5) A person with a current wealth of $100,000 who faces the prospect of 25 percent chance of losing his or her $20,000 automobile through theft during the next year Suppose this person's utility function is U(Y) = InY. a). If this person takes no action, what is the expected utility? b). What is the actuarially fair premium? What is his expected utility if he purchase this insurance. c). Suppose that now the insurance company provides a new type of insurance. This insurance costs $4900 and requires the individual to incur the first $1000 of the loss from theft would yield. That is expected utility of this new insurance? Will the person choose the insurance in b) or c)?

5) A person with a current wealth of $100,000 who faces the prospect of 25 percent chance of losing his or her $20,000 automobile through theft during the next year Suppose this person's utility function is U(Y) = InY. a). If this person takes no action, what is the expected utility? b). What is the actuarially fair premium? What is his expected utility if he purchase this insurance. c). Suppose that now the insurance company provides a new type of insurance. This insurance costs $4900 and requires the individual to incur the first $1000 of the loss from theft would yield. That is expected utility of this new insurance? Will the person choose the insurance in b) or c)?

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter7: Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7.9P

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

Assume that the probability of having an accident in a year is 0.08. Suppose that your yearly income is 50,000 TRY and in case of an accident your income drops to 15,000 TRY. Your utility function is U(?) = ln (?) where C is consumption. a) What is your expected utility at the end of the year without insurance?b) Calculate an actuarially fair insurance premium for the full insurance. c) What would your expected utility be if you purchase a full insurance with actuarially fair premium? Will you buy this insurance, why or why not?
A woman with current wealth X has the opportunity to bet an amount on the occurrence of an event that she knows will occur with probability P. If she wagers W, she will received 2W, if the event occur and if it does not. Assume that the Bernoulli utility function takes the form u(x) = with r > 0. How much should she wager? Does her utility function exhibit CARA, DARA, IARA? Alex plays football for a local club in Kumasi. If he does not suffer any injury by the end of the season, he will get a professional contract with Kotoko, which is worth $10,000. If he is injured though, he will get a contract as a fitness coach worth $100. The probability of the injury is 10%. Describe the lottery What is the expected value of this lottery? What is the expected utility of this lottery if u(x) = Assume he could buy insurance at price P that could pay $9,900 in case of injury. What is the highest value of P that makes it worthwhile for Alex to purchase insurance? What is the certainty…
Leora has a monthly income of $20,736. Unfortunately, there is a chance that she will have an accident that will result in costs of $10,736. Thus leaving her an income of only $10,000. The probability of an accident is 0.5. Finally assume that her preferences over income can be represented by the utility function u(x) = 2ln(x).a) What is the expected income? What is Leora’s expected utility (you may leave in log form)? b) What is the certainty equivalent to her situation? What is the risk premium associated with her situation?c) What is the maximum that Leora would be willing to pay for a full insurance policy?d) Illustrate her expected utility, expected wealth, certainty equivalent, the risk premium and her willingness to pay for a full insurance policy in a diagram.
Seung's utility function is given by U - C^(1/2), where C is consumption and C^(1/2) is the square root of consumption. She makes $50,625 per year and enjoys jumping out of airplanes. There's a 5% chance that in the next year, she will break both legs, incur medical costs of $30,000, and lose an additional $5,000 from missing work. a. What is Seung's expected utility without insurance? b. Suppose Seung can buy insurance that will cover the medical expenses but not the forgone part of her salary. How much would an actuarially fair policy cost, and what is the expected utility if she buys it? Policy cost: $___ Expected utility: ___ c. Suppose Seung can buy insurance that will cover her medical expenses and foregone salary. How much would such a policy cost if it's actuarially fair, and what is her expected utility if she buys it? Policy cost: $___ Expected Utility: ___
