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United States Doctrine For Joint Operations

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In July 1943, Allied Forces launched the largest joint, combined operation of World War II to date. American, British and Canadian forces attacked the island of Sicily in an effort to gain a foothold on the European continent and protect the Mediterranean lines of communication. Although the Allies were successful in pushing the Axis powers out of Sicily, Operation Husky demonstrated that Allied forces were not adequately prepared for joint operations. In particular, and based on current doctrine for joint operations, the Allies failed to effectively utilize the principles of Mission Command and also failed to realize the full potential of the Joint Force by inadequately integrating elements of the Joint Force into a cohesive organization. …show more content…

With this backdrop, the British drew the primary role in the invasion with the Americans relegated to protecting their flank. To add confusion and lack of clarity in the plan, General Alexander did not plan for any objectives beyond the initial invasion, preferring to wait until forces were ashore. This failure of leadership on the part of Alexander and lack of decisive guidance left the field commanders without clear objectives and contributed to the mistrust of both their commander as well as each other. Guidance as simple as locate the German Army in your zone and destroy them would have contributed much to alleviate the lack of trust, at least with the higher echelon of command. As it was, joint force leadership failed to give clear guidance that, in addition to negatively contributing to issues of trust, clouded the field commanders understanding of the battlefield.
As a primary tenet of Mission Command, understanding allows the field commander to assess what is happening on the battlefield and make rapid decisions on the best way to carry out the commander’s intent. Without clear and concise guidance on objectives, opportunities to exploit advantages as they arose were lost and significant time was wasted reorienting forces to adhere to guidance that was not current based on conditions. Both General’s Eisenhower and Alexander failed to identify the objectives and

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