were put in place to make sure that future NIEs did not make the same mistakes as the 2002 Iraq NIE. However, based on review of the unclassified versions of some recent NIEs, the process has become too fearful of itself to be effective.

Dr. Pillar argues bad leadership led to the Iraq war not bad intelligence, asserting that the intelligence community (IC) advised against the use of force. The 2001 IC statement on world threats did not mention the possibility of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in Iraq. Thus, former Secretary of State Powell misguided the international community when he affirmed before the United Nations in February 2003 that his argument was “based on solid intelligence.” The administration’s officials, including the president and his national security advisor, also barely read the 2002 intelligence estimates on Iraqi WMD programs. The IC concluded that the Iraqi regime was unlikely to use WMDs against the U.S or hand them to terrorists, did not believe

After the events of September 11, the United States found itself in position never seen before. Unlike the last few hundred years of conventional warfare, the United States was fighting a new type of war. This war was not waged against other nations but rather on small groups with a similar ideology. The country needed to quickly adapt to the new threat and how it would eventually overcome it. One such issue came under the guise of how the U.S. would interview/interrogate prisoners of this new found war. This essay will use a case example to look into the culture of the new enemy; identify legal issues, interrogation strategies, and defense mechanisms when interrogating this new threat.

Every day, the United States has to deal with many issues, issues of morality, issues of war, and, most prominently, issues of terrorism. In order to assist in the countering of terrorist action, the United States relies on a large number of people and programs, the largest contributor being the CIA, or Central Intelligence Agency of the United States. The CIA has an obligation to provide information regarding the issues of terrorism to the President of the United States, in addition to those who assist him in the making of decisions, both by aiding in the making of decisions for the Presidents and through providing sufficient information for decision makers to make rational, well-informed decisions. However, in doing this, the question of

The main human sources of intelligence (HUMINT) operation conducted and speculated during the Iraq WMD program was Curveball. Curveball was a German intelligence source whose intelligence was passed along. The United States (U.S.) Intelligence was only able to talk with curveball on one occasion and never able to fully vet him regarding his reliability until it was too late. (Jervis, 2010, p. 141). To cut to the meat of the problem, curveball identified Iraq had a secret biological weapons program. In particular Curveball insisted Iraq had mobile facilities to produce such weapons. (Silberman & Robb, 2005, p. 80). It was later revealed due to his admission he lied about it. The analysts received intelligence regarding curveball’s information and due to masking of

In August of 2002, the Bush administration’s position about Iraq had changed significantly. Prior to this point, the United States and other western countries had been arming Iraq with weapons of every type. The fact the United States and other countries had been arming Iraq with weapons, shows how little they considered Iraq to be a threat. This quickly changed. A debate on invading Iraq, held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, created

The IR textbook outlines three fundamental levels of analysis: The individual, the state, and global system. These levels of analysis help people understand how world politics work.

Central to threat assessment is intelligence to help develop our own targets to deter or punish state sponsors.  In this regard, the development of long-term human source intelligence [HUMINT] is often cited as a vital component in building our ability to preempt attacks. Critical to threat assessment is the need to get smarter, not just in protecting against the threat from outsiders, but smarter about the threat posed by people with legitimate access.  This includes acts of carelessness by insiders.  A chain is only as strong as its weakest link.  We need to continue our efforts to enhance our vigilance to minimize any potential threats posed by third country nationals- for example, threats posed by outsiders working at U.S. embassies and military installations overseas.