United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea

service as hostages -- or by the performance of see-no-evil soldiers from the Fiji Islands in Israeli-occupied southern Lebanon” (Reeves, 1996,1). Not only was the United Nations not prepared for the task but also made a bad situation worse because the United Nations interfered disrupting the balance of power killing even more in africa

Due to these instabilities within Somalia, it was essential for the UN, EU, and AU to combine their efforts and form an

The goal of the United Nations, when formed was to “maintain international peace and security and commit to economic and social development. (Fomerand, Jacques)” As one

Later the peacekeeping forces brought about cease-fires in Central America and the Iran-Iraq War. As a safeguard they kept forces there to make sure that peace continued. After a few failures in Africa, the United Nations learned that by sending a force that is too small and not very intimidating, peace will crumble. The largest peacekeeping mission ever undertaken by the United Nations was the civil war between Bosnia and Herzegovina, after Yugoslavia broke up. On numerous occasions the United Nations underestimated the forces needed and failed the campaign. Since that failure in Bosnia, the United Nations has refused help to any other nations requesting assistance. (United Nations 2)

Thesis: The role of the United Nations has changed from being primarily an international peacekeeping force to primarily a humanitarian organization.

Sudanese President al-Bashir agreed to allow the A.U. to deploy a mission (AMIS) to monitor a ceasefire agreement signed on 8 April 2004, a mission endorsed by United Nations Security Counci Resolution 1556. The A.U. initially deployed 150 troops in August 2004 but had increased that number to 7,700 troops by April 2005. African leaders resisted efforts to widen the intervention to non-African countries. These voices included South African President Thabo Mbeki, who stated “we have not asked for anybody outside of the African

The UNAMIR was originally established to help implement the Arusha Peace Agreement signed by the Rwandese parties on the 4th August 1993. Although the mandate was adjusted on a number of occasion due to the tragic events such as the genocide and the Kibeho Massacre which changed the situation in Rwanda. The new mandate aimed to provide security and protection of the refugee civilians at risk. After a long deliberation the Australian government decided to provide 600 Australian men and women from the medical contingent along with an infantry company to provide security. These people of the Australian Military Forces worked alongside the United Nations over this 3 year Mission to manage the peacekeeping agreement, supervise Rwandans progress, and eventually provide support and help to the injured refugees and aim to return them to their home

For a mission to be peacekeeping, the UN needs to be invited by at least one side, and more commonly two. The forces on a peacekeeping mission are usually lightly armed in order to prevent them from acting aggressively, while also confirming its role as a peacekeeper that is neutral. The main role of the peacekeepers is to act as a buffer and report when a country violates a ceasefire. The peacekeeping force enters after the conflict has started and its mission is to fulfill the mandate provided by the council. Lately peacekeeping missions have focused more on aid and state building rather than just preventing conflict. Recently there have been calls for the UN to move from peacekeeping to peace enforcement in some situations. Peace enforcement usually requires a larger, better, and heavier equipped force that won’t just keep the peace, but enforce it if it has too. With peace enforcement, the UN would like to stop more conflicts before they start because the threat of a large UN force being called in might make some countries question going on the offensive in a war. For a peace enforcement mission to be successful, the orders and mandate given must be very clear to the troops so that they can respond in war in real time and not be held up in bureaucracy. Peace enforcement also doesn’t require the force to be impartial or to find the aggressor, but to work in the most efficient way possible to end the fighting.

Internally, the U.N. leadership charged with handling peacekeeping operations did not have enough time to setup and receive proper instruction as to the events transpiring in Somalia. Second, the manner with which the U.N. planned to continue U.S. operations did not align with the actions taken by their predecessors. “Such changes of leadership, tradition, doctrine, personal chemistry, operating procedures, policy instincts, and bureaucratic systems were bound to disrupt the effectiveness and credibility of the military presence” (Crocker, 1995). Aside from operational failures by the UN and US in Somalia as a part of UNOSOM II, Richard K. Betts explains well another key reason why failure was imminent. In his article “The Delusion of Impartial Intervention”, he says that foreign nations can’t just provide military assistance in terms of a peacekeeping effort, because when the fight is “over” what is to say further uprising will not continue (Betts, 1994). Avoiding a lack-luster strategy of neutrality in times of conflict, he advocates for decisive action on behalf of a favored organization. In the case of UNOSOM II, coalition forces should have worked harder to politically intervene. By not rebuilding a political structure in Somalia, a vacuum of power continued to exist, resulting in a continuous oligarchy dominated by the