Assume that you will earn $90,000 next year. The probability of having an accident in a year is 0.05 and your income will be $22,500 in that case. Your utility function is U(C)= C1/2 where C is consumption. a) What is your expected utility at the end of the year without insurance?b) Calculate an actuarially fair insurance premium for the full insurance. c) What would your expected utility be if you purchase a full insurance with actuarially fair premium? Will you buy this insurance, why or why not?
Tess and Lex earn $40,000 per year and all earnings are spent on consumption (c). Tess and Lex both have the utility function c. Both could experience an adverse event that results in earnings of $0 per year. Tess has a 1% chance of experiencing an adverse event and Lex has a 12% chance of experiencing an adverse event. Tess and Lex are both aware of their risk of an adverse event. 1. Suppose the actuarially fair premium charge is 2600, Calculate Tess’ expected utility with full insurance if she is charged the premium. Round to two decimal places. 2. What is the premium that private insurance companies will charge for full insurance? Round to two decimal places. 3.Assume the social welfare function is the sum of the Tess’ and Lex’s utility functions. Select the correct statement regarding the explanation for what has happened in the private market and the role of social insurance. a.Adverse section has lead to market failure. The government could improve social welfare by…
Assume that your utility has a natural log function U(W)=ln(W), which is a concave function. Your car is worth $10,000 and your total wealth is $20,000 including the car. There is a 5% chance that a major accident occurs and you have a total loss of $10,000; a 10% chance that a minor accident occurs and you have a loss of $500; 85% chance you will not have any accident. Given these assumptions, how much are you willing to pay for an insurance that provides full coverage against car accidents? Thank you. Regards, Jim Carroll
Consider the following prospects – A: (0.5, 0, 0.5: $100, $60, $10) B: (0, 0.9, 0.1: $100, $60, $10) C: (0.2, 0.5, 0.3: $100, $60, $10) D: (0.4, 0.2, 0.4: $100, $60, $10) Show that D>A>B>C is consistent with expected utility theory and that this preference ordering implies “risk-loving” preferences. Show that C>B>D>A is consistent with the expected utility theory.
A risk-averse expected-utility maximizer has initial wealth w0 and utility function u. She facesa risk of a financial loss of L dollars, which occurs with probability π. An insurance companyoffers to sell a policy that costs p dollars per dollar of coverage (per dollar paid back in theevent of a loss). Denote by x the number of dollars of coverage.(a) Give the formula for her expected utility V (x) as a function of x.(b) Suppose that u(z) = −e−zλ, π = 1/4, L = 100 and p = 1/3. Write V (x)using these values. There should be three variables, x, λ and w. Find the optimal value of x,as a function of λ and w, by solving the first-order condition (set the derivative of the expectedutility with respect to x equal to zero). (The second-order condition for this problem holds butyou do not need to check it.) Does the optimal amount of coverage increase or decrease in λ,where λ > 0?(c) Repeat exercise (b), but with p = 1/6.(d) You should find that for either (b) or (c), the optimal coverage…
Suppose that consumers have utility function U(C) = log(C) where C is the consumption level and log is the natural logarithm. Consumers have initial consumptionlevels of 100 and are exposed to the following risk of loss: lose 10 with probability0.4 and lose 5 with probability 0.6. They are considering buying insurance to coverthese losses. What is the fair price for the insurance?
Suppose that there is a 20% chance Malik is injured and earns $100,000, and an 80% chance he stays healthy and will earn $500,000. Suppose further that his utility function is the following (utility = square root of income) Malik is risk ____. He will prefer ____ (given the same expected income). a. lover; actuarially fair and full insurance to no insurance b. averse; no insurance to actuarially fair and full insurance c. neutral; he will be indifferent between actuarially fair and full insurance to no insurance d. lover; no insurance to actuarially fair and full insurance e. averse; actuarially fair and full insurance to no insurance
PROBLEM (4) A homeowner with expected utility preferences with ?(?) = √? (sqare root x) owns a house worth $490k. There is a probability p that she will experience a house fire, in which case the damages will cost $240k. A risk-neutral insurance company asks for an insurance premium of $10k in return for covering the damages fully in case of a fire. (a) What should p be so that the homeowner is willing to insure her house? (b) What should p be so that the insurance company is willing to offer insurance?