3:39 The dictator game Multiple Choice reveals nothing important about economic behavior because the money used is hypothetical. demonstrates that people care about fairness and will sacrifice financially for others. demonstrates nothing definitive about fairness, as concerns about the other player's perceptions will influence the dictator's choices. regularly results in the dictator taking all of the money for him/herself, as economic theory would predict.

3:39 The dictator game Multiple Choice reveals nothing important about economic behavior because the money used is hypothetical. demonstrates that people care about fairness and will sacrifice financially for others. demonstrates nothing definitive about fairness, as concerns about the other player's perceptions will influence the dictator's choices. regularly results in the dictator taking all of the money for him/herself, as economic theory would predict.

Principles of Microeconomics

7th Edition

ISBN:9781305156050

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter22: Frontiers Of Microeconomics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8PA

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