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The Role Of Autonomy In The Military

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counterproductive to the mission of our war fighters and disastrous to the mental health and stability of our warfighters. One of the components of conventional warfare is sustained assault, and with the application of this ideal to our special warfare troopers comes unnecessary fatigue. In conventional combat, troopers normally expect light to medium level engagements, all the while being supported by a platoon or more and having an excellent supply chain. Currently a special operator is expected to go into medium to extreme grade conflict normally with just a squad worth of men with high quality but limited equipment. While this is going on the operators are also required to constantly make morally and ethically difficult decisions at a…show more content…
Risk aversion was the greatest trend I saw. SOF, especially Army SF, were originally started to be able to be small, fluid, flexible, and able to make serious international diplomatic decisions on their feet. I had one instance in Iraq where a CONOP for a counter-mortar LP/OP was disapproved because we “didn’t have enough team leadership on the operation,” even though it was two E-6s with four Iraqi Scouts. The risk adverse leadership is promoted from within because their OER looks better, and the free-thinking, daring officers and NCOs tend to leave the force for the civilian world… sometimes for no other reason than getting away from the insanity.”(Webb) “The most glaring and critical operational deficit is the fact that, according to doctrine, the theater special operations commands are supposed to be the principal node for planning and conducting special operations in a given theater—yet they are the most severely under resourced commands. Rather than world-class integrators of direct and indirect capabilities, theater special operations commands are egregiously short of sufficient quantity and quality of staff and intelligence, analytical, and planning resources. They are also supposed to be the principal advisers on special operations to their…show more content…
“..you need a massive intelligence and logistics infrastructure to accomplish complicated and technical Special Operations missions, but it also leads to a bloated bureaucracy filled with staff officers who have no real job other than to interject white noise into the decision making process. However, I see the real problem in SOCOM being careerism and CYA risk aversion before the real obstacle and not a simple matter of the numbers involved. SOCOM is still way too top-heavy with officers, though. It is so bad that it is to the point that entire new bureaucracies were created overseas just so that officers could have jobs. One is the CJSOTF which is not a doctrinal part of Special Forces operations. ODAs do JCETs all over the world without a CJSOTF and seem to do just fine. The CJSOTF may be required for some logistical resupply operations and unit deconfliction, but it has grown into a monster over time which has created this inverse relationship in which Officers now see the CJSOTF as the maneuver element, and ODAs as the supporting mechanism for this bureaucracy.” -Former Special Forces/75th Ranger Jack
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