In the book, Dallaire voices his discontent with the United Nations, especially for the lack of action taken by the Security Council. The mission was commanded from an understaffed and under-funded headquarters in New York, the DPKO. There were concerns regarding the need for soldiers and United Nations personnel that could be used to help maintain peace throughout the mission. The troops that were enlisted for the mission were to assist in ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali; monitor the ceasefire agreement, the establishment of an expanded demilitarized zone (DMZ), and demobilization procedures, and monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional Government's mandate leading up to elections; and assist with mine-clearance. The mission would also provide security for the repatriation of Rwandese refugees and displaced persons by assisting in humanitarian assistance and relief operations. Initially, Dallaire requested 5,500 men for the mission however; he was only allocated approximately 2,600 to use. Many of the 2,600 were underqualified, coming for several developing nations who took directions from their own officers rather than Dallaire. No nation would readily contribute to a mission in a country where there were no strategic national or, international interests and no major threats to international peace and security. There were only 2,538 UNAMIR military personnel on the

Prior to the outbreak of the genocide in April 1994, the United Nations had established the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda. UNAMIR forces consistent of just over 2,000 personnel, and was responsible for the supervision the transition from war to peace. Their responsibilities included ‘monitoring the ceasefire, assisting with demobilisation and mine clearance, and encouraging the facilitation of political and social conditions that would allow a transitional government to take control.1

The Rwandan civil war started in 1990 between the Rwandan government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). In 1993, the Arusha Accords created a government that shared power between the RPF and President Juvnal Habyariama’s government. The Rwandan genocide was sparked by the assassination of Habyariama in April 1994. This assassination was the catalyst for the genocide because it ignited anti-Tutsi rage and ultimately the genocidal actions of the majority Hutus against the minority Tutsis that resulted in the deaths of up to one million people. The United Nations played a prominent role in the implementation of the Arusha Accords through the UN Security Council resolution 872 that established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in 1993. With the spark of the genocide, UNAMIR remained in Rwanda after the Arusha Accords in order to maintain peace and provide humanitarian resources. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) is regarded as a failure due to the lack of action and intervention from the UN despite being informed of the impending

The UN 's lack of intervention, was based mainly on economics and conflict avoidance. The UNAMIR was an understaffed peacekeeping force which was ill-equipt intentionally, to keep costs low. With that in mind, the UN simply didn 't want the added expense of sending extra troops to Rwanda.[7] An example of this mindset was evident in the actions of the United States. After suffering recent losses in Somalia, the United States was not interested in being involved in another costly conflict.[8] However, as the atrocities in Rwanda escalated, the UN had no choice but to act. On May 17, 1994, the UN finally agreed on the deployment of 5,000 to Rwanda, but their departure was delayed due to arguments regarding who will pay for them.[9] The UN had a legal and moral obligation to intervene sooner. As a former colony, the presence of colonialism in a country, will impose values and rule of law onto the culture.

As should be obvious, U.N. Peacekeepers are hesitant to secure even the blameless, in light of the fact that (A) they have no enthusiastic association or sentiment obligation regarding, or (B) are advised to never connect with without unequivocal requests that never come in time.

In 1998, fighting began over what is said to be a minor border dispute, as well as differences on ethnicity and economic progress. This is highly understandable considering the various ethnicities in each country, the religious differences, and the tribal conflicts that have been taking place in the region. This fighting began a two-year long war, in which countless men and women were killed and the economies of the two countries ravaged by the military expenditures (Abbink, 2003, p. 410-16). In the end, Ethiopia’s size, military power, and armament won out over Eritrea’s enthusiasm, and the two countries formed a tenuous peace that has lasted through the present (Abbink, 2003, p. 416-17).