1) There are 100 individuals where 80 of them are poor and builds the public, and 20 are rich elites that that controls the government. Each individual takes utility from consumption with a utility function ui (ci) = Ci. 100 The government collects income tax with a rate 7 € [0, 1] and transfers income T≥ 0 to each individual. The government pays a total cost of 17² Σiª y; for collecting tax where y; is income of individual i. Each poor individual has an income 40,000 USD and each rich has an income 120,000 USD per annum. The elites choose an income tax rate 7, after observing it the public either accepts the policy or makes a revolution. If they make a revolution, they grab all the income of elites and share them among themselves equally. Revolution is costly and μ€ [0, 1] share of the total income in the economy gets lost if there is a revolution. a) For μ = 0.9, find if there will a revolution or not, and it there will not be a revolution find the equilibrium tax rate. b) Repeat (a) when μ = 0.5. c) Repeat (a) when μ = 0.1.

Microeconomic Theory
12th Edition
ISBN:9781337517942
Author:NICHOLSON
Publisher:NICHOLSON
Chapter4: Utility Maximization And Choice
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 4.7P
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1) There are 100 individuals where 80 of them are poor and builds the public, and 20 are rich
elites that that controls the government. Each individual takes utility from consumption with a
utility function
ui (ci) = Ci.
100
The government collects income tax with a rate 7 € [0, 1] and transfers income T≥ 0 to each
individual. The government pays a total cost of ²1 yi for collecting tax where y; is income of
individual i. Each poor individual has an income 40,000 USD and each rich has an income 120,000
USD per annum.
The elites choose an income tax rate 7, after observing it the public either accepts the policy or
makes a revolution. If they make a revolution, they grab all the income of elites and share them
among themselves equally. Revolution is costly and μ = [0, 1] share of the total income in the
economy gets lost if there is a revolution.
a) For μ = 0.9, find if there will a revolution or not, and it there will not be a revolution find
the equilibrium tax rate.
b) Repeat (a) when μ = 0.5.
c) Repeat (a) when μ = 0.1.
Transcribed Image Text:1) There are 100 individuals where 80 of them are poor and builds the public, and 20 are rich elites that that controls the government. Each individual takes utility from consumption with a utility function ui (ci) = Ci. 100 The government collects income tax with a rate 7 € [0, 1] and transfers income T≥ 0 to each individual. The government pays a total cost of ²1 yi for collecting tax where y; is income of individual i. Each poor individual has an income 40,000 USD and each rich has an income 120,000 USD per annum. The elites choose an income tax rate 7, after observing it the public either accepts the policy or makes a revolution. If they make a revolution, they grab all the income of elites and share them among themselves equally. Revolution is costly and μ = [0, 1] share of the total income in the economy gets lost if there is a revolution. a) For μ = 0.9, find if there will a revolution or not, and it there will not be a revolution find the equilibrium tax rate. b) Repeat (a) when μ = 0.5. c) Repeat (a) when μ = 0.1.
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