What Is Military Coercion and What Factors Determine Its Success or Failure?

Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts such as World War II, Vietnam and the Iraq war are still being felt and have created significant strategic repercussions. The failures of these conflicts are the result of our military and political leaders’ failure to quickly adapt to wartime conditions. This occurs because of a general refusal to commit to a military culture of learning that encourages serious debate, critical assessments of our military operations, and challenges to our doctrine in the face of emerging change. Additionally, leaders have struggled with the critical responsibility of forecasting and providing for a ready force, one that is well-resourced and prepared to conduct future operations. It is the responsibility of our military and political leaders to send our military to war with a ready force, and a strategy that will ultimately result in victory. But understanding war and warriors is critical if societies and governments are to make sound judgments concerning military policy.

During the past decade of military operations combating terrorism, members of the U.S. government have thoroughly debated the power of the President and the role of Congress during a time of war. A historical review of war powers in America demonstrates the unchecked power of the executive when it comes to military decision-making and the use of force. Throughout history the power of the President to initiate, conduct, and sustain military operations without oversight has greatly increased. Through a historical lens, this essay will

The United States is a militaristic country because of the military budget, the military’s expansion into civilian areas, and military culture. The large and increasing budget of the military is an example of U.S. militarism. According to National Priorities

The United States from the Cold War and into the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) continues to face challenges in translating military might into political desires due to its obsession with raising an army, electing politicians and assembling a diplomatic corp that continue to gravitate towards State-to-State engagements that if not rectified could lead to substantial delays in fighting terrorism and non-terrorist adversaries or worse total failure of the United States Military’s ability to properly carry out it’s politicians objectives due to being blindsided.

The U.S. Constitution provides power to the President and Congress to develop and enact national security policy (Ulrich, 1). As such our civilian leaders have the right and responsibility to maintain oversight of the military. Two civil-military relations theories, Normal and Clausewitzian, offer competing views. The Normal theory suggests officers are professionals and interference from civilian leaders is inappropriate (Cohen, 4). The Clausewitzian theory contends the statesman may inject himself in any aspect of military strategy since

This paper discusses the War Powers Act/Resolution of 1973. Though this resolution was passed by Congress to give it more say in declaration of war and the deployment of American troops to foreign countries promising hostilities, this aim has hardly been achieved. The War Powers Act remains as one of the most contentious legal provisions in the American constitution and has been the subject of several debates and interpretations. More often than not, one finds American soldiers actually engaged in hostilities in foreign lands without the explicit or even implied support of the US Congress. This paper discusses why this is so and hypothesizes that realpolitik has significantly contributed to the practical ineffectiveness of the War Powers Act. Structurally, this paper will first proceed to present a brief history of the War Powers Act and its intended purpose. Afterwards, the linkage between realpolitik and the Act will be discussed.

As the country goes through its tenth year of the war on terror one can look back and see some of the policy differences that has plagued this country when, as a nation, our young men are sent to war. Everything, in this author’s view needs to be on the table, and transparent. Of course, troops strength, strategy, and general war plans should be kept from the enemy, the need of informing our own people has been a tight rope that is not easy to balance on for any one person. This was especially true of the “enhanced interrogations” used by the Bush administration at the beginning of the War on Terror. What this paper plans to do is to explain the four greatest

Military Budget is ‘Foolish and Sustainable’”, Benjamin Friedman and Justin Logan, a researcher and a director, respectively at Cato Institute, discuss ways in which a minimization in military spending can have positive outcomes for both the U.S. and other countries. To summarize the essay, they state that the best approach is if for the U.S. to reduces its military presence in other countries. Effectively, this would prevent countries from relying on U.S. intervention and allow more countries to be dependent on themselves; additionally, it will also prevent “weaker” allied nations from gaining a false sense of emboldenment to take risks they otherwise would not against neighboring countries, which would inevitably force the U.S. to intervene. Friedman and Logan estimated that a disinclination to impose rule over these “weaker” nations will not only increase content among both nations, but it will save over $250 billion over a span of a decade and thousands of lives, and still leave a force capable of winning any ground war if needed (Friedman, B., et al., 2012, 177-191). Friedman and Logan have valid claims that agree with and support my position as to both how, and why, there should be cuts in military

Affirming the notion that the elected leader of the United States is privileged following inauguration the title of also being the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, he or she retains the option to utilize the privilege if and when a situation of confounding merit is introduced. During times in which the safety of the national public-home or abroad- is threatened, I believe that the president is entitled, with clarified ramifications of course, to exercise his or her capacity of powers within the United States Armed Forces as a means of temporary resolution to matters regarding support immediate or imminent threat. Although on recent accounts the elicited power of utilizing force has come into conflict with constitutional stipulations

The notion of an American way of war informs how scholars, policymakers, and strategists understand how Americans fight. A way of war—defined as a society’s cultural preferences for waging war—is not static. Change can occur as a result of important cultural events, often in the form of traumatic experiences or major social transformations. A way of war is therefore the malleable product of culturally significant past experiences. Reflecting several underlying cultural ideals, the current American way of war consists of three primary tenets—the desire for moral clarity, the primacy of technology, and the centrality of scientific management systems—which combine to create a preference for decisive, large-scale conventional wars with clear objectives and an aversion to morally ambiguous low-intensity conflicts that is relevant to planners because it helps them address American strategic vulnerabilities.

Diplomacy is the art of dealing with foreign countries and their people in a sensitive and effective way. The ability to influence people and situations contributes to effective American diplomacy. In The Ugly American William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick comment on the nature of American diplomacy in 1950s Southeast Asia. They identify the characteristics and effects of both inept and skilled diplomacy. The book highlights knowledge of language, history, and culture as critical components to the ability to influence indigenous populations. In many ways the situations and characters described in the book mirror situations and challenges faced by Special Operations Forces (SOF) today. Special Operations Imperatives are a planning tool that SOF use to influence people and situations they encounter. In order to understand the influence and effects of proper application of the Special Operations Imperatives the stories of Homer Atkins, Colonel Hillandale and Solomon Asch provide a setting to compare and contrast with my own experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq and Jordan.

You are the Secretary of Defense and the President has asked you to advise him on the use of military force.What are the costs and benefits of resorting to force? The Secretary of Defense’s job entails of many main responsibilities. One of the many being that it exercises authority, direction and control over the department. The Department of Defense is directly under the president, who is the Commander in Chief. The main objective of the Department of Defense is to provide the military the necessary resources, means and power to deter war and protect the citizens of the country. The main headquarters of the Department of Defense is at the Pentagon, which is located in Arlington County, Virginia.

In President Barack Obama’s speech addressing the action taken in Libya, he said that the United States reserves the right to unilaterally use military force to address direct threats to "our people, our homeland, our allies, and our core interests" (Morici). To save the collapsing rebellion, air attacks had to target Gadhafi’s tanks, artillery, motorized columns, and government installations (Hanson). The problem that Congress faces is the question of whether unilateral action is constitutional. Unilateral action

The concept of airpower and its effectiveness against the enemy’s fielded military forces is well documented in a number of literatures. In the history of American military, airpower has been considered not only as the sharpest military sword but also a highly versatile set of tools used to effectively promote national strategy. Airpower’s effectiveness in support of national strategy has significantly improved since 1945. The study of airpower exposed certain consistencies which have affected its effectiveness. The theory and practice of airpower filled the past century with frequently persuasive victories coupled with a historical documentation packed with arguable failures. It is important to note that the effectiveness of airpower, as a military operational strategy, has triggered a debate among proponents and non-proponents. Some airpower theorists have debated its effectiveness. Throughout history, the many claims about airpower’s decisiveness to independently win wars or conflicts have hindered the notional and real application of this instrument of power. This essay highlights factors which consider the scope of the strengths and limitations of airpower that has been and will continue to be effective throughout the 21st century.

Combat compliance is framed as an analytic puzzle related to the variability of behavior, or responses of combatants, both individuals and as a collective, to the realities and risks of warfare. The underlying assumption here is that there is an intrinsic risk of death in any scenario of combat (Magagna, 2016). The enemy is always rationally assumed to have an interest in your death. What follows is that obeying of commands presents itself as an implicit acceptance of such risks. The puzzle here is figuring out how and why vastly differing reactions occur. At some points soldiers show limited levels of compliance, sometimes even ending up in mutiny, while in other cases units show extremely high levels of compliance, exhibiting tenacity under conditions of overwhelming odds (Magagna, 2016). This essay attempts to explain the factors that give rise to the variability of combat compliance. What is important, as alluded to earlier, is to be able to provide a generalizable argument that is applicable across time and space. The essay will first lay out of varying levels of combat compliance to discuss the characteristics and consequences of variability. Secondly, it will explore and contrast the factors of automaticity as a function of training and institutional design and the factor of the combat contract as a rational cost benefit analysis of material and moral incentives, in an attempt to critically analyze their merits in accounting for the variability of combat compliance